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Summary 
The Building Colleges for the Future programme was a flagship endeavour for the 
Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS) (as it then was) and the 
Learning and Skills Council (LSC). Through it the neglected Further Education sector was 
finally getting the infrastructure it deserved. Many colleges, and through them learners and 
the wider community, have and will continue to benefit from iconic building projects. But, 
as we set out in this report, no-one was keeping an eye on the total amount of money 
which was being committed and the value of applications coming forward. In December 
2008 it suddenly dawned on the senior management of DIUS and the LSC that the total 
potential cost of projects which had received ‘Approval in Principle’ exceeded the capital 
budget and many more applications were in the pipeline.   
 
Far from trying to damp down increasing demand in 2008 the LSC had been encouraging 
it. The extent to which LSC regional staff were actively involved in “bigging up” projects is 
still a matter of dispute between the colleges and the LSC, but there is no doubt in our 
minds that the LSC’s language—particularly the use of phrases like “once in a generation 
opportunity” and even in January 2009 “there is a strong association between new 
buildings and high achievement”—was building up a ‘bid now, and bid big’ culture among 
colleges, which contributed to the funding crisis. 
 
This report draws on the excellent work of Sir Andrew Foster who was asked to review the 
capital programme in January 2009 and pulled no punches with his criticism of DIUS and 
the LSC. We have also had the opportunity to look forward and assess the steps DIUS (now  
the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (DBIS)) and the LSC have taken to 
move the programme forward. As we considered our Report the LSC announced that 13 
colleges have been placed on a shortlist where they may receive money if their bids are 
scaled down. We analyse how this has been done, and also assess the latest state of 
discussions about compensation for the vast majority of colleges who will not receive 
funding for their projects in the near future—an important issue which has not yet been 
resolved. 
 
There are also wider lessons in this report—both for management of other LSC 
programmes, such as Train to Gain and adult apprenticeships, and for the Government. 
We note significant comments made by the then Secretary of State for DIUS about the 
problems that can be caused by the use of Non-Departmental Public Bodies (such as the 
LSC), which we recommend should be considered across the whole of government. We 
consider the tension which can exist between demand-led and needs-based provision, and 
call for clarification of the concept of “informed demand”. We also review how this 
problem partly arose from a series of Machinery of Government changes and the prospect 
of the abolition of the LSC in 2010. 
 
While this is a very difficult situation for those colleges which have not received funding it 
is not without hope. As the Association of Colleges recently stated “colleges have a long 
history of innovation and resourcefulness that they can tap into when seeking alternative 
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funding streams, given the chance.” There is clear potential for colleges to collaborate with 
HEFCE or with local authorities, and we note that LSC has begun belatedly to support this 
joint work—such efforts must continue and be given top priority as a way for the Council 
to make amends for its mistakes. 
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1 Introduction 
The Committee’s inquiry  
1. Further Education plays a central role in developing the skills of young people and 
adults. The recent programme of capital investment run by the Learning and Skills Council 
(a non-departmental public body (NDPB) of the Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills)1 has had real success in redeveloping more than half of the FE college estate.2 
2. However, in December 2008, after three years of considerable and welcome expansion, 
the LSC suddenly froze consideration of applications which were due for decision.3 On 16 
January 2009 colleges which had expected to receive multi-million pound contributions for 
their projects, having received so-called ‘Approval in Principle’, 4 were told that “a small 
number of applications that were due for decision—both in-principle and in-detail—have 
been deferred from December to March.”5 It began to become clear that as the Rt Hon 
John Denham MP, the former DIUS Secretary of State, told the House of Commons on 3 
February, “many more schemes [were] currently in preparation than [could] be funded in 
this spending round.”6 On 27 January 2009 Sir Andrew Foster, former Chief Executive of 
the Audit Commission and author of the major 2005 report on FE, Realising the Potential,7 
was appointed to review the capital programme by John Denham and the Chairman of the 
LSC, Chris Banks CBE.8 Mark Haysom CBE, the Chief Executive of the LSC, resigned on 
23 March, shortly before Sir Andrew Foster’s review, A Review of the Capital Programme in 
Further Education, was published on 1 April 2009.9   
3. We launched our inquiry following an open call for topics for hearings which we called 
“Subjects for Scrutiny: have your say”. The 157 Group, which represents 26 of the largest 
colleges in England,10 asked us to investigate what had happened, arguing that “the hearing 
would add value in giving clarity and transparency to an important issue which needs 
perspectives, debate and insight from a range of angles to facilitate sector and public 
confidence in how this issue is being dealt with.”11  We held the first evidence session with 
Mark Haysom CBE on 13 May and the second with the 157 Group, the Association of 
 
1 The Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills—DIUS—at the time the evidence for this inquiry was taken 
2 A Review of the Capital Programme in Further Education, Sir Andrew Foster, March 2009, para 8. Referred to in this 
report as “the 2009 Foster Review” 
3 Ev 37, para 7 and Annex [Association of Colleges] 
4 The 2009 Foster Review notes that “there was a two-stage applications process for projects with a gross cost in 
excess of £10 million: Application in Principle (AiP) in which the overall shape, scale, phasing and educational case 
for the project were agreed and Application in Detail (AiD) in which the detailed specification and cost schedule 
were agreed.” (p 13) 
5 Letter from Mark Haysom to College Principals, 16 January 2009 [not printed] 
6 HC Deb, 3 February 2009, col 719 
7 Realising the Potential: a review of the future role of Further Education Colleges, Sir Andrew Foster, November 
2005, Department for Education and Skills 
8 Denham and LSC appoint Sir Andrew Foster to review College building programme finances, DIUS press release, 27 
January 2009 
9 2009 Foster Review. See also HC Deb, 1 April 2009, col 70WS 
10 Ev 40, para 1 
11 As above, para 3 
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Colleges (the representative body for the 369 FE colleges in England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland),12 the Learning and Skills Council and the Department for Innovation, 
Universities and Skills on 20 May. We also held a private meeting with Sir Andrew Foster. 
We are grateful to all those who submitted written and oral evidence.   
4. In this report we draw extensively on the 2009 Foster Review and the evidence we have 
heard to comment on how Sir Andrew’s recommendations are being taken forward. We 
have not sought to re-run Foster’s thorough analysis, but rather to build on it. In our 
concluding section we set out wider issues that should be noted by other government 
departments. This inquiry has also taken account of the report published by the National 
Audit Office in July 2008, Renewing the physical infrastructure of English further education 
colleges13 and the subsequent Public Accounts Committee hearing in November 2008,14 on 
which we comment in Section 6. The Public Accounts Committee Report will be published 
shortly. 
5. Analysing what happened has proved to be a challenging task because the LSC is a 
complicated organisation with a large number of boards and committees operating at both 
national and regional levels. The sequence of events is also important. We therefore annex 
to the report a timeline showing the key events during 2008 and 2009 and append charts 
from the 2009 Foster Review which show the organisational structure of the LSC. 
6. DIUS was merged with the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
(BERR) on 5 June 2009 in a surprise machinery of government change to create a new 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. Thus there are now multiple layers of 
transition. It has already been announced that the LSC is being wound up in 2010 (subject 
to the passage of the Apprenticeships, Children, Skills and Learning Bill through 
Parliament) and from that date: 
• local authorities will have responsibility for commissioning and funding all 
education and training for young people up to the age of 19, with “a new slim-line 
non-departmental public body, the Young People’s Learning Agency (YPLA) [to] 
support and enable local authorities to carry out their new duties.”15  
• responsibility for post-19 education and training will be transferred to the Chief 
Executive for Skills Funding who will head up the new Skills Funding Agency 
(SFA). The Agency will oversee “a new demand-led approach to adult education 
and training”. 16 
7. We expect that the new Skills Funding Agency will be overseen by the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills. We look forward to DBIS’s response to this report and 
 
12 Ev 36, para 1 
13 National Audit Office, Renewing the physical infrastructure of English further education colleges, HC (2007–08) 924, 
July 2008  
14 Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence taken before the Public Accounts Committee on 17 November 2008,  
HC (2007–08) 1201-i 
15 Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF), Apprenticeships, Children, Skills and Learning Bill: summary 
of proposals in the Bill, Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) 
16 As above 
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trust that it will work with the LSC speedily to establish transition arrangements in which 
the FE sector and others can have confidence. 
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2 Building Colleges for the Future and the 
2009 Foster Review 
Building Colleges for the Future 
8. In 1993 further education colleges were incorporated, allowing them to take control and 
ownership of their land, buildings and reserves from local authorities.17 The National Audit 
Office (NAO) noted that at the time “much of the physical infrastructure was in poor 
condition, and many buildings required urgent health and safety-related repairs, were 
unattractive to potential learners, unsuitable for modern learning, inaccessible to people 
with disabilities and inefficient to run.”18 A survey of the college estate commissioned in 
1992 estimated the repair backlog to be £800 million.19 Despite this, between 1993 and 1996 
capital funding was mainly for projects relating to health and safety issues, and for the 
following two years only “very limited funding” was available.20   
9. In 1999, the then Department for Education and Skills (DfES) obtained funding for the 
Further Education Funding Council (FEFC) to distribute to colleges as grants for capital 
projects.21 In 2001 the Learning and Skills Council took over from the FEFC. Colleges were 
“expected […] to provide the majority of their project costs through disposal of any surplus 
assets, taking out loans secured on their assets, and use of reserves.”22 Capital funding was 
also available in the form of private finance or public-private partnerships (PFI/PPP) 
although “almost all”23 colleges chose to proceed on a grant-funding basis.  
10. Following Sir Andrew Foster’s 2005 review of the future role of FE colleges, Realising 
the Potential,24 the 2005 Budget announced: 
a step change in capital investment in the Further Education (FE) sector [...] Existing 
plans should enable overall Government support for investment in the FE estate to 
rise to an estimated £250 million in 2007–08. Budget 2005 announces that an 
additional £350m of capital investment will be made over 2008–09 to 2009–10 to 
support the longer-term transformation of the further education sector.25 
 
17 National Audit Office, Renewing the physical infrastructure of English further education colleges, HC (2007–08) 924, 
July 2008, Summary, para 2 
18 As above 
19 National Audit Office, Renewing the physical infrastructure of English further education colleges, HC (2007–08) 924, 
July 2008, para 1.8 
20 National Audit Office, Renewing the physical infrastructure of English further education colleges, HC (2007–08) 924, 
July 2008, Summary, para 2 
21 As above, para 3 
22 As above 
23 As above 
24 Department for Education and Skills, Realising the Potential: a review of the future role of Further Education 
Colleges, Sir Andrew Foster, November 2005 
25 HM Treasury, Budget 2005: Investing for our future—fairness and opportunity for Britain’s hard-working families, 
HC (2004-05) 372, paras 6.54-6.55 
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11. The Chart below shows how the programme grew between 2001–02 and 2007–08. 
Between 2001–02 and 2007–08, projects with a total cost of £4.2 billion were approved and 
the Council’s contribution to these was £1.7 billion:26 
Figure 1: LSC funding of approved capital projects, 2001–02 to 2007–08  
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Source: National Audit Office analysis of the Learning and Skills Council’s project data 
Sir Andrew Foster’s review 
12. Sir Andrew Foster’s 2009 Review of the Capital Programme in Further Education is a 
clear analysis of what went wrong during 2008. He set out his terms of reference as “in 
essence to assess”: 
• the main causes of the increased demand for capital funding;   
• the LSC’s management processes and how they could be improved; and  
• any further steps that could be taken to ensure that in future the demand for capital 
funding is kept in line with budgeted resources.27 
13. Describing the aim of his review as “to put back on track what has generally proved to 
be an excellent programme of capital investment in the Further Education (FE) sector”28, 
Foster set out how it came to be, as he put it, that a “large surge in college proposals […] 
 
26 National Audit Office, Renewing the physical infrastructure of English further education colleges, HC (2007–08) 924, 
July 2008, p 6, Box 5 
27 2009 Foster Review, Summary, p 4 
28 As above, p 3 
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opened an untenable gap between the resources identified and the cost of projects 
underway or in the pipeline.”29   
14. The size of this gap was remarkable. As the review continues “[w]hen the LSC 
completed its review of the project pipeline on 4 March 2009 [...] 79 projects had already 
received the first stage of approval in principle, with a requirement of £2.7bn from the 
LSC. A further £3bn would be needed for the 65 colleges that had submitted proposals for 
approval in principle.”30 To put these figures into context, the National Projects Director 
recently stated “the current plan [is] for the LSC to approve projects in June 2009 that 
required £500 million in grant, in the expectation that their total costs would be around 
£750 million”,31 [our emphasis] referring in June 2009 to “a potential budget of up to £515 
million. 32 
Foster’s analysis 
15. Foster states that “proposals [after the 2005 Budget] at first remained stubbornly 
behind the curve of the total capital budget”33 but “by early 2008, powerful drivers were 
increasing both the amount of grant support required from the LSC, and the speed at 
which proposals were being brought forward for approval”.34 These drivers were: 
• “The good news about the success of the programme had spread. Colleges that had 
been sceptical or wary at the outset saw the impact on colleges that had been 
modernised and renewed”; 
• Colleges applying after the “first wave of ‘early implementers’” had “relatively less 
strong balance sheets and narrower financial margins” and needed a higher 
proportion of LSC grant support; 
• Early successes meant colleges had higher expectations “fuelling increases in both 
the scale of projects and their cost”; 
• “The standards of environmental sustainability were also increasing, with a 
requirement to meet BREEAM [Building Research Establishment Environmental 
Assessment Method] ‘excellent’ criteria introduced in March 2008”; 
• “Inflation in construction industry costs”;  
• Mindful of “the need to use or lose in-year budgets” the LSC “promoted the 
programme intensively”, according to Foster, “local LSC teams actively solicited 
projects from colleges and worked with college principals to turn more modest 
proposals into wholesale upgrading of the entire college estate” (we comment on 
this in paragraphs 70-77); 
 
29 2009 Foster Review, Summary, p 3 
30 As above, p 3 
31 LSC, Capital Reference Group minutes, 29 April 2009: “assuming an average grant rate between 65% and 70%” 
32 LSC, Capital Reference Group minutes, 15 June 2009, para 5.2  
33 2009 Foster Review, para 11 
34 As above, para 13 
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• Nervousness arose on the part of colleges about two aspects of Machinery of 
Government changes: Foster states that “The budget split between FE and 16–19 
capital after the establishment of DIUS and DCSF had increased nervousness that 
resources thought ring-fenced for colleges might be diverted to schools” and that 
colleges also “feared the impact that the establishment of the new YPLA and SFA in 
2010 might have on their ability to participate and access funds”; and 
• The economic downturn “was having a triple effect. Colleges were finding it harder 
to realise their private contribution through borrowing and land sales; as the 
building industry contracted there was increased capacity to take college work 
more rapidly through development stages; and some foresaw growing pressure on 
public sector borrowing, making a tight fiscal settlement likely after 2010.” 35 
16. Together, these factors led to an exponential increase in applications and approvals, 
which Foster refers to as becoming “a veritable tsunami”.36 But the LSC and DIUS did not 
realise that this rapid increase was happening until it was too late. We explore the reasons 
for this in the following sections of the report. 
17. Foster’s analysis seems to have been well received. The memorandum from DIUS 
stated that it “accepts Sir Andrew’s conclusions”.37  The Acting Chief Executive of the LSC 
said “Andrew Foster’s report was extremely helpful to me in that respect. It was a clear 
analysis and it also made some very sensible recommendations.”38 Mark Haysom, the 
former LSC Chief Executive, told us that: 
I agree with an awful lot of his analysis. Where I would disagree would be at the 
margin, and I could argue about individual, small things, but I cannot see any value 
in that. I would not choose to express things in quite the way he has on occasions, 
but, fundamentally, I agree with him.39 
18. We commend Sir Andrew Foster for his thorough review of the FE capital 
programme and his perceptive description of events in 2008 and 2009. We have drawn 
on his work throughout this report. 
 
35 2009 Foster Review, para 13 
36 As above, para 2 
37 Ev 33, para 8 
38 Q 230 
39 Q 3 
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3 Events in 2008 
The Capital Affordability Review: failure of management systems 
19. As we have already noted, the FE capital programme was somewhat slow to gather 
momentum after the announcement of increased funding in 2005. But the pace of demand 
was increasing, and an internal review commissioned in December 2007 and completed in 
February 200840—the Capital Affordability Review—included the statement “From 2010 to 
2013 however, if current policies did not change and the tempo of capital projects is 
maintained, the demand for capital grant payments moves in 2010–11 up to £450 million 
above the funds available for FE projects. This simply proves that the continuation of the 
current payment profile of projects is unaffordable to the Council.”41   
20. The Review was commissioned by the LSC’s Director of Property and Infrastructure 
Services42 and prepared by George Edwards of George Edwards Consulting Limited. It 
included forecast projections of capital spend under different scenarios and was relatively 
short (29 paragraphs). The conclusions were:  
The reduction in flexibility of FE Capital budgets will mean, if about £100 m of the 
FE budget is not restored, that either the FE renewal programme must be slowed 
down or prioritising or rationing must be introduced; and 
These recommended capital policy changes increase the manageability of the capital 
payments system and if adopted will help to ensure that the Learning and Skills 
Council can continue to manage its capital budget within the available funds despite 
the increasing volatility of capital claims from colleges. 
21. The Capital Affordability Review had a limited circulation, although it was seen by the 
NAO43 as it prepared its report on the programme (see section 6). Despite Mark Haysom’s 
insistence that “I worked very hard in the LSC to try and create a culture which was really 
open and where people could actually come directly to me with their concerns”44 both he 
and Chris Banks, the Chairman of the Council, confirmed that they did not see the Review 
until much later in 2008, after the scale of the problem had become apparent. Mark 
Haysom told us “that report was not escalated within our organisation to the extent that it 
reached my desk. So I was never aware of that report, and that meant that neither I nor 
senior DIUS officials nor anyone else was aware that that report existed.”45 Chris Banks, 
similarly, “To be very explicit on that, I was unaware of the existence of that report, I am 
 
40 2009 Foster Review, para 15. The Review is published with this Report (Ev 50). 
41 As above 
42 As above 
43 The Review is listed in Appendix Five of the NAO Report (“Learning and Skills Council reviews”) which states “The 
purpose of this review, which reported in February 2008, was to consider the affordability of the current system of 
capital grant support to further education colleges within the context of the current affordability policy of the 
Council” and lists  “results and action taken” as “The review recommended a number of capital policy changes to 
increase the manageability of the capital payments system and help to ensure that the Council can continue to 
manage its capital budget within the available funds. The Council will present the conclusions to the national capital 
committee and reflect them in updated guidance.” 
44 Q 20 
45 Q 9 
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afraid, but you should know. The earliest I might have known would be December, it may 
have been later than that. […] No-one mentioned it or raised it with me.”46  
22. What did happen to the Capital Affordability Review, as is made clear in the 2009 
Foster Review, is that it was passed around the LSC’s labyrinthine management structure. 
The Capital Policy Group, after considering the report on 22 April 2008,47 referred it to the 
executive Finance and Resources Board in May. A Prioritisation Working Group was also 
established.48 David Hughes, then Regional Director for London and Chair of the FRB, and 
now National Projects Director for the LSC, defended the treatment of the Review, telling 
us that “I do not think it [the Review] was predicting disaster for the programme. What it 
said was there were some serious problems on the horizon.”49 He stated that the Finance 
and Resources Board had referred the matter on to the LSC’s Capital Committee:  
there are some actions we need to take, including prioritisation, including limiting 
the grant paid by the LSC and a number of others that we can see in the report, so we 
said we need to do that, and we referred that, quite understandably, to the Capital 
Committee and asked the Capital Committee to take that on. They did not do that 
until September.50  
23. The Minutes of that September Capital Committee meeting record that the view was 
taken on 19 September that “further work” was necessary before strategies “could be 
finalised”: 
The Committee was told that this year is the first time since the LSC was formed a 
potential overspend against the current capital budget was forecast compared to the 
potential underspend usually forecast at the same point in previous years [...] The 
Committee would have to look at how projects are funded in the medium to longer 
term as the first regional capital strategy returns indicate a significant increase in 
forecast projects and a peaking of requirements around 2010–11 possibly influenced 
by the Machinery of Government outcomes. Further work was likely to be required 
reconciling these estimates with previous years forecasts before the strategies could 
be finalised.51 
The Capital Affordability Review and DIUS 
24. We turn later in this report to the somewhat troubled relationship between DIUS and 
the LSC, one of its Non-Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs). Cabinet Office Guidance 
from June 2006 notes: 
The term ‘NDPB’ has been in existence since 1980 when it was coined by Sir Leo 
Pliatsky in his ‘Report on Non Departmental Public Bodies’. An NDPB is described 
as: ‘A body which has a role in the processes of national government, but is not a 
 
46 Q 170 
47 2009 Foster Review, para 17 
48 As above 
49 Q 193 
50 Q 199 
51 LSC, Capital Committee minutes, 19 September 2008, para 3.7 
14    Spend, spend, spend? — the mismanagement of the LSC’s capital programme in FE colleges   
 
 
government department, or part of one, and which accordingly operates to a greater 
or lesser extent at arm’s length from ministers.’52 
25. The Guidance notes that the “distance [of NDPBs] from government means that the 
day-to day decisions they make are independent as they are removed from ministers and 
Civil Servants.” However, it adds “Ministers are […] ultimately responsible to Parliament 
for a NDPB’s independence, its effectiveness and efficiency”53 and “the relationship 
between each NDPB and its sponsor department must be clearly defined in a way which 
supports the appropriate degree of delegation and independence of the NDPB, while 
assuring the accountable minister and department that financial management 
arrangements ensure propriety, regularity and value for money, and that risks will be 
managed.”54    
26. As part of this oversight process DIUS staff had regular meetings with key LSC staff and 
attended some committees.55 But, as we were told by Stephen Marston, DIUS Director 
General of Universities and Skills: “I deeply regret that it [the Capital Affordability Review] 
was not escalated […] I was not aware of the report until November.”56 He explained: 
What did happen is it was a member of my staff who attended the meeting—I think 
it was actually in April—that first looked at the February report [...] I do not think it 
is quite right to say it was just ignored. I think a number of things followed from it 
[…] reaction number one to this report was, right, we must sort out the short-term 
position. The second reaction to it was, ‘It is right that we are going to have to think 
about prioritisation’ […] the bit that we clearly just failed to get right was the speed 
of understanding that we were at a tipping point, the whole programme was 
changing and we did not react fast enough.57 
27. When pressed on why that DIUS official had not alerted senior staff to the contents of 
the Capital Affordability Review, Stephen Marston replied “For me the critical issue is the 
confidence to escalate, to err on the side of escalating if you see a problem, even if the 
group conclusion in that meeting you are attending is, ‘It is okay. Let us keep it under 
review. It is going to be all right.’ That is what went wrong.”58 
28. The then Secretary of State told us: 
so far as Ministers are concerned, none of this (and I think this is accepted) reached 
Ministers until November, and it is also fair to say that the thrust of the concerns that 
were raised with Ministers in November were more about the phasing of payments 
and how well they would match the planned capital payments than they actually 
 
52 Cabinet Office, Public Bodies: A Guide for Departments, June 2006, Chapter 2, para 2.1 
53 Cabinet Office, Public Bodies: A Guide for Departments, June 2006, Chapter 2, para 2.2 
54 As above, para 3.1.3 
55 See Annex and Q 260 
56 Q 249 
57 As above 
58 Q 255 
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were about the problem which subsequently emerged, which was the sheer scale of 
the number of schemes in the pipeline.59 
Perception that this was an ‘in-year’ problem 
29. Foster notes that work within the LSC in spring 2008 focussed on the in-year financial 
position of the capital programme, rather than the longer-term60 and David Hughes linked 
this point to the issue of the Capital Affordability Review: 
So when we saw this report, it said: you need £100 million in-year to manage the 
budget. We had a very strong assurance, unofficially, that we would end up with that 
money. 
Q198 Chairman: From whom?  
Mr Hughes: From officials. 
Q199 Chairman: Your own officials?  
Mr Hughes: We were in discussion about a budget […] in the end there was £110 
million brought forward […] so that foresight was right.61 
30. This was confirmed by other witnesses from the LSC. As Mark Haysom, former Chief 
Executive, put it “everyone was focused on trying to solve the in-year issues.”62 Chris 
Banks, Chairman of the LSC said, similarly, “The key issue that we were looking at within 
the council actually on an on-going basis was the in-year expenditure, and that is the thing 
that was being reported as the key pressure point.”63 
31. Mark Haysom added: 
The £110 million was the right information and we could see that very clearly, but 
the way that we had anticipated managing that £110 million overspend was through 
end of year flexibilities. That was not something that proved possible, but that 
situation was resolved when the budget was brought forward from 2010–11. So that 
in-year problem was resolved during that period.64 
32. But, as Sir Andrew Foster noted, this “was not just an in-year problem; even had it been 
so, the scope for using Train to Gain underspends, a possibility that had been discussed, 
was reduced by the emergence of other DIUS cost pressures at mid-year. A decision to 
bring forward £110m of capital funding did seem to disguise the underlying problem in-
year but merely amplified it for 2009-10.” 65 
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Conclusion 
33. We conclude that the treatment of the February 2008 Capital Affordability Review 
demonstrates what was going wrong both within the LSC and between the LSC and 
DIUS. There were failures in communication within and between the two organisations 
and a shared—but flawed—assumption was formed that this was an in-year issue that 
had no long-term implications. A central element in this was the failure of the LSC’s 
then Chief Executive and Chairman to have a process where they regularly considered 
the future direction of a key programme which was to consume up to 9.2% of the LSC’s 
total budget by 2009–10.  
May—November 2008 
34. The 2009 Foster Review sets out what happened during the rest of 2008 in the various 
LSC groups, boards and committees: 
The LSC’s Management Board […] received a paper on capital issues at its meeting 
on 13 May 2008 warning of increasing pressure on the capital budget and alerting it 
to expect advice on short and medium term priorities at its meeting on 12 June 2008. 
No such advice was provided, however, and neither were capital issues discussed at 
that meeting. Moreover, no recommendations from the Prioritisation Working 
Group were put to the national Capital Committee until September 2008.66 
The 30 July Council meeting approved the combined recommendations of the 19 
June and 17 July Capital Committee meetings. These determined or recommended 
26 FE and 16–19 capital funding applications with a total estimated cost of £1.2bn, 
including grant support of just over £1bn, payable over the next 5–6 years. The 
workload of the Capital Committee had become so onerous by June that the Director 
of Property and Infrastructure requested an extra meeting in August to deal with the 
large number of projects waiting to be presented.67 
The Capital Committee met on 19 September 2008 and agreed to recommend to 
Council 7 Approvals in Principle and 1 Approval in Detail with a total value of 
£401m. It met again on 22 October 2008 and put forward a further 4 Approvals in 
Principle and 5 Approvals in Detail with a total value of £530m.68 
Meanwhile, consideration of project proposals continued. As already noted, the 
Council had deferred decisions on the recommendations from the October meeting 
of the Capital Committee to satisfy itself about affordability. However, the November 
meeting of the Capital Committee agreed to recommend to the December meeting 
of Council further projects with a value of about £500m (fitting in an extra meeting 
on 4 December to get through them all).69 
 
66 2009 Foster Review, para 19 
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68 As above, para 23 
69 As above, para 25 
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35. Areas of ambiguity remain in the evidence we received about when different parts of 
the LSC were aware of potential problems. Dr John Blake of Sussex Downs College 
reported that Phil Head, LSC Director of Infrastructure and Property Services, visited his 
College in September 2008 to say that phasing might be necessary: “we were told that 
maybe it [the College’s project] needed to be phased so we began to be a little bit concerned 
about what that meant.”70 It is not clear to us why, given that we were told that, 
commendably, Phil Head had been responsible for commissioning the Edwards report 
which gave the first warning signs over the programme, there appears to have been no 
discussion about looming longer-term problems between him and the then Chief 
Executive (or Chairman) through 2008.71 This seems particularly curious given the then 
Chief Executive’s self-proclaimed ‘open-door’ style.72 
36. Minutes of the 17 December LSC National Council meeting seem to indicate that 
concerns over affordability were in existence at the beginning, rather than the end of 
November, which puts the positive picture painted to the Public Accounts Committee later 
that month (see section 6) into perspective:  
Council asked that a correction to the report [proposing changes to the management 
and funding of the FE capital programme] be formally recorded. The report stated 
that ‘At its meeting on 5 November 2008 the Council did not have time to consider 
and determine the project proposals (both in principle and detailed) recommended 
at the 22 October Capital Committee meeting’. It was noted and acknowledged that 
the main underlying reason had been concern over affordability.’73 (emphasis added)  
37. The 2009 Foster Review also refers to the November Council meeting as significant: 
When Council met on 5 November 2008 it was presented with Capital Committee 
project recommendations with costs approaching a further £1bn. Mindful of 
growing pressures on the capital budget, Council also received an initial report on 
the future funding and priorities of the capital programme alongside those 
recommendations from Capital Committee. Council approved the 
recommendations from September, only £44.5m of which was application in detail, 
but deferred decisions on October recommendations until its 17 December meeting. 
Members also requested a report on the funds available in 2008–09 and future years, 
and a paper forecasting Approval in Principle commitments on the budget across the 
current and next Comprehensive Spending Review periods.74 
December 2008 
38. In December, as we have noted, the news finally permeated to the top of both the LSC 
and DIUS that there was a serious problem. Mark Haysom explained that he was “pretty 
shocked” when the full extent of the LSC’s spending commitments became apparent in late 
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2008, commenting “the speed with which the situation changed is one of the most 
extraordinary things about the whole episode.”75  
39. The LSC Council met on 17 December 2008 and agreed to a three-month pause in 
consents to proceed with Approval in Principle (AiP) and Approval in Detail (AiD) 
applications. 76 Further mistakes were then made. The Council did not immediately carry 
out a full-sector communications plan because, Foster reported, Ministers considered “that 
a full action plan needed to be brought forward about the scale of the problem and how to 
rectify it, before it should be communicated.”77 The 2009 Foster Review states “The 
Council wanted full communication but it did not happen”, suggesting that the LSC did 
not have the detailed information available to explain the situation.78 This meant that there 
was considerable confusion among colleges in early 2009 (the Association of Colleges 
referred to “chaotic effects”79) which compounded an already difficult situation. Mark 
Haysom, then Chief Executive, wrote to all college principals on 16 January 2009. The 
letter stated: 
there has been confusion recently over the future of the programme. I wanted to 
write to clarify the situation. There is no freeze on the capital funding programme. 
However, the pace of demand for capital funding has increased as projects and the 
scale of Government funding required becomes increasingly ambitious. On top of 
this some colleges are finding their ability to raise their own funds curtailed by the 
economic downturn […] In light of these factors the LSC has taken the decision to 
look at the proposals for all capital schemes in the pipeline to assess the likely impact 
on funding support for individual projects […] As a result of this consideration, a 
small number of applications that were due for decision—both in-principle and in-
detail—have been deferred from December to March. The 253 colleges that have 
been given approval in detail and either have work underway or have previously 
been given the final go ahead for works to begin will not be affected. But the LSC will 
be in contact with colleges that are in the process of submitting bids to advise them 
on the steps they need to take. 80 
Conclusion 
40. The unprecedented level of capital expenditure on the FE estate between 2005 and 
2008 can be regarded as a great achievement by the Government and by the LSC. On 
the basis of the 2009 Foster Review and the evidence we have taken we conclude that 
there was a catastrophic mismanagement of the LSC capital budget during 2008 and 
neglect of oversight by those in the most senior positions in the LSC. The fact that the 
situation changed quickly does not excuse the lack of recognition of crucial warning 
signs, in particular the February 2008 Capital Affordability Review.   
 
75 Q 6 
76 LSC, National Council minutes, 17 December 2008, para 5.7 
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79 Ev 37, para 7 
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4 Wider issues  
41. In our evidence sessions we sought to resolve remaining areas of ambiguity about the 
chain of events in 2008 and 2009 and also assess how Sir Andrew Foster’s 
recommendations were being taken forward. We focussed our attention on prioritisation, 
risk management, the role of the National Council and the Chairman of the LSC, 
communications between the LSC and colleges and, finally, the relationship between the 
LSC and DIUS. 
Lack of a prioritisation mechanism 
42. The lack of any clear prioritisation strategy for this programme is clear in several key 
LSC documents: 
• The LSC Capital Handbook, published in November 2006, stated “in the event of 
applications for capital grant exceeding the funds available, the LSC will put in 
place national moderation arrangements to determine the relative priority to be 
given to competing applications.”81; and 
• Building Colleges for the Future: the LSC’s National Capital Strategy for 2008–09 to 
2010–11, published in March 2008, stated that the LSC was concerned about 
colleges’ ability to manage major capital schemes and provided a scheme called the 
Client Capability Enhancement Programme to help them. While the Strategy 
noted that “changes outlined in this document and the substantial increase in 
project volumes may all require changes within the LSC as an organisation, in 
order to deliver an enlarged capital programme”82 it stated “[t]he LSC will continue 
to monitor the demand for capital funds. It may introduce criteria to prioritise 
capital applications according to urgency and according to the timing and nature 
of payments (should the demand for funds exceed the budget available in any 
particular year).”83 
43. Foster rightly identified the lack of “a fully integrated management approach at the 
LSC. The strengths of capital planning and weaknesses in financial foresight have sat side 
by side without apparent grip from the overarching general management and corporate 
governance functions.”84 He stated “Over-commitment should have been detected and 
challenged sooner [...] If it had been anticipated strategically, the surge could have been 
mitigated and managed.”85  
44. Foster also referred to the lack of regulation of the demand-led approach and the fact 
that there was no “robust LSC policy framework for making managerial choices.”86 He 
 
81 LSC, LSC Capital Handbook, November 2006, para 32 
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concluded, damningly, “where has been the routine analysis, projection and reporting of 
aggregate, year-on-year cost?”87 Added to this was a cultural short-sightedness, despite the 
fact that these were long-term projects. Foster referred to a perceived need within the 
Council “to use or lose in-year budgets”88 and we have already referred to the perception 
that the budgetary problems were in-year.89 
45. Projects were assessed on individual merit and financial viability rather than against the 
total budget and national need; Foster refers to the “rigorous and diligent” project 
assessment process at individual project level, but “diametrically poorer quality of overall 
financial and management information.”90  
46. David Hughes, National Projects Director at the LSC, stated that “we were starting to 
move towards a prioritisation scheme”,91 but only after it was too late. Mark Haysom made 
clear what the LSC’s perception had been—one in which prioritisation was simply not 
required: 
the world was pretty much as we had understood it to be for the previous five years 
where we had a very successful programme that was running within budget and 
where our biggest challenge was making sure that there were sufficient projects in the 
pipeline that would come to fruition in a timely fashion so that they could be 
delivered in future years. And that was the situation right the way through the 
summer of 2008. That was the situation, incidentally, that was confirmed by a 
National Audit Office Report at that stage. 92 
47. It is worth noting that other large scale national capital programmes have clearly 
identified “need” for the funding (rather than being first in the queue) as an important 
factor to consider. Guidance for Local Authorities on Revising and Resubmitting 
Expressions of Interest for projects in waves 7 to 15 of Building Schools for the Future, for 
example, stated:  
BSF was prioritised on the average social and educational need of the groupings of 
schools proposed by authorities. Eligibility for free school meals was used as proxy 
for social need, and GCSE results for educational need. In 2004 we announced the 
first authorities to start in the programme. In early 2005, we gave all authorities an 
indication of where all their projects were prioritised in the national programme. 
Further waves were subsequently launched, most recently in June 2008, when 8 
authorities joined the programme in an interim wave 6a, selected on readiness to 
deliver criteria from those prioritised in waves 7 to 9. 93 
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48. The hospital building programme has also in the past been subject to a form of national 
prioritisation. The guidance for the “2004 prioritisation round” stated: 
The host Strategic Health Authorities will submit SOCs [Strategic Outline Cases] to 
the Department of Health for prioritisation. These will then be peer-reviewed by 
other Strategic Health Authorities operating as part of a Technical Group, co-
ordinated and guided by the Department of Health. The Technical Group will then 
report to the Department’s Management Board, which will make a prioritisation 
recommendation to Ministers, who will then decide the relative priority of schemes 
and announce those schemes that are approved to be further developed. 
To be prioritised, schemes must demonstrate compelling evidence of health service 
need and deliverability. The assessment of health service need will be undertaken by 
the host Strategic Health Authority, because its role in leading and managing local 
service strategy makes it best placed to make this assessment. National prioritisation 
will then focus on the factors that influence the delivery of the scheme, including the 
quality of stakeholder support, project management arrangements and technical 
considerations.94 
49. The evidence we took revealed a strange world in which staff at the LSC believed 
prioritisation would not be needed in the short to medium term because the 
programme had historically been underspending. Hence they could defer difficult 
decisions, for example on how to rank projects within and across regions, to someone 
else—perhaps the LSC’s successor organisations. But this meant that the programme in 
the end operated on a first-come, first-served basis, with no consideration given either 
to need or wider departmental or government policy objectives. Some colleges received 
funding for iconic buildings when something much cheaper would have served 
perfectly well. Other worthy projects, perhaps in areas of greater deprivation, will now 
not be funded at all. 
50. This should not have happened and must not happen again. We recommend that it 
should be a requirement for all national capital programmes to have an agreed 
mechanism for prioritisation built in to them from the start, even if they initially 
underspend. In this case the perceived need within the LSC to “use or lose in-year 
budgets” was a key factor in the Council’s decision to seek to build up demand in the 
early stages of the programme, a build-up which proved impossible to manage. 
Consideration should be given to how to mitigate the tendency to focus on in-year 
budgets and therefore make short-term decisions, for example enabling greater 
flexibility to carry-over funds in the early stages of a programme to ensure that growth 
is managed sustainably.  
Role of the LSC in liaising with the Regions 
51. Sir Andrew Foster noted that “the Regions were playing an effective role in scrutinising 
the building plans, but there was no effective monitoring or control of costs—they had no 
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delegated budgetary responsibility and it was assumed that it was being done centrally.”95 
David Hughes, now National Projects Director at the LSC but Regional Director for the 
London Region during 2008 and also Chair of the Finance and Resources Board which had 
had sight of the Capital Affordability Review in May 2008, confirmed that “It was a 
national budget to which we were pushing through projects, so we had no regional 
budget.”96  
52. When asked whether the LSC had been consulting the Regional Directors about the 
scale of applications in the pipeline Mark Haysom explained: 
one of the things that had happened was that we had gone round all of the regions, 
asking what was in the pipeline and for their best estimate of future demand. And in 
2007, I think, the figure that came back was that there was £8 billion worth of activity 
in the pipeline. One of the things that happened in 2008 is that, when that came back 
again, and I think that was in the September, having reviewed it, that number had 
leapt to £16 billion […] we were very anxious about that.97 
53. The NAO noted that Regional Directors themselves had authority to approve 
expenditure on projects;98 according to a 2006 LSC paper, the Capital Committee had 
delegated authority to determine applications for consent and capital project grant support 
(including borrowing consent) for projects estimated to cost up to £30 million, the Chief 
Executive for projects estimated to cost up to £10 million where the Council’s grant 
contribution was 50% or less and Regional Directors for projects estimated to cost up to £5 
million where the Council’s grant contribution was 35% or less.99 We were told by the LSC 
that the Chief Executive had authorised £115.9 million of LSC expenditure between 
October 2003 and December 2008.100 
54. We conclude that the senior management of the LSC made two significant mistakes 
in dealing with the regions during 2008. They should have been consulting Regional 
Directors much more frequently about the programme to establish likely overspends,  
whether or not they were aware at the time of the Edwards report and its implications, 
and Regional Directors should have been given a responsibility to monitor and report 
on the number of projects coming through the system.  
Conclusion 
55. Mark Haysom’s evidence revealed that there had been a general lack of longer-term 
strategic thinking at the LSC following the announcement of its imminent demise, which 
may have been one of the reasons why this looming problem was not addressed: 
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the way we were thinking about the future had changed pretty dramatically. We were 
in the business of steering the organisation towards an end point of April 2010, and 
that kind of longer-term strategic thinking […] suffered. As a consequence of that 
the whole organisation becomes focused on that end point rather than managing the 
way that you would previously.101 
56. The 2009 Foster Review referred to this as “‘eye off ball syndrome’ associated with 
organisational change”,102 stating clearly that “The impact of the demise of the LSC and 
uncertainty about arrangements for the new agencies should not be underestimated. Many 
meetings took place about areas of contention and disagreement and the main focus of 
management was on these issues”,103 concluding: 
Of course it is no good saying that organisational change should be reined in: it has 
always happened, as circumstances change, and it always will. It is very often 
essential and inevitable. The point is that the distracting and even blighting impact of 
change must be anticipated and positively managed at all levels. There is no shortage 
of wisdom about this in the manuals of management.104 
Risk management 
57. At the same time as these events were unfolding LSC was responding to previous 
criticism of its risk management systems made by LSC Internal Audit in both 2006–07 and 
2007–08. Mark Haysom’s 2007–08 Statement on Internal Control, published with the LSC’s 
2007–08 Annual Report and Accounts, stated that “Internal Audit performed a review of 
risk management during the year which gave a restricted assurance and has resulted in a 
qualification to the Internal Audit Annual Report. In the last quarter of 2007–08 the failure 
to properly embed corporate risk management was recognised at the highest level within 
the LSC as the National Audit Committee reported the matter to the National Council”105  
and added “The assurance provided by Internal Audit has been qualified in regard to risk 
management […] [T]he 2006–07 Annual Report identified significant action was required 
across the LSC to properly embed risk management.”106  
58. In response to this, in July 2008, the LSC’s Management Group and the National Audit 
Committee agreed the LSC’s top four risks, which were: 
• Machinery of Government; 
• Finance and Systems; 
• Performance: Train to Gain and Apprenticeships; and 
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• Demand Led Funding: Provider Capacity.107  
59. The September 2008 Delivery Report added “LSC has a refreshed risk management 
process which will ensure that there is a clear line of sight between risks identified from 
across the organisation and the four corporate risks set out above. These risks will be 
managed by national and regional risk champions and overseen by the Risk Management 
Board reporting to Management Group. Issues will be escalated to Council as appropriate.” 
The December 2008 Delivery Report (LSC Management Group Report to Council) noted 
that  “EMA and National Apprenticeship Service” had been added to the top risks.108 
60. But even as a result of all this work the capital programme was not flagged up as a 
potential major problem. As Chris Banks told us “because of the various changes that were 
going on and the uncertainty, we did instigate [...] a full review of all of our risk 
management so that we could get a better grip on it, but you are right, it failed”.109 This 
review was also mentioned by Mark Haysom:  
we revisited our whole risk management approach during 2008 because it was not as 
robust as it should have been previously—and the Audit Committee were doing a 
very good job for the LSC and flagged that up. So I put in place very prompt action to 
address that and we put in place, what I considered to be, a pretty robust risk 
management approach. Next question: why was the capital programme not on the 
risk register? I think, well, I know, because it was seen to be a success, that flipping 
into, in record time, a situation of over-demand was not seen to be an issue on the 
radar. I am sorry, but it was not.110  
61. DIUS was well aware of the problems in risk management at the LSC, and the issue was 
mentioned in its Accounts for 2007–08: 
The Learning and Skills Council (LSC) is one of the Department’s key NDPBs and 
an area of concern has been identified with regard to the failure to properly embed 
corporate risk management across the organisation and respond to concerns raised 
by internal audit in the previous financial year. This has been disclosed in the LSC 
Statement on Internal Control for 2007–08 and is being addressed as a matter of 
priority. The LSC has undertaken a redesign of its approach to risk management and 
is working to achieve prompt and genuine progress in this area for review by the 
LSC’s National Audit Committee.111 
62. But DIUS chose not to include this specific risk in the table listing risks in Annex 3 of 
its 2008 Departmental Report. When we scrutinised the Report we were highly critical of 
the way in which that risk table was put together and the way it differed from the list in the 
annual accounts, noting: 
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The risks listed in DIUS’s accounts appear to us to be matters for which public 
officials—and ultimately ministers—have control and should be accountable if they 
do not address and take all reasonable steps to reduce the risk. We are concerned 
that the list in the audited accounts has not been reproduced in the list of risks in the 
Departmental Report. Instead DIUS has produced a list that includes items that are 
likely to defy accountability.112   
63. The fact that the LSC’s weak risk management system was being addressed as these 
events were unfolding, and that even as a result of this the capital programme was not 
identified as a major potential problem is astounding. In this context we repeat our 
criticism that DIUS did not place key risks it had identified in its Accounts—including 
poor risk management at the LSC—in its 2008 Departmental Report.  
The role of the National Council and the Chairman of the LSC 
64. The LSC’s website states: 
The National Council is the top tier of decision-making in the Learning and Skills 
Council. The National Council is responsible for all of the functions of the LSC 
unless it chooses to delegate those functions. It steers LSC strategy and provides 
leadership to the LSC and delivery system as a whole. 
It provides challenge and support to the LSC’s chief executive and senior 
management team, monitors and evaluates the LSC’s performance nationally, 
ensuring that local and regional activity delivers national priorities and targets. 
Members of the National Council also act as national ambassadors for the LSC and 
for learning and skills.113  
65. Chris Banks, the Chairman of the LSC, came with a background in business, having 
founded Big Thoughts, a company which was set up following a management buy-out 
from The Coca-Cola company in 2001. He was previously Managing Director of Coca-
Cola Great Britain. His post at the LSC is on a part-time basis (approximately two days a 
week—though he told us he worked more than this114) for a salary of around £51,000.115 
66. We asked Chris Banks a series of questions on his role in the events in 2008 and his 
decision not to stand down at the same time as the Chief Executive. He explained that the 
Council was “a corporate body of almost entirely non-executive members plus a chief 
executive [...] we took the decision early on that we would delegate all the day-to-day 
operations of the organisation to the executive team, if you like, the experts, and also the 
people who are working day in day out on the detail of these, and I think it is worth having 
that model in mind because it is a different model from business or some other agencies or 
organisations that people have seen.”116 
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67. He added that he had been unaware of any problems until the end of 2008, and that as 
soon as the Council had become aware of the crisis it had acted quickly and decisively.117  
He also acknowledged major failings in the way in which information was dealt with and 
the fact that, as he noted, “capital was not on the risk register.”118 When asked whether he 
had considered his own position he told us:  
Of course I did. It would be only natural to, would it not, in the circumstances, and I 
do want to put on record my personal apologies as well as those of the organisation 
to all of those people who have been affected by the difficulties that we have had and 
the consequences to everyone else, but my belief is that, as the day-to-day 
responsibility for the management of that programme rested with the chief executive 
and that he has resigned as a result of this, that is the right thing, and my job is to try 
and ensure that this organisation delivers all that it possibly can between now and the 
time when it is dissolved in the spring.119 
68. Cabinet Office guidance notes that the Boards of public bodies have “a collective 
responsibility for the proper conduct of the body’s affairs and for ensuring that staff 
maintain the strictest standards of financial propriety. Where the Public Body has been set 
up by statute, the Board has a duty to ensure that the requirements of propriety, regularity 
and value-for-money are met in its use of public funds.”120 As Chairman of the Council 
Chris Banks had a responsibility to ensure that the executive team had systems in place to 
manage key programmes.  
69. We note the points made by Chris Banks about the position of the LSC Council and 
his own position as Chairman of that Council. While the LSC Council delegated 
responsibility for management to the executive team it retained a responsibility to 
provide high-level oversight, set overall strategy and to challenge and question what the 
management team were doing, and the Chairman of the Council should have been 
leading the Council in achieving this. The Chairman and the Council clearly failed in 
this oversight during 2008.  
Communications between the LSC and colleges 
70. The 2009 Foster Review alludes to encouragement given by the parts of the LSC to 
colleges to bring projects forward in the context of a programme which had been 
underspending. Foster stated that “There was strong encouragement for the programme 
from Ministers and the LSC Chief Executive throughout 2006 and 2007. Mindful of the 
need to use or lose in-year budgets, the LSC promoted the programme intensively and 
supplemented client capability in the sector to support the more cautious cohort. Spurred 
on by the stated policy of renewing the entire estate, local LSC teams actively solicited 
projects from colleges and worked with college principals to turn more modest proposals 
into wholesale upgrading of the entire college estate.” 121 
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71. Our evidence session with college representatives provided us with specific examples of 
this “bigging-up process”: 
about three and a half years ago we had a quite modest project of about £8 million to 
replace one of our sixth form colleges. At the beginning of the LSC process [...] it 
went up to £30 million, then it went up to £90 million, and at the end it was £175 
million, and in the end most of that was a bigging-up process, and that happened 
through the regional LSC property process.122 (Dr John Blake, Sussex Downs 
College) 
To begin with I think he [Mark Haysom] was frustrated with the sector that they 
were not coming forward fast enough [...] I suspect, although I do not know from the 
inside, that he [Mark Haysom] sent out instructions, or his team sent out 
instructions, to the regions and to the local areas for them to go out and talk to the 
colleges about their plans and asking were these plans transformational enough. I 
know in the West Midlands, for example, in 2007 we were all invited to share with 
the local LSC and the regional LSC what our expectations and hopes were, so there 
was a regional capital plan. What it could have been was a capital plan that was based 
on need and business case and so on. What I think it was was actually a wish list of 
what colleges wanted to do [...] I knew what my priorities within the structure were 
but I was constantly questioned, ‘You are missing an opportunity. This is a once-in-
a-lifetime opportunity for the sector.’ (Graham Moore, Principal of Stoke College 
and Chair of the 157 Group)123 
72. Dr Blake continued “I can remember going to a meeting with the LSC in Sussex where 
all the principals and all the chairs were basically told that they were being too 
conservative.”124 Martin Doel, Chief Executive of the Association of Colleges, confirmed 
“Those conversations were still going on [in summer 2008] and that was the National 
Capital Team coming round to say, ‘No, it is not sensible for you to leave part of your 
estate untouched, you should be coming up with a plan to refurbish the whole of the estate’ 
[…] The final thing I would say is a term which has been bandied around a good deal 
during this period—and I understand it and I was there—is that this was a ‘once-in-a-
generation rebuild’, a ‘once-in-a-generation opportunity’.”125  
73. This phrase was also used by Mark Haysom when he gave evidence to us:  
I was giving very clear messages, as were ministers at the time, that this was a once-
in-a-generation opportunity to rebuild the capital estate and that what we wanted to 
do, where it was possible, was to create great buildings and what we did not want to 
do was to just put up buildings that replicated the existing buildings, just a bit more 
modern. 126 
Although he also said: 
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I do not think we were asking people to go from modest to major. The signal that we 
were giving was, ‘If we’re going to put up new buildings, can we make sure that they 
are buildings that are right for the community, right for learners and right for 
employers and use this opportunity, wherever possible, to create great buildings’.  
That is the message that consistently went out.127 
74. We raised these issues with David Hughes. He responded: 
I have heard a lot of anecdotes about this, but I have seen no evidence, and Foster 
said the same. I have never talked up a project, I have never bigged-up a project. [...] I 
am absolutely confident that no-one in my team ever did that. What I am clear about 
is that there was lots of ambition in the sector and there were lots of iconic schemes 
being put up, and other colleges looked at those and, I think, thought, ‘We want one 
of those.’ I do not think we were in the game of saying, ‘Go away and re-write and 
make it two or three times as big.’ I certainly have never done that.128 
75. And when questioned further during the same evidence session: 
Mr Marsden: […] please, for the record, understand that the reason we are asking 
these questions is that we have had two college representatives before us this 
morning who have already said exactly what the Chairman has said, that these 
projects were talked up by regional LSC advisers, and that is why. You must have 
been an oasis of rectitude compared to the rest.  
Mr Hughes: As I said, I can confirm that absolutely we did not do that.129 
76. He was quoted in LSC London Magazine in January 2009 as saying: 
For the last couple of years we have been accelerating the approval of big capital 
schemes in colleges across London. We want the colleges in London to be good to 
look at, good to learn in and offering modern facilities and kit. That’s what today’s 
learners demand: exciting, modern, aspirational environments with cutting-edge 
facilities and carefully designed learning and social spaces […] There’s a strong 
association between new buildings and high achievement.130 
77. The extent to which individual colleges were urged to increase the scale of particular 
projects may be a matter of some debate between the LSC and the colleges themselves. 
But given the historically cautious expectations of the majority of the FE sector, it is in 
our view highly unlikely that colleges would have “bigged up” their projects without 
direct encouragement from regional officers or national directors at the LSC.  The 
evidence appears more than anecdotal that LSC was encouraging bigger and bigger 
schemes to come forward: the use of phrases such as “once-in-a-generation 
opportunity” and “a strong association between new buildings and high achievement” 
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was irresponsible and bound to build up excess demand that could not be satisfied and 
the LSC as a whole, and those individuals involved, should accept responsibility for this. 
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5 DIUS oversight of the LSC 
78. The 2009 Foster Review was damning of DIUS’s oversight of the LSC, commenting that 
“There has been insufficient clarity and understanding around the relationship between the 
LSC and DIUS, and their respective responsibilities, authority and need for information. 
Meetings have been frequent but evidently not effective in foreseeing and averting recent 
difficulties.” 131 It added “DIUS monitored the LSC during the period and had most of the 
information that was actually collected and held centrally by the LSC. Senior staff in DIUS 
could have probed more actively the robustness of the forward projections of future 
funding commitments. Their challenge was insufficiently incisive to uncover ongoing flaws 
in implementation.” 132 
79. It is not as if there was a shortage of DIUS oversight. We have already noted that DIUS 
staff sat on certain LSC committees and groups, as well as the National Council. There 
were a series of meetings between staff at various levels within the LSC and DIUS 
throughout the period that the programme was running into difficulties. Ministers also 
met senior DIUS staff on a number of occasions, as set out in the Annex.   
80. So what went wrong? Mark Haysom commented that the tone and state of relations 
between the two organisations had at the same time intensified and soured after the 
announcement that the LSC was going to be abolished in 2010: 
To my knowledge, there is nothing that the LSC does, there is no management 
information that the LSC has, that is not shared with DIUS and the level of scrutiny 
has always been intense. And, just to return to my comment a moment ago about the 
Machinery of Government, it had become even more intense thereafter.133 
Yes, but they had a perfectly legitimate cause for doing that because they were going 
to have to pick up responsibility, one way or another, for everything the LSC did 
from an end date, so it was a perfectly legitimate ‘crawling all over’, if you like. But 
the impact of that was a kind of paralysis in terms of the ability of the Learning and 
Skills Council to take its own decisions.134 
81. We have already noted that the poor risk management at the LSC was not added to the 
risk table in the DIUS Departmental Report 2008 (although it was included in the 
Department’s 2007–08 Accounts). This is perhaps indicative of a general failure within 
DIUS to appreciate warning signs. It is arguable, for example, that the Department should 
have been more in tune with the tone of discussions within the FE sector. As one of the 
college representatives pointed out, rumours about the sustainability of the programme 
were circulating during 2008: 
I think it is fair to say that in the sector before that period there was a general feeling 
of unease growing because we are all intelligent people, so are the local LSC offices, 
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and so on, and we could see that the volume was building up. I am one of the colleges 
in that group of 70-odd colleges between approval in principle and approval in detail, 
and at a meeting in September 2008 we received approval in principle for £96 million 
and Bradford College, who were also there on the same day, received approval in 
principle for over £100 million. It does not take a genius to work out that those sorts 
of figures cannot go on for very long given the finite size of the budget.135 
And at the National Council meeting in November 2008 Stephen Marston of DIUS was 
not urging caution, as the Minutes state:  
Members were concerned about the pressure on the capital budget especially given 
the added pressures of the unstable economy. It was suggested that a clear steer from 
Ministers was required over whether to continue with capital spend at all costs, or 
slow down. Stephen Marston commented that Treasury’s steer was to bring forward 
capital spend, especially on the public side. 136  
82. We were told that none of the problems surfaced at a senior level in DIUS until late 
November/early December (after the Public Accounts Committee hearing on the NAO 
report).137 The one point of ambiguity we identified was in the minutes of an LSC External 
Advisory Group138 meeting on 30 September 2008, which stated: 
Item 6. Investing in Specialisation: The LSC’s Capital Skills Prospectus 
6.1 Laurence Leader presented the LSC’s Capital Skills Prospectus to members, who 
welcomed the general approach. 
6.2 There was a strong governance aspect to this work, with the new Regional 
Councils taking a lead in considering these proposals. 
6.3 The Prospectus was clear but the proposals were likely to generate a lot of 
demand, with associated risks. Ministers were currently considering these risks. 
(emphasis added) 
6.4 Reference needed to be made in the document to the increase in demand from 
learners as a result of capital investment. 
6.5 The focus on specialisation for colleges was a concern, given the current 
economic situation. 139 
83. When we raised this with the then Secretary of State he told us “I have to say, 
Chairman, I do not know and I have never known what that refers to.”140 
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84. We ask the LSC and DBIS to clarify the remark made in the minutes of the LSC 
External Advisory Group meeting in September 2008 that Ministers were considering 
risks associated with the FE college capital programme. 
The NDPB Review 
85. DIUS stated in its memorandum that “Sir Andrew found that the scrutiny by DIUS of 
LSC management of the capital programme had been insufficiently rigorous. The Secretary 
of State therefore asked the Permanent Secretary to carry out a review of the DIUS’s 
relationships with all of its Non-Departmental Public Bodies to ensure that there is clarity 
about accountability and responsibility. This is underway.”141 The then Secretary of State 
went further when giving oral evidence to us, pointing to weaknesses in the logic behind 
NDPBs: 
the theory of NDPBs when they were first set up, that they protect ministers from the 
political flack when things go wrong, does not appear to work as well as some of us 
might have liked […] My conclusion is you should use NDPBs where they are 
necessary, but not otherwise […] I think the SFA will show that we will have simpler 
decision-making, clearer lines of accountability, and you can never be sure about 
these things, but a better prospect of making sure this does not happen again.142 
86. While, as he stressed to us, the new Skills Funding Agency will “not be an NDPB”143, we 
note that the Young People’s Learning Agency which will work with local authorities is to 
be “a new slim-line non-departmental public body.” 144 
Conclusion 
87. Lessons must be learned by DBIS and across Government from the events at the 
LSC in 2008. DIUS clearly failed in its oversight duties. As we noted earlier in this 
Report the same management problems that befell LSC were also there in DIUS—a key 
official did not report back to more senior staff about the Capital Affordability Review; 
there was a wider lack of challenge; and a total failure to pick-up messages from the 
sector (or apply common sense) about the scale of commitments which were being 
made. 
88. The then Secretary of State told us that “the theory of NDPBs when they were first 
set up, that they protect ministers from the political flack when things go wrong, does 
not appear to work as well as some of us might have liked […] My conclusion is you 
should use NDPBs where they are necessary, but not otherwise.” Events at the LSC 
show that NDPBs can diffuse political and financial accountability to such an extent 
that serious problems are not identified or addressed and responsibility for failure is at 
best unclear. In this case the situation was made worse by the prospect of the NDPB 
being wound-up; the Department should have realised that this could affect operations 
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and ensured that its oversight was effective. We conclude that a review of the operation 
of NDPBs not just across DIUS (now DBIS) but the whole of Government is urgently 
required.  
DCSF 
89. While DIUS was the LSC’s sponsoring department, the Department for Children, 
Schools and Families is also involved in the college building programme. Mark Haysom 
suggested that DCSF took a hands-off approach, as revealed in this exchange: 
Q56 Mr Marsden: You mentioned very helpfully the issue of Machinery of 
Government changes and I want to ask you a straightforward question: given that 
some 49% of the income into this sector comes from DCSF, although the sponsoring 
Department is DIUS, did you at any time over that period have discussions formally 
or informally with officials or ministers in DCSF? 
Mr Haysom:  About? 
Q57 Mr Marsden:  About the capital programme? 
Mr Haysom:  I cannot recollect during 2008 having discussions. 
Q58  Mr Marsden:  So no discussions with no ---- 
Mr Haysom:  Not about the overall state of the programme. 
Q59  Mr Marsden:  So no involvement with DCSF at all? 
Mr Haysom:  There were discussions going on about the fact that we ---- 
Q60  Mr Marsden:  But you never sat down with senior officials at DCSF or met with 
them informally or discussed informally any of the aspects of the capital 
programme? 
Mr Haysom:  We discussed the split that had occurred in the budget and the actual 
pressures that had happened as a consequence of that and we discussed the fact that 
we could have been in a situation where there was potentially pressure on one side of 
the budget and underspend on the other, but, beyond that, we did not have any 
discussions. 
90. In the last part of this exchange Mark Haysom was noting a point discussed in the 
LSC’s Capital Committee in September and October 2008 about the splitting of the capital 
budget. The Minutes of the Committee meeting on 19 September linked this to the 
potential overspend, noting “the retrospective splitting and ring-fencing of the capital 
budget into ringfenced DIUS and DCSF portions, without warning, last November ie 
retrospectively in-year. Previously the LSC had had a single line capital budget and was 
able to offset FE capital spend against the 16–19 Capital Fund.”145   
91. The 22 October Capital Committee Minutes noted that: 
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The 16–19 Capital Investment fund is now ring-fenced and the previous years 
underspend on 16–19 capital was retained by DCSF instead of being carried 
forward.146 
92. The 157 Group argued that forthcoming changes in the governance of sixth form 
colleges should mean that “sixth form college applications […] should be transferred to the 
BSF [Building Schools for the Future] Programme and resources should also be transferred 
from BSF to BCF to take account of the costs of sixth form college projects already 
approved under BCF.”147 The memorandum from the Association of Colleges complained 
that DCSF appeared to have released only £80 million out of a £700 million budget towards 
Colleges, and added that it was possible that “DIUS capital grants are cross-subsidising pre-
19 education.”148 It suggested that, compared to the process that colleges would have to 
now endure, “the same level of rigour has not been applied in the spending of the capital 
budgets for school and university modernisation (£18 billion and £2.2 billion respectively 
in the period 2008 to 2011)”149 and concluded that “the two Departments need to pool 
relevant funds into a single college capital budget.”150   
93. As far as we can see DCSF was a silent partner in this situation, though it is clear 
that within the LSC the splitting of the capital budget was regarded as a critical factor in 
making management of the programme more difficult. We note the points made by the 
157 Group about the possible transfer of some projects to the Building Schools for the 
Future programme and urge DBIS and DCSF to work together to establish whether this 
is an appropriate way forward. We also recommend that the proposal for a single 
college capital budget using pooled DCSF and DBIS funds is investigated with the 
outcome of the review reported to Parliament in the form of a Written Ministerial 
Statement. 
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6 The NAO report in July 2008 
94. Mark Haysom told us that he was responsible for the NAO reviewing the Building 
Colleges for the Future programme in 2008: “I was the one that suggested that the NAO 
came in and looked at the capital programme because I felt that it was a programme that 
was significant, important and that it was something that we could feel good about. They 
verified that.”151 
95. The 2009 Foster Review notes that the NAO made some positive comments about the 
programme, with reservations: 
We should perhaps recall the July 2008 NAO report Renewing the physical 
infrastructure of further education colleges. On value for money, it concluded that the 
joint funding approach, with the Learning and Skills Council providing additional 
grant funding to colleges, was enabling the sector to make good progress in 
rationalising its estate, providing facilities that were of high quality and meeting the 
needs of learners. The report, however, did state the need going forward for careful 
risk management and providing DIUS with clearer visibility to achieve a smooth 
transition to the LSC’s successor bodies.152 
96. The NAO concerns about the programme included:  
The organisation and funding of the programme has meant that there has been no 
national prioritisation of projects, but programme management has improved over 
time. The Learning and Skills Council initially operated through 47 local Learning 
and Skills Councils, which might have made it difficult to prioritise projects at a 
regional or national level. Until it began to fund higher proportions of project costs 
from about 2004, to build on the strengths of the further education sector early in the 
capital programme the Council gave priority to projects at colleges that were willing 
and able to majority fund themselves. In 2006, following internal reorganisation, the 
Council’s regional operations took on planning functions and prepared regional 
capital strategies that aimed to help target project funding so as to balance 
educational and property priorities. As a consequence of the initial arrangements, 
some areas and colleges with the greatest need have not received the highest 
priority.153  
Management information on the national programme is inadequate. The Learning 
and Skills Council relies on spreadsheets for management information, but such 
systems are not sufficiently robust for a programme of this scale. There are also areas 
where information needs to be better collated, such as the actual costs of completed 
projects, contract strategies used and the lessons learned that colleges have identified 
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from their completed projects. The Council is planning to develop a management 
information and budgeting system that is intended to address these concerns.154 
Completion of the programme by 2016 will require careful risk management and 
prioritisation of the capital funds available to the Council’s successor bodies. Colleges 
still to be renewed may be less financially strong or less able to contribute through 
applying reserves, disposing of assets or raising of loan finance. The cost of renewing 
the remaining colleges is becoming more expensive, putting the affordability of the 
programme at risk within the limits of the Learning and Skills Council’s capital 
budgets. The Council will need to consider how best to prioritise funding or 
encourage colleges to use procurement strategies that require less upfront public 
funding.155 
Our assessment of progress in renewing the estate, based on current project costs 
and grant levels, indicates that achieving the target will be challenging. Assuming the 
national capital budget is maintained until 2016, to replace the remaining estate with 
new buildings that conform to the existing cost norms, the Learning and Skills 
Council is likely to need colleges to provide around half of the funding (which is 
consistent with estimates prepared separately for the Council). By contrast, the 
Council support rate for projects approved in principle (i.e. projects that will cost 
over £10 million) in 2007–08 was 74%. The Council, in consultation with the 
Department, is considering what changes and possible project prioritisation it will 
introduce during 2008–09, to make completion of the programme more affordable 
within the current national budget levels. Colleges may need to find efficiencies, for 
example through procurement strategies that group projects or by spreading the 
capital cost over a longer period.156 
97. However, the comments relating to prioritisation in the recommendations were 
addressed to the Department, rather than the LSC:  
Given the planned changes to the further education system, the Department needs 
clearer visibility of the programme to achieve a smooth transition of the programme 
from the Learning and Skills Council to the successor bodies. The Council has had a 
key role in managing the capital programme. With the dissolution of the Council by 
2010, the Department will need to provide continuity of standards in programme 
management and the setting of programme targets in a clear policy context. To 
enhance the Department’s oversight, it could commission an independent Gateway 
Review of the programme before it is handed over to the Council’s successor bodies. 
The Department [DIUS] should also be party to the decision on how best to 
prioritise future projects for funding.157 
98. The general tone of the report was positive, as demonstrated by the press notice 
produced at the time, in which prioritisation was not mentioned: 
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The further education capital programme is enabling colleges in England to make 
good progress in renewing and rationalising their estate, replacing poor quality 
buildings with high quality, more suitable facilities. The programme has taken 
advantage of colleges’ accumulated reserves, access to loan funding and scope to 
dispose of surplus assets. In addition, the Learning and Skills Council approved 
grants of £1.7 billion towards the £4.2 billion costs of the renewal programme. 
Around half of the planned work was completed or underway by the beginning of 
2008. The progress of the programme has varied between regions: ranging from only 
32% of the estate in Greater London renewed by 2007 compared with 63% in the 
South West. The variations are in part due to project proposals being developed by 
the colleges themselves, and differences in the complexity and condition of the 
regional college estates at the start of the Learning and Skills Council’s programme. 
Most new buildings are of a high standard, meeting the needs of colleges and 
learners, and they have been completed on or close to their budget. The earlier 
projects did not perform well when judged against environmental sustainability 
criteria, but since 2007 the Learning and Skills Council has required higher 
environmental standards in new college buildings. 
As a result of borrowing to fund the programme, the sector’s indebtedness increased 
to £731 million by 2007, and its interest payable was equivalent to around 1% of its 
income. Between 2005–06 and 2006–07, the number of colleges that were assessed as 
being financially weak increased by 21 (from 68 to 89). Whilst this programme is 
affordable for the sector as a whole, colleges with large debts could be more 
vulnerable to loss of income if they fail to generate the projected demand for courses. 
Tim Burr, head of the National Audit Office, said today: 
The capital programme for further education is enabling colleges and the Learning 
and Skills Council to achieve together what neither could have achieved on their 
own, and is delivering high quality buildings. The sector has taken on a higher level 
of debt, and therefore of risk, but the cost should be manageable. If the second half of 
the programme can maintain the success achieved in the first, further education will 
be well placed to offer enhanced value for money. 158 
99. Mark Haysom stressed to us that he had taken positive messages from the Report: “Yes, 
the NAO is not given to praise and I actually thought it was a very positive report […] I felt 
that it was a programme that was significant, important and that it was something that we 
could feel good about. They verified that” 159 and also stated that one of the reasons that 
other warnings were not taken seriously was because of the NAO reassurance: 
At that stage, I understand, the [Finance Performance] Committee there were not 
convinced that what was being said [in the February 2008 Capital Affordability 
Review] was robust enough [...] I have to say, that was almost exactly at the time as 
we received an NAO Report, where they had been crawling all over the organisation, 
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which found no really immediate cause for concern. There were some very helpful 
things in that report, but there were no immediate causes for concern. 160 
100. Similarly, the DIUS press notice announcing that Sir Andrew Foster had been 
commissioned to review the programme noted “Recent National Audit Office and Public 
Accounts Committee reports have acknowledged the success of the programme” 161 and the 
Association of Colleges commented that “the NAO praised the management of projects.”162   
101. The Public Accounts Committee took oral evidence on the NAO Report in November 
2008 and the version of events presented by LSC and DIUS witnesses was a positive one: 
Mr Watmore: I think the portfolio as a whole is now really well up to speed and the 
progress is remaining positive on the newer projects. 163 
Mr Haysom: I think at the moment we are content, given the scale and nature of this 
project, that we are in good shape. 164 
Although Mark Haysom noted that the volume of projects in the pipeline was increasing: 
Mr Haysom: In the early days, what we were trying to do when we started this 
programme was to get a build-up of momentum very quickly with this to make sure 
that we were tackling as many colleges as we could and to encourage those that were 
going to be more difficult and more complex to come forward and start developing 
their plans. That is exactly what has happened and I have to say it has worked very 
well. It is working to the extent that we have huge applications coming through in 
huge numbers now, and we are having to make sure that we are balancing those very 
carefully. 165 
Mr Haysom: It is also true that since this Report was signed off, because the Report 
captures data up to March, there has been a significant move forward. If I refer you 
to paragraph 4 on the same page, it talks about £4.2 billion worth of applications. 
That is now £5.3 billion. It talks about £1.7 billion worth of grants. That is £2.45 
billion now. That now equates to 693 capital projects since the beginning of this. 
That is why I was talking about momentum. We have built momentum very fast and 
it has been maintained, and there are huge numbers of applications still flowing 
through the system. 166 
102. We conclude that, while the NAO rightly identified some of the issues in its July 
2008 Report, the facts that the report (1) did not give a sense of the urgency with which 
a prioritisation mechanism was required and (2) did not put the problem in the context 
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of poor risk management diluted its impact. The fact that paragraph 14 of the Report’s 
Summary addressed prioritisation in the context of the completion of the programme 
by 2016 by the LSC’s “successor bodies”, alongside the positive tone of the press notice, 
pandered to the view that was then prevalent within the LSC that prioritisation was a 
medium and longer-term problem, not something that had to be done immediately.  
103. Given the seriousness of the mistakes that were made the NAO report appears in 
hindsight to be surprisingly positive: we find it hard to reconcile the fundamental 
problems that became apparent with LSC’s capital management, in particular the lack 
of national prioritisation and planning for this high-cost, high-profile programme, 
with the tone of the report. This is all the more surprising given that the NAO had sight 
of the Capital Affordability Review. We conclude that if the NAO had produced a more 
hard-hitting report in July the worst of the over-commitment would have been averted. 
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7 Next steps 
104. We were keen that our inquiry, even in the short time available, did not solely 
consider what had gone wrong, but also looked to the future. The LSC noted that work was 
underway to implement Sir Andrew Foster’s recommendations, as shown in the table 
below.167 
Foster review recommendations (in italics) followed by extracts from Learning and Skills 
Council memorandum 
 
Recommendation 1 The priority business is to agree how the present demand-led approach can be 
replaced by a needs-based approach with explicit priorities and choice criteria. These should inform 
the necessary decisions about the future capital programme.  The LSC support the move to a needs-
based approach. We have now worked with stakeholders to develop new criteria and designed a 
process by which future bids for capital funding will be prioritised. We expect the first stage of the 
prioritisation process to be finished by the end of June in order for the LSC to approve a small group 
of college projects to proceed this summer. 
 
Recommendation 2 To this end there must be an early and open process of engagement and 
consultation between DIUS, the LSC and the college sector. A panel of college principals should be 
identified to work with LSC officials and DIUS representatives. This grouping should confer with the 
Association of Colleges, the Sixth Form Colleges’ Forum, the 157 Group, the Local Government 
Association, local authorities and Regional Development Agencies. Since the report the LSC have 
already started a consultation process including the use of a reference panel of college principals and 
representative college groups convened by the AoC and we are also consulting widely with Regional 
Development Agencies and local authorities. 
 
Recommendation 3 The process must be grounded in fully accurate and detailed information 
about capital schemes in the pipeline. There should also be a preliminary mapping of potential needs 
indicators to assist the discussion process. The LSC now has detailed information on all existing 
capital schemes and those in the pipeline. We have engaged Grant Thornton to independently verify 
the accuracy of the information currently held. We have also worked with specialist advisers who will 
independently apply the agreed criteria to projects in the pipeline to provide confidence that the 
resulting proposals will be fairly determined. 
 
Recommendation 4 A realistic assessment is required, founded on excellent information, of 
individual colleges that have incurred expenditure, with high expectations, but have no guarantee of 
final approval for their proposals. A balanced approach is urgently required to expedite clarification 
of their position. It should include a process of structured self-assessment against agreed criteria. 
Experience in other public sector settings suggests this would benefit the colleges themselves and 
help to move things forward quickly. This focused on a realistic assessment being required of 
individual colleges that have incurred expenditure, with high expectations, but have no guarantee of 
final approval for their proposals. An initial assessment of costs already incurred by colleges with 
Approval in Principle has been carried out. LSC regional finance teams are working with these 
colleges to establish their financial position and to address any cash flow issues. The LSC has given a 
commitment that no college will become insolvent as a result of capital project delays. The LSC and 
DIUS are developing a policy position on how to deal with the legitimate costs incurred by colleges 
where their project may not now proceed in the near future. 
 
Recommendation 5 In order to achieve speedy implementation, it will be essential to have a 
blended approach of open consultation with the sector, matched by a small dedicated project 
management group which drives a highly organised programme across LSC and DIUS levels. It must 
restore confidence with its professional approach and urgency of action. There is a need for 
balanced reflection and consultation for the first task and excellent project management skills for 
the second. In response a joint project team involving LSC and DIUS staff was set up with David 
Hughes appointed to take personal responsibility for LSC’s capital programme, with the additional 
support of a senior finance director within the LSC. The LSC will be making further changes to the 
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way the capital programme is managed which will help in this transition year from the LSC to the 
SFA and YPLA. We hope to be able to announce these changes, along with wider management 
arrangements shortly. 
 
Recommendation 6 Talks should be held with HM Treasury to reinforce the importance of skills 
development in the context of national economic recovery and to review resourcing for the 
continuing capital programme. It is essential that a robust recovery plan is demonstrated. The 
Budget on April 22nd saw an announcement of further funding for capital projects.  
 
Recommendation 7 Future development must take place in the context of a comprehensive and 
competent financial strategy that supports needs-related planning. The LSC is working with DIUS, 
colleges and stakeholders to assess the priority needs for the future. This assessment will provide, by 
Spring 2010, clarity on future needs and funding requirements. On this basis, a new financial 
strategy will be developed for the SFA, YPLA and local authorities to take forward in the discussions 
for the next spending review.    
 
Recommendation 8 Active consideration must now be given to the future working arrangements 
of the Skills Funding Agency and the Young People’s Learning Agency. Key issues for resolution 
include: the formulation of a robust investment strategy, the development of best-practice 
procurement methods in the light of experience in other public sector programmes and approaches 
to the engagement of partner organisations. The nature and management of their relationship with 
DIUS and DCSF must be clarified and it will be essential to design a regulatory function that inspires 
confidence within and beyond the FE sector itself. Discussions are underway with DIUS, DCSF and 
local authority representatives about the future arrangements for capital in the Skills Funding 
Agency and the Young People’s Learning Agency. The new arrangements include regulation and 
oversight of capital by DIUS and DCSF, a new financial strategy and best practice procurement 
methods. 
 
Future prioritisation of projects 
105. On 4 March the then Secretary of State announced in a Written Ministerial Statement 
that projects at eight colleges which had been deferred at the December Council meeting —
Stoke-on-Trent, Coulsdon (Surrey), West Kent, Liverpool, Solihull, Northampton and two 
in Bolton—had been given Approval in Detail. He added that he had asked the LSC “to 
consult with the Association of Colleges and the FE sector to advise me on ways of 
prioritising schemes in the future programme.”168 The Minutes of the LSC Council meeting 
on 22 April 2009 revealed that there had been some disquiet about how this decision was 
taken: 
Council members were grateful for the further detail contained in the circulated 
paper but some felt that they should have been furnished with this information at the 
time of being asked to approve proposals in order to give full scrutiny to the 
implications. One member confirmed that he would not have approved the eight 
projects had this information been available at the time.169 
106. There is now clearly a very substantial funding gap: David Hughes, National Projects 
Director stated in April that “the current plan [is] for the LSC to approve projects in June 
2009 that required £500 million in grant, in the expectation that their total costs would be 
around £750 million”170; this compares to £2.7 billion of schemes which had already 
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received Approval in Principle and £3 billion of schemes which had bid for Approval in 
Principle but not yet received it.171 Hence, as the Association of Colleges put it, “the capital 
budget will still be insufficient to fund many valuable projects.”172 The LSC admitted in its 
memorandum that “It is clear that the urgent and greatest need projects will not include 
the majority of college projects which either have Application in Principle approval, or 
have been seeking such approval.”173 Hence the need for a rational prioritisation process. 
The Capital Reference Group 
107. DIUS explained on 5 May 2009 that in “order to determine which projects will be 
funded, the LSC are consulting with the sector on prioritisation criteria and they have 
established a reference panel of college principals convened by the Association of Colleges 
to inform the approach for prioritising schemes.”174 The Capital Reference Group met for 
the first time on 29 April under the Chairmanship of David Hughes. It included 
representatives of DIUS, DCSF, LSC, AoC, various FE and sixth form colleges and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC).  
108. According to the Minutes of the meeting David Hughes set out the next steps to be 
taken, noting that “the main purpose of this meeting was to discuss the process for 
agreeing and applying the new prioritisation criteria.” The prioritisation process was also 
discussed: 
There would be a four stage process: the readiness assessment, the assessment against 
priorities, a ranking of projects and a fourth stage in which the planned programme 
would be assessed. […]  
The priorities were grouped in five areas with an initial suggestion as to indicative 
weightings: education and skills impact (currently 20% of the total), contribution to 
local economic regeneration (15%), co-dependency with third parties (15%), 
condition of the estate (20%) and value for money (30%). A total of 20 criteria would 
be used to rank projects within these 5 categories.  
The process would be tested in the next few days in a dry run.  
The aim was to complete the readiness assessments by 15 May 2009. The aim was 
then to complete the assessment against priorities by 22 May 2009 so that 
recommendations could be made to the LSC Capital Committee meeting around the 
26 May 2009. The Capital Committee recommendations would be taken to the LSC 
National Council for authority to proceed on 3 June 2009. 175 
109. The first stage of the process, the “readiness assessment” is also being referred to as the 
need to be “shovel-ready”. Dr John Blake, who was at the 29 April meeting, commented: 
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I think they have made a good start in terms of being more open and more 
transparent and more involving […] They were talking at the first meeting about the 
process to be used to decide how the extra money that is available this year will be 
allocated on 3 June at the National Council meeting. It was an objective process. It 
was much more needs-based than previously. I think if a number of colleagues have 
got a concern it still has the risk of being about first-come, first-served, which is what 
we feel has happened so far. Shovel-ready basically means you have to have been 
lucky in the capricious process that got you this far in the LSC capital funding 
process to date so the 30 or 40 colleges who were successful may not be the most 
needy but they may be the ones who just happen to be ready this August.176 
110. Martin Doel of the Association of Colleges was keen to emphasise that the role of the 
Capital Reference Group was to draw up criteria rather than choose between competing 
bids: 
First and foremost, you need to understand the role of the Reference Group. It is to 
inform the criteria that will be used. It is not to have one set of principals judge upon 
another set of principals’ projects to see which will go forward. It is to produce an 
objective set of criteria and to inform that process so that they are applied in a way 
that is fair, transparent and can be seen to be proper.177   
Outstanding issues 
111. The Association of Colleges identified two particular issues in which certainty was 
urgently required: 
• The extent to which the future budget is already committed: AoC stated “There is 
also uncertainty about the extent of forward commitments. It normally takes two 
to three years to complete a new college building. Some of the £1.2 billion which is 
now available between 2009 and 2014 has already been committed to projects that 
have been approved.”178 
• The full cost of projects in the pipeline: “There continues to be uncertainty about the 
full cost of projects in the college capital funding pipeline. On 4 March 2009, John 
Denham stated that there were 144 projects worth a total of £5.7 billion awaiting 
decisions. It has since become clear that the LSC undercounted the number of 
projects and underestimated their cost” 179 
112. The Association of Colleges pointed out in its memorandum that, while making quick 
decisions could be risky “there are a large number of colleges where quick decisions are 
essential to ensure that governing bodies and Principals can schedule works in the summer 
holidays either to start building or to carry out emergency works on abortive projects.”180   
 
176 Q 142 
177 Q 144 
178 Ev 37, para 9 
179 As above 
180 Ev 38, para 10 
44    Spend, spend, spend? — the mismanagement of the LSC’s capital programme in FE colleges   
 
 
The 3 June Council meeting 
113. When we took evidence on 20 May we were told that the LSC Council meeting on 3 
June would be key in taking matters forward. Martin Doel of the Association of Colleges 
emphasised: 
The line will be how much money there is for allocation on 3 June [...] [T]he next 
thing we really do need to think about is what happens to all of those colleges that do 
not receive the go-ahead or the prospect of going ahead? The word we have so far is 
that there will be no new starts on current plans until 2011, and funding for that is 
uncertain.181 
114. This was clearly set out in a letter to college principals written by the acting Chief 
Executive on 24 April: 
We want to be as inclusive as possible in consulting on this, but also have very tight 
timescales to meet in order to deal with these urgent issues; our aim is to finalise by 
15 May in order to have new projects approved at the 3 June National Council 
meeting. This is very ambitious and will require close co-operation with all colleges, 
but it is one which we were keen to offer to Government to secure the new 
funding.182 
115. However, after we had taken our oral evidence, there were further delays. The acting 
Chief Executive wrote an open letter to college principals on 1 June: 
As stated in my letter of 24 April, we had originally intended to have identified new 
projects to take to the Council meeting on 3 June for approval. However, many more 
colleges have put forward a case for their projects to be considered as ‘shovel ready’ 
than expected, and so unfortunately we are not in a position to ask the Council on 3 
June to approve individual projects. The Council will instead consider the evidence 
from PWC regarding the readiness assessment and the prioritisation process to 
inform a judgement about which colleges will advance. Therefore, no immediate 
announcements will be made as to which colleges have gone through to the next 
stage of the process; we will make that announcement later in the month.183 
The letter continued: 
that next stage will be a tough value for money challenge to the colleges that come 
out of the prioritisation process as those with the greatest need. To ensure the largest 
number of colleges can still benefit from these funds, more colleges will be chosen for 
that stage than can be funded according to the size of their original bids. The 
challenge for colleges will therefore be to radically reduce the cost and the scope and 
sourcing of the funding of their projects. [...] We will expect all colleges on the short 
list to come back with revised bids and plans by the end of the month, which will 
need to be capable of implementation this autumn, quickly. 
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116. And it concluded with an apology: 
I recognise that the LSC is not in an ideal position in relation to this issue, so I want 
to thank all of you for your understanding and cooperation in helping us to take 
forward these challenging and urgent tasks. 
LSC announcement on 26 June 
117. Finally, on 26 June, the LSC announced that 13 Colleges—Barnsley College, 
Bournville College, Furness College, Hartlepool College of Further Education, Kirklees 
College, Leyton Sixth Form College, Manchester College—Wythenshawe, North West 
Kent College, St Helens College, Sandwell College, South Thames College, Tresham 
Institute of Further and Higher Education, Corby and West Cheshire College—had 
“progressed to the next stage of the process” and been put on a “shortlist”, meaning that 
they had first passed the readiness assessment and then the application of the five criteria: 
education and skills impact, contribution to local economic and regeneration priorities, co-
dependency, current condition of estate and value for money. 184 
118. The announcement letter, from Chris Banks, confirmed that “for those colleges 
unsuccessful in this round there is now no prospect of getting their projects funded this 
CSR” and continued: 
We and our partners in this process are determined to ensure that the funds we have 
available achieve the greatest possible improvements for learners across the country 
and maximise the leverage of other funds into the sector. I am acutely aware that 
there are going to be many sorely disappointed colleges up and down the country 
which have good projects which we cannot fund in this round and it is imperative 
that we show them that we have done everything possible to reduce the costs of the 
13 which we are inviting to progress. 
To ensure these funds have as wide an impact as possible, more projects have been 
identified at this stage than can be funded according to the size of their original bids. 
Each college must now substantially reduce the cost and scope of their projects and 
review other sources of funding.185 
119. A Written Ministerial Statement made by Kevin Brennan, Minister for FE, Skills, 
Apprenticeships and Consumer Affairs warned “All 13 colleges will receive funding only if 
the overall cost is reduced.” 186 
Conclusion 
120. As it turns out 2008 was indeed a once-in-a-generation opportunity for FE capital 
expenditure, though not in the way that the LSC and DIUS intended. We are now left 
with a situation in which funding is scarce and worthy cases cannot be prioritised. Out 
of over 180 projects submitted to the LSC—of which a significant proportion had 
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received Approval in Principle—only 13 have proceeded to the next stage of 
consideration. Even they have all been asked to “substantially reduce the cost and scope 
of their projects and review other sources of funding”. For the others there is “no 
prospect of getting their projects funded this CSR.” 
121. This is a difficult situation for all concerned. LSC is making its best efforts to 
address this prioritisation in a fair way but given the inadequacies of the demand-led 
process our inquiry has identified, we believe the prioritisation and criteria on which 
future funding should be committed should take account of all factors relevant to the 
bids available. This includes the impact of the capital project on the added value of the 
college’s programmes and the vocational development of its student body as well as the 
impact of the project on the regeneration of the area in which it sits as well as the 
potential areas from which it recruits its students, not simply the chronological status 
of bids at the time the programme was put on hold. We therefore have concerns about 
the application of the readiness gateway which we do not believe should be applied in 
the future when making decisions about funding. 
122. LSC must move to a position where it can show its working on the extent to which 
the existing budget is committed, the value of projects being considered and how 
projects have been evaluated. It is particularly disappointing that the announcement of 
further delays was made only two days before the long-anticipated 3 June Council 
meeting and we recommend that LSC immediately takes steps to set out the timetable 
for the remainder of the evaluation process.   
Compensation 
123. The Association of Colleges stated in its memorandum: 
Colleges in these circumstances have a legitimate claim for compensation from the 
LSC for money they spent in good faith up to the moratorium in December 2008 and 
for committed costs that they are still incurring, for example on temporary 
accommodation. In March 2009, AoC carried out a survey of the 79 Colleges with 
approvals in principle and another 120 Colleges carrying out feasibility studies to 
establish some facts. 168 Colleges responded to the survey (an 80% response) and 
reported the following: 
• £215 million in capital expenditure to date on stalled projects;  
• £187 million that will be written off in their accounts if projects do not go forward. 
This will put most Colleges in deficit and wipe out their reserves; 
• £269 million in extra costs (maintenance etc) in the next five years.187 
124. One College with Approval in Principle, West Cheshire, submitted written evidence 
to us, which set out the cost—both financial and non-financial—of the delays in receiving 
funding: 
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£5 million has already been invested by both the College and the LSC. 
Buildings have deteriorated with the majority having a very limited lifespan 
(probably two years) as per an updated survey undertaken by consultants in 2006. 
Maintenance programmes have been limited to health and safety activities only as 
the buildings are due for replacement and this was agreed with the LSC. 
The College has already vacated 12,000 square metres in order to build on its 
footprint due to local political pressure, Green Belt and EMV8 regulations. After 
discussions with the LSC, feasibility and enabling work has started so the College 
could meet the agreed planned programme in our applications in principle and in 
detail (e.g. a substation has been moved). Progress was discussed with the LSC on 
14th January 2009 and requested information was subsequently provided to them. 
Students are in temporary buildings and off site (virtually all of our 16–19 year olds 
spend at least some time in temporary accommodation). These are not long term 
solutions and are costly.188 
125. We note the 2009 Foster Review’s comments that some colleges continued to celebrate 
provisional approval as if it were final approval, even when the warning signs of a funding 
shortage had become apparent (Foster refers to this as the “champagne moment” 
culture.)189  Graham Moore of the 157 Group stressed: 
If you get approval in principle you then have to spend a large tranche of money to 
get to approval in detail because this is a fully costed contract where if you get the 
money you sign the contract and you start work the following day, the ‘shovel-ready’ 
concept which we hear about […] In our case it would cost about £5 million.  We 
had spent £2.7 million when we were told to stop and other colleges were in the same 
situation […] I do not think any corporations felt that they were taking significant 
risk, in fact it was a requirement: if you wanted to get AiD and you got AiP you could 
do nothing but spend that money. That was absolutely essential.190 
126. Discussions about compensation are ongoing. The LSC memorandum stated that 
“The LSC has given a commitment that no college will become insolvent as a result of 
capital project delays. The LSC and DIUS are developing a policy position on how to deal 
with the legitimate costs incurred by colleges where their project may not now proceed in 
the near future.”191 And a letter from Siôn Simon, then FE Minister, to college principals 
was placed on the DIUS website in March: 
The LSC monitors financial risk in colleges and there are well established procedures 
for dealing with any college judged to be at risk. If you are concerned that your 
college may be at significant risk financially, you should speak to your local LSC who 
will organise a discussion with their financial advisers and will agree with you a plan 
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to ensure that the college is not put at risk of not being able to meet its financial 
obligations. 192   
127. Martin Doel of the Association of Colleges stressed the need for clarity: 
The key point for us will be what clarity colleges will have on the funds returned to 
them and how that will be treated on their balance sheets in order that they can begin 
to work out their own responses to the situation that they find themselves in and 
having that clarity going forward.193 
128. Geoff Russell, the acting LSC Chief Executive, told us: 
The LSC has clear rules that set out what colleges are allowed to spend money on at 
each of the stages. The external advisers that we have appointed are assessing that 
very issue for each college and we will have the position for each of them within days. 
Once we know who is going forward, we will turn to the issue of sunk-costs. We will 
do it in a sympathetic way, because clearly the LSC shares a great deal of 
responsibility for this.194 
129. The Minutes of the Capital Reference Group meeting on 29 April 2009 shed further 
light on the issues which remain to be resolved: 
David Hughes stated that LSC would pay fee support in line with the usual 
arrangements but needed to address three issues on sunk and abortive costs:  
• accounting for costs incurred. LSC was working with AoC and audit firms on this 
issue. 
• cash flow issues. LSC would use its financial intervention procedures to ensure that 
colleges in financial difficulty received short-term support.  
• the extent of its responsibility for costs incurred before the moratorium. Lambert 
Smith Hampton would review the position in every college after which further 
consideration would be given to this issue.  
This work would take place in parallel with the assessment process but run slightly 
behind it. Phil Head added that some of the sunk costs incurred, for example in 
buying or improving land, would not necessarily be abortive if a project did not 
happen. 
Points made in the subsequent discussion: 
Peter Corrigan [Worthing College] said that the systems used by LSC to assess 
financial health needed to be adjusted to take account of these circumstances. 
 
192 Letter from Siôn Simon MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Further Education, to College Principals, 23 
March 2009 [not printed] 
193 Q 130 
194 Q 232 
Spend, spend, spend? — the mismanagement of the LSC’s capital programme in FE colleges      49 
 
Merydydd David [Reaseheath College] said that some costs incurred after the 
moratorium, for example on temporary accommodation, were legitimate and 
consideration should be given to being able to claim some of these costs from the 
LSC. 
Julian Gravatt [Association of Colleges] said that the current plan was for the 2009 
accounts direction to colleges to be issued in May 2009. Further guidance on the 
sunk costs issue might need to be issued in June 2009. 195 
130. The Acting Chief Executive’s letter of 1 June confirmed that work was still underway: 
For those projects that will not be taken forward in this stage, we will consider 
maximising the longer term value of costs incurred, the accounting implications, 
borrowing flexibilities and other ways to help resolve problems. The latter will 
include pursuing with stakeholders whether there may be a role for the LSC in 
encouraging discussions with the sector and private sector financing partners. 196 
131. The matter was discussed again at the Capital Reference Panel Group meeting on 15 
June with frank discussions between LSC and college representatives: 
David Hughes explained that LSC finance staff were collecting additional 
information on costs incurred by colleges to date to allow an assessment of any LSC 
liability. This process needed to be completed by 30 June. All 209 colleges who had 
completed questionnaires had been contacted in the last couple of days. He said that 
LSC would pay its fee contribution in line with the Capital Handbook and had put 
some funds aside to pay further costs to mitigate the impact of spend on financial 
health. Phil Head added that a further round of payments for fee contributions 
would be made on 22 and 29 June 2009—assuming that colleges had supplied the 
necessary paperwork—and would cover fees incurred up to the end of the LSC 2008–
09 financial year (i.e. until 31 March 2009). 
John Blake asked how large a contribution would be made by LSC to total project 
costs. David Hughes said that the policy was still in discussion but the plan might pay 
a higher share to colleges further down the track. He made it clear that there was not 
enough money to simply pay for all of the development costs incurred by every 
college. John Blake pointed out that LSC had taken nine months to assess one 
college’s project. 197 
132. The Ministerial Statement made on 26 June warned that reimbursement of costs 
would be “limited to those appropriately incurred within the terms of the capital 
programme.” 198 
133. Press reports indicate that the Association of Colleges has been considering legal 
action, with Martin Doel, Chief Executive, quoted in the Financial Times as stating “I think 
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we’re prepared to look at judicial review as a possible way of addressing some of these 
issues.”199 The 157 Group memorandum similarly stated “Legal action may be inevitable if 
college corporations/boards are to fulfil their fiduciary responsibilities.”200 This problem 
has been anticipated by the LSC, as the Council’s December minutes stated “Members 
asked that a clear action plan be in place to respond to any legal challenges arising from its 
decision to carryover project approvals from its December 2008 meeting until March 
2009.”201  
134. The commitment that “no college will become insolvent as a result of capital 
project delays” does not go far enough. DBIS will now need to work with the LSC to 
ensure that compensation arrangements for sunk costs are settled as a matter of 
urgency and the presumption must be that those colleges which incurred significant 
expenditure moving from Approval in Principle towards Approval in Detail have those 
costs fully reimbursed. Funding for this should not be top-sliced off the overall capital 
budget. 
Capital Innovation Fund, Small Projects Fund and alternative funding 
135. One suggestion made by colleges was that a ‘capital innovation fund’ should be 
established “so that people can find alternative means of funding their projects in the 
meantime, perhaps on a scaled-down size or through refurbishment, in order to meet their 
essential and immediate needs, and in order to respond to the demands that have been 
placed on them in the face of the recession.”202 The Association of Colleges expanded on 
this in its memorandum, arguing for a “small amount of Government funding to support 
college innovation in the following areas”: 
• redesign of projects on a more modest scale to meet immediately pressing needs; 
• project funding involving a larger amount of borrowing, perhaps supported in 
some way by a college’s home Local Authority; 
• sale and leaseback of facilities involving commercial partners; 
• shared use of facilities with other education institutions; and 
• further examination of the use of HEFCE capital funding for colleges.203 
136. The NAO Report noted that the LSC and HEFCE had been discussing “how to 
simplify cross-sector capital procedures”204 and the Association of Colleges noted that 
“Many of the schemes which have been delayed are in Colleges which provide a significant 
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amount of higher education for example City College Norwich, Blackpool and the Fylde 
College and Grimsby Institute for FE and HE.”205 
137. The latest announcement by the LSC mentioned the possibility of a “small projects 
fund which would begin this autumn” though it linked this to “savings” in the successful 
colleges’ projects which could be reinvested. It also stated that the LSC was “pursuing other 
routes of funding by exploring the potential for collective approaches to private financing 
and borrowing. Early discussions with partners are encouraging and we will again work 
with the Capital Reference Panel and other groups to move this forward.” 206 The Minutes 
of the Capital Reference Panel on 15 June provided a certain amount of further detail on 
how a small projects fund would work. David Hughes, National Projects Director 
explained that “the small fund proposal was designed to support projects on a reduced 
scale and that the work exploring private financing options might help others.” 207  
138. The Minutes of the 15 June meeting confirmed that work was also underway on 
alternative funding sources:  
Stuart Howie of Price Waterhouse Coopers introduced himself and explained that 
PwC had been commissioned by LSC to conduct a quick scoping study on 
alternative funding sources for projects, for example ways to make debt cheaper, 
asset backed vehicles and possibilities for identifying revenue streams associated with 
investment. He said that workshops would be held in the following week to explore 
options. In a brief discussion on the work, members suggested that PwC look at the 
historic attempts to use PFI in colleges, alumni, loan support funding and guarantees 
and VAT issues etc.208 
139. In its response to the announcement the Association of Colleges commented that 
“AoC wants to help colleges explore alternative ways of funding projects and we will be 
running a series of events this year to help them do so—including a summit in July. 
Colleges have a long history of innovation and resourcefulness that they can tap into when 
seeking alternative funding streams, given the chance.” 209 
140. The Department and the LSC should be making every effort to help those colleges 
which will not receive funding in this spending round. We therefore endorse the 
proposal by the Association of Colleges for a small amount of government funding to 
support colleges in raising alternative finance for their projects and welcome the 
announcement by the LSC of the creation of a small projects fund. We see the potential 
involvement of HEFCE as particularly relevant given the ever-increasing amount of HE 
delivery via Further Education and the growing convergence between Higher 
Education and FE in the future for which the Capital building programme is designed. 
We also see considerable potential to involve local authorities in some projects, given 
firstly the role of FE colleges in local regeneration and skills development, secondly, the 
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access local authorities have to capital funding, and, thirdly, the authorities’ role in 16–
19 provision from 2010. Furthermore, colleges should be assisted to share best practice 
and contacts or to reduce the overall cost of their projects through shared use or 
redesign. We recommend that funding both for an innovation fund and for small 
projects is not contingent on the successful 13 Colleges making savings and is not ‘top-
sliced’ from the LSC capital budget.   
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8 Conclusions and wider implications 
Budget management 
141. We were warned that a similar situation could arise again with other budgets 
managed by the LSC. Graham Moore, Chair of the 157 Group, told us: 
Another issue that I think comes out of the Foster Report is that this can happen 
again, and we have with Train to Gain at the moment all the signs that we might be 
in the same sort of situation but under different management and leadership. It is 
being tackled with a degree of gusto, albeit a bit late, but I think we must learn from 
Foster about the way in which we deal with these funding issues.210 
142. Recent advice to providers from the LSC about Train to Gain funding indicates that, 
indeed, problems had arisen though steps were being taken to address them: 
because of your collective success in delivering to young people and providing Train 
to Gain, projected demand has increased to a level which if not managed effectively, 
would be greater than the budget available. This in turn has led to our need to 
discuss with you your actual and forecast position and to include within that 
discussion a review of performance.211 
143. We were advised by Geoff Russell, acting LSC Chief Executive, that he had already 
made significant changes to the organisation’s systems: 
in the private sector it would be unthinkable not to have the chief internal auditor 
report directly to the chief executive with a dotted line to the chairman of the Audit 
Committee, and I think it was probably less than two weeks before I was in position 
before I made that change.212 
144. How the LSC now deals with Train to Gain and Adult Apprenticeship funding, 
where it is again having to introduce additional prioritisation because of potential 
overcommitment, will need to be monitored closely. We recommend that the new 
Business, Innovation and Skills Committee maintains our scrutiny of this policy area. 
145. Geoff Russell also rightly identified the tensions between demand-led and needs-based 
structures, commenting “we need to move from demand-led to needs-based, not just in 
capital but across our programmes […] We have moved from an environment where it 
was, ‘How much do you want?’ to ‘This is what you can have. Where is the best place to put 
it?’”213 Adding “as to the college programme, you have heard that it was kind of who was 
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first in the queue. Clearly we need to move away from that […] I think we have to move in 
the same direction on all our programmes.”214 
146. But the then Secretary of State maintained the importance of demand-led provision, 
even if it led to increased risks: 
If you wanted me to pull out, frankly, a generic problem here, we are trying to move 
the skill system to a much more demand-led and responsive system from a system 
that most people have regarded as too centralist, bureaucratic and rigid.215 
147. The Minutes of the 22 April LSC National Council meeting included a summary of a 
discussion with the Secretaries of State for Children, Schools and Families and Innovation, 
Universities and Skills. “Comments and requests from members” [of the Council] included 
the stark statement “Acknowledge the danger of repeating the capital experience with 
Train to Gain and Sixth Form funding if robust action was not taken in time to manage 
demand within available resources. Put processes in place to ensure robust future 
projection to avoid ‘surprises’” In responding, the Secretaries of State advised “A more 
sophisticated demand led approach: ‘demand’ to mean ‘informed demand’, not necessarily 
‘first come first served’.”216 
148. There is an ongoing tension between demand-led and needs-based provision which 
needs to be resolved between the LSC and DIUS (now DBIS) and across government 
more widely. The Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families and the then 
Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills told the LSC Council in April 
2009 that they wanted “informed demand” rather than prioritisation on a “first come 
first served” basis. We ask DBIS to set out precisely what is meant by “informed 
demand”, and how this links to the way in which the LSC and the new Skills Funding 
Agency and Young People’s Learning Agency will manage their programmes. 
Conclusion 
149. Perhaps the most telling description of the situation was given to us by the then 
Secretary of State: 
one of the things I found in discussing this issue is it is sometimes described as 
though there were a group of people who knew exactly what was going on and they 
did not tell other people exactly what was going on. I am afraid the problem was 
there was a group of people that we might have expected to know what was going on 
who did not themselves have a full grasp of it and, therefore, could not communicate 
the problem to us.217 
150. The programme of capital investment in FE colleges has greatly benefited some 
colleges, communities and students but in a haphazard manner. We conclude that both 
DIUS and the LSC are jointly liable for not recognising the weak points of a capital 
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programme which suffered from no overall budget and poor management 
information, but which was being heavily marketed by the LSC to colleges. A heinously 
complicated management structure within the LSC and the approaching Machinery of 
Government changes bred a lack of responsibility and gave an air of distraction.  
Everyone wanted this laudable programme to succeed and so failure became 
unthinkable. Mark Haysom alluded to this when he said “why was the capital 
programme not on the risk register? I think, well, I know, because it was seen to be a 
success, that flipping into, in record time, a situation of over-demand was not seen to 
be an issue on the radar. I am sorry, but it was not.”   
151. We believe that the greater the freedom given to arms-length agencies by 
Government departments to carry through major public expenditure programmes, the 
greater the obligation on the senior management of those agencies to observe due 
diligence over internal reviews of that expenditure. That includes being proactive in 
flagging up potential major resource problems to the sponsoring Government 
department. It is clear that this was not done in the case of LSC and DIUS. It is, above 
all, a sorry story of management within the LSC compounded by failures of 
government oversight within DIUS which is likely to cost hundreds of millions of 
pounds. 
152. Looking forward, the decision-making structure will shortly become even more 
complicated as the number of organisations involved increases from three (LSC, DIUS, 
DCSF) to five (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, DCSF, Local 
authorities, Skills Funding Agency, Young People’s Learning Agency). Both the 
transition to these new arrangements (which will be led by a new Department) and the 
new arrangements themselves have the potential to repeat and compound all the 
problems we have identified throughout this report. The new Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills and the new management of the LSC must ensure that this does 
not happen.    
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Conclusions and recommendations 
Building Colleges for the Future and the 2009 Foster Review 
1. We commend Sir Andrew Foster for his thorough review of the FE capital 
programme and his perceptive description of events in 2008 and 2009. We have 
drawn on his work throughout this report. (Paragraph 18) 
The Capital Affordability Review: failure of management systems 
2. We conclude that the treatment of the February 2008 Capital Affordability Review 
demonstrates what was going wrong both within the LSC and between the LSC and 
DIUS. There were failures in communication within and between the two 
organisations and a shared—but flawed—assumption was formed that this was an 
in-year issue that had no long-term implications. A central element in this was the 
failure of the LSC’s then Chief Executive and Chairman to have a process where they 
regularly considered the future direction of a key programme which was to consume 
up to 9.2% of the LSC’s total budget by 2009–10.  (Paragraph 33) 
3. The unprecedented level of capital expenditure on the FE estate between 2005 and 
2008 can be regarded as a great achievement by the Government and by the LSC. On 
the basis of the 2009 Foster Review and the evidence we have taken we conclude that 
there was a catastrophic mismanagement of the LSC capital budget during 2008 and 
neglect of oversight by those in the most senior positions in the LSC. The fact that 
the situation changed quickly does not excuse the lack of recognition of crucial 
warning signs, in particular the February 2008 Capital Affordability Review.  
(Paragraph 40) 
Lack of a prioritisation mechanism 
4. The evidence we took revealed a strange world in which staff at the LSC believed 
prioritisation would not be needed in the short to medium term because the 
programme had historically been underspending. Hence they could defer difficult 
decisions, for example on how to rank projects within and across regions, to 
someone else—perhaps the LSC’s successor organisations. But this meant that the 
programme in the end operated on a first-come, first-served basis, with no 
consideration given either to need or wider departmental or government policy 
objectives. Some colleges received funding for iconic buildings when something 
much cheaper would have served perfectly well. Other worthy projects, perhaps in 
areas of greater deprivation, will now not be funded at all. (Paragraph 49) 
5. This should not have happened and must not happen again. We recommend that it 
should be a requirement for all national capital programmes to have an agreed 
mechanism for prioritisation built in to them from the start, even if they initially 
underspend. In this case the perceived need within the LSC to “use or lose in-year 
budgets” was a key factor in the Council’s decision to seek to build up demand in the 
early stages of the programme, a build-up which proved impossible to manage. 
Consideration should be given to how to mitigate the tendency to focus on in-year 
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budgets and therefore make short-term decisions, for example enabling greater 
flexibility to carry-over funds in the early stages of a programme to ensure that 
growth is managed sustainably.  (Paragraph 50) 
Role of LSC in liaising with the regions 
6. We conclude that the senior management of the LSC made two significant mistakes 
in dealing with the regions during 2008. They should have been consulting Regional 
Directors much more frequently about the programme to establish likely overspends,  
whether or not they were aware at the time of the Edwards report and its 
implications, and Regional Directors should have been given a responsibility to 
monitor and report on the number of projects coming through the system.  
(Paragraph 54) 
Risk management 
7. The fact that the LSC’s weak risk management system was being addressed as these 
events were unfolding, and that even as a result of this the capital programme was 
not identified as a major potential problem is astounding. In this context we repeat 
our criticism that DIUS did not place key risks it had identified in its Accounts—
including poor risk management at the LSC—in its 2008 Departmental Report.  
(Paragraph 63) 
The role of the National Council and the Chairman of the LSC 
8. We note the points made by Chris Banks about the position of the LSC Council and 
his own position as Chairman of that Council. While the LSC Council delegated 
responsibility for management to the executive team it retained a responsibility to 
provide high-level oversight, set overall strategy and to challenge and question what 
the management team were doing, and the Chairman of the Council should have 
been leading the Council in achieving this. The Chairman and the Council clearly 
failed in this oversight during 2008.  (Paragraph 69) 
Communications between the LSC and colleges 
9. The extent to which individual colleges were urged to increase the scale of particular 
projects may be a matter of some debate between the LSC and the colleges 
themselves. But given the historically cautious expectations of the majority of the FE 
sector, it is in our view highly unlikely that colleges would have “bigged up” their 
projects without direct encouragement from regional officers or national directors at 
the LSC.  The evidence appears more than anecdotal that LSC was encouraging 
bigger and bigger schemes to come forward: the use of phrases such as “once-in-a-
generation opportunity” and “a strong association between new buildings and high 
achievement” was irresponsible and bound to build up excess demand that could not 
be satisfied and the LSC as a whole, and those individuals involved, should accept 
responsibility for this. (Paragraph 77) 
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DIUS oversight of the LSC 
10. We ask the LSC and DBIS to clarify the remark made in the minutes of the LSC 
External Advisory Group meeting in September 2008 that Ministers were 
considering risks associated with the FE College Capital programme. (Paragraph 84) 
11. Lessons must be learned by DBIS and across Government from the events at the LSC 
in 2008. DIUS clearly failed in its oversight duties. As we noted earlier in this Report 
the same management problems that befell LSC were also there in DIUS—a key 
official did not report back to more senior staff about the Capital Affordability 
Review; there was a wider lack of challenge; and a total failure to pick-up messages 
from the sector (or apply common sense) about the scale of commitments which 
were being made. (Paragraph 87) 
12. The then Secretary of State told us that “the theory of NDPBs when they were first set 
up, that they protect ministers from the political flack when things go wrong, does 
not appear to work as well as some of us might have liked […] My conclusion is you 
should use NDPBs where they are necessary, but not otherwise.” Events at the LSC 
show that NDPBs can diffuse political and financial accountability to such an extent 
that serious problems are not identified or addressed and responsibility for failure is 
at best unclear. In this case the situation was made worse by the prospect of the 
NDPB being wound-up; the Department should have realised that this could affect 
operations and ensured that its oversight was effective. We conclude that a review of 
the operation of NDPBs not just across DIUS (now DBIS) but the whole of 
Government is urgently required. (Paragraph 88) 
13. As far as we can see DCSF was a silent partner in this situation, though it is clear that 
within the LSC the splitting of the capital budget was regarded as a critical factor in 
making management of the programme more difficult. We note the points made by 
the 157 Group about the possible transfer of some projects to the Building Schools 
for the Future programme and urge DBIS and DCSF to work together to establish 
whether this is an appropriate way forward. We also recommend that the proposal 
for a single college capital budget using pooled DCSF and DBIS funds is investigated 
with the outcome of the review reported to Parliament in the form of a Written 
Ministerial Statement. (Paragraph 93) 
The NAO report in July 2008 
14. We conclude that, while the NAO rightly identified some of the issues in its July 2008 
Report, the facts that the report (1) did not give a sense of the urgency with which a 
prioritisation mechanism was required and (2) did not put the problem in the 
context of poor risk management diluted its impact. The fact that paragraph 14 of 
the Report’s Summary addressed prioritisation in the context of the completion of 
the programme by 2016 by the LSC’s “successor bodies”, alongside the positive tone 
of the press notice, pandered to the view that was then prevalent within the LSC that 
prioritisation was a medium and longer-term problem, not something that had to be 
done immediately.  (Paragraph 102) 
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15. Given the seriousness of the mistakes that were made the NAO report appears in 
hindsight to be surprisingly positive: we find it hard to reconcile the fundamental 
problems that became apparent with LSC’s capital management, in particular the 
lack of national prioritisation and planning for this high-cost, high-profile 
programme, with the tone of the report. This is all the more surprising given that the 
NAO had sight of the Capital Affordability Review. We conclude that if the NAO 
had produced a more hard-hitting report in July the worst of the over-commitment 
would have been averted. (Paragraph 103) 
Next steps 
16. As it turns out 2008 was indeed a once-in-a-generation opportunity for FE capital 
expenditure, though not in the way that the LSC and DIUS intended. We are now 
left with a situation in which funding is scarce and worthy cases cannot be 
prioritised. Out of over 180 projects submitted to the LSC—of which a significant 
proportion had received Approval in Principle—only 13 have proceeded to the next 
stage of consideration. Even they have all been asked to “substantially reduce the cost 
and scope of their projects and review other sources of funding”. For the others there 
is “no prospect of getting their projects funded this CSR.” (Paragraph 120) 
17. This is a difficult situation for all concerned. LSC is making its best efforts to address 
this prioritisation in a fair way but given the inadequacies of the demand-led process 
our inquiry has identified, we believe the prioritisation and criteria on which future 
funding should be committed should take account of all factors relevant to the bids 
available. This includes the impact of the capital project on the added value of the 
college’s programmes and the vocational development of its student body as well as 
the impact of the project on the regeneration of the area in which it sits as well as the 
potential areas from which it recruits its students not simply the chronological status 
of bids at the time the programme was put on hold. We therefore have concerns 
about the application of the readiness gateway which we do not believe should be 
applied in the future when making decisions about funding. (Paragraph 121) 
18. LSC must move to a position where it can show its working on the extent to which 
the existing budget is committed, the value of projects being considered and how 
projects have been evaluated. It is particularly disappointing that the announcement 
of further delays was made only two days before the long-anticipated 3 June Council 
meeting and we recommend that LSC immediately takes steps to set out the 
timetable for the remainder of the evaluation process.   (Paragraph 122) 
19. The commitment that “no college will become insolvent as a result of capital project 
delays” does not go far enough. DBIS will now need to work with the LSC to ensure 
that compensation arrangements for sunk costs are settled as a matter of urgency 
and the presumption must be that those colleges which incurred significant 
expenditure moving from Approval in Principle towards Approval in Detail have 
those costs fully reimbursed. Funding for this should not be top-sliced off the overall 
capital budget. (Paragraph 134) 
20. The Department and the LSC should be making every effort to help those colleges 
which will not receive funding in this spending round. We therefore endorse the 
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proposal by the Association of Colleges for a small amount of government funding 
to support colleges in raising alternative finance for their projects and welcome the 
announcement by the LSC of the creation of a small projects fund. We see the 
potential involvement of HEFCE as particularly relevant given the ever-increasing 
amount of HE delivery via Further Education and the growing convergence between 
Higher Education and FE in the future for which the Capital building programme is 
designed. We also see considerable potential to involve local authorities in some 
projects, given firstly the role of FE colleges in local regeneration and skills 
development, secondly, the access local authorities have to capital funding, and, 
thirdly, the authorities’ role in 16–19 provision from 2010. Furthermore, colleges 
should be assisted to share best practice and contacts or to reduce the overall cost of 
their projects through shared use or redesign. We recommend that funding both for 
an innovation fund and for small projects is not contingent on the successful 13 
Colleges making savings and is not ‘top-sliced’ from the LSC capital budget.    
(Paragraph 140) 
Conclusions and wider implications 
21. How the LSC now deals with Train to Gain and Adult Apprenticeship funding, 
where it is again having to introduce additional prioritisation because of potential 
overcommitment, will need to be monitored closely. We recommend that the new 
Business, Innovation and Skills Committee maintains our scrutiny of this policy area. 
(Paragraph 144) 
22. There is an ongoing tension between demand-led and needs-based provision which 
needs to be resolved between the LSC and DIUS (now DBIS) and across government 
more widely. The Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families and the then 
Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills told the LSC Council in 
April 2009 that they wanted “informed demand” rather than prioritisation on a “first 
come first served” basis. We ask DBIS to set out precisely what is meant by 
“informed demand”, and how this links to the way in which the LSC and the new 
Skills Funding Agency and Young People’s Learning Agency will manage their 
programmes. (Paragraph 148) 
23. The programme of capital investment in FE Colleges has greatly benefited some 
colleges, communities and students but in a haphazard manner. We conclude that 
both DIUS and the LSC are jointly liable for not recognising the weak points of a 
capital programme which suffered from no overall budget and poor management 
information, but which was being heavily marketed by the LSC to Colleges. A 
heinously complicated management structure within the LSC and the approaching 
Machinery of Government changes bred a lack of responsibility and gave an air of 
distraction. Everyone wanted this laudable programme to succeed and so failure 
became unthinkable. Mark Haysom alluded to this when he said “why was the 
capital programme not on the risk register? I think, well, I know, because it was seen 
to be a success, that flipping into, in record time, a situation of over-demand was not 
seen to be an issue on the radar. I am sorry, but it was not.”   (Paragraph 150) 
24. We believe that the greater the freedom given to arms-length agencies by 
Government departments to carry through major public expenditure programmes, 
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the greater the obligation on the senior management of those agencies to observe due 
diligence over internal reviews of that expenditure. That includes being proactive in 
flagging up potential major resource problems to the sponsoring Government 
department. It is clear that this was not done in the case of LSC and DIUS. It is, 
above all, a sorry story of management within the LSC compounded by failures of 
government oversight within DIUS which is likely to cost hundreds of millions of 
pounds. (Paragraph 151) 
25. Looking forward, the decision-making structure will shortly become even more 
complicated as the number of organisations involved increases from three (LSC, 
DIUS, DCSF) to five (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, DCSF, Local 
authorities, Skills Funding Agency, Young People’s Learning Agency). Both the 
transition to these new arrangements (which will be led by a new Department) and 
the new arrangements themselves have the potential to repeat and compound all the 
problems we have identified throughout this report. The new Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills and the new management of the LSC must ensure 
that this does not happen. (Paragraph 152) 
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 Annex: timeline 
February 
2008 
LSC-commissioned Capital Affordability Review completed which states “the 
continuation of the current payment profile of projects is unaffordable to the 
Council”  (para 19) 
March 2008 LSC publishes National Capital Strategy for 2008–09 to 2010–11: “Weighted 
assessments will be introduced at national, regional and local assessment levels if 
and when it becomes necessary to prioritise capital applications that already meet 
or exceed the threshold criteria” (para 42) 
22 April 2008 LSC Capital Policy Group refers Capital Affordability Review to LSC Finance and 
Resources Board, which considers it in May (para 22) 
May–June 
2008 
LSC’s Management Board receives a paper on capital issues at its meeting on 13 May 
2008 warning of increasing pressure on the capital budget and alerting it to expect 
advice on short and medium term priorities at its meeting on 12 June 2008. No such 
advice is provided and neither are capital issues discussed at that meeting (para 34) 
June 2008 Workload of the Capital Committee becomes so onerous that the Director of 
Property and Infrastructure requests an extra meeting in August to deal with the 
large number of projects waiting to be presented (para 34) 
16 June 2008 Ministerial review meeting with the LSC Chairman and Chief Executive takes place 
(2009 Foster review, para 44): “Ministerial Review meetings are held jointly by the 
Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills and the Department for Children 
Schools and Families.  Each meeting is chaired by the Parliamentary Under Secretary 
of State for Further Education, and attended by a Minister from DCSF, the Director 
of the DIUS Learning and Skills Performance Directorate and a Director from the 
DCSF Young People's Directorate.  The LSC is represented by its LSC National Chair, 
Chief Executive and its key national directors.  Other Ministers and officials from 
both Departments may also attend depending on the agenda” (Ev 47) 
27 June 2008 Post-19 Performance and Finance Group meeting “between senior managers of the 
LSC and DIUS” (2009 Foster review, para 44) 
11 July 2008 National Audit Office report published.  Head of NAO states “The sector has taken 
on a higher level of debt, and therefore of risk, but the cost should be manageable. 
If the second half of the programme can maintain the success achieved in the first, 
further education will be well placed to offer enhanced value for money” (paras 94-
103) 
30 July 2008 LSC Council meeting approves the combined recommendations of the 19 June and 
17 July Capital Committee meetings. These determine or recommend 26 FE and 16-
19 capital funding applications with a total estimated cost of £1.2bn, including 
grant support of just over £1bn, payable over the next 5-6 years (para 34) 
12 August 
2008 
“Finance stock-take meeting” involving senior managers in DIUS, LSC Chief 
Executive and Director of Resources (2009 Foster review, para 44): “Joint DIUS/DCSF 
financial stock take meetings take place approximately once a quarter.  These are 
official level meetings, and are attended by the Director-General of the DIUS 
Further Education and Skills Group, the Director General of the DCSF's Young 
People's Directorate and the LSC Chief Executive.  Other officials from both 
Departments, and from the LSC, may also attend depending on the agenda” (Ev 47) 
19 September 
2008 
Capital Committee meets on 19 September 2008 and agrees to recommend to 
Council 7 Approvals in Principle (AiPs) and 1 Approval in Detail (AiD)  with a total 
value of £401m. Affordability is discussed: the Minutes of the meeting state “The 
Committee was told that this year is the first time since the LSC was formed a 
potential overspend against the current capital budget was forecast compared to 
the potential underspend usually forecast at the same point in previous years ... The 
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Committee would have to look at how projects are funded in the medium to longer 
term as the first regional capital strategy returns indicate a significant increase in 
forecast projects and a peaking of requirements around 2010–11 possibly influenced 
by the Machinery of Government outcomes. Further work was likely to be required 
reconciling these estimates with previous years forecasts before the strategies could 
be finalised” (para 34) 
23 September 
2008 
Post-19 Performance and Finance Group meeting “between senior managers of the 
LSC and DIUS” (2009 Foster review, para 44) 
30 September 
2008 
LSC External Advisory Group meets.  Considers the LSC Capital Skills Prospectus.  
Minutes state that “There was a strong governance aspect to this work, with the 
new Regional Councils taking a lead in considering these proposals. The Prospectus 
was clear but the proposals were likely to generate a lot of demand, with associated 
risks. Ministers were currently considering these risks” (para 82) 
21 October 
2008 
Ministerial review with the LSC Chairman and Chief Executive takes place (2009 
Foster review, para 44)  
22 October 
2008 
LSC Capital Committee meets and puts forward a further 4 AiPs and 5 AiDs with a 
total value of £530m (para 34); minutes state “a special submission had been made 
to DIUS to bring forward funds from future years (when the capital budget 
increases) to cope with the current exceptional demand for funds [...] The 
Committee was told that there is a possibility of capital allocations being brought 
forward to help ease current pressures. There may also be the possibility, given 
recent announcements by the Government of bidding for additional funds for the 
capital budget, but it is far from certain that this will happen” 
5 November 
2008  
Council meets.  Presented with Capital Committee project recommendations with 
costs approaching a further £1bn and an initial report on the future funding and 
priorities of the capital programme. Council approves the recommendations from 
September, only £44.5m of which was application in detail, but defers decisions on 
October recommendations until its 17 December meeting. Members also request a 
report on the funds available in 2008-09 and future years, and a paper forecasting 
AiP commitments (para 37) 
13 November 
2008 
“Finance stock-take meeting” involving senior managers in DIUS, LSC Chief 
Executive and Director of Resources (2009 Foster review, para 44) 
November—
December 
2008 
Capital Committee agrees to recommend to the December meeting of Council 
further projects with a value of about £500m (fitting in an extra meeting on 4 
December to get through them all)” (para 34) 
November 
2008 
LSC produces a new Capital Skills Prospectus with an introduction from the Secretary 
of State 
17 November 
2008 
Ian Watmore, Mark Haysom and Ms Susan Pember, Director, FE and Skills 
Performance Group, DIUS, give oral evidence to Public Accounts Committee on the 
FE programme (para 101) 
20 November 
2008 
Post-19 Performance and Finance Group meeting “between senior managers of the 
LSC and DIUS) (2009 Foster review, para 44) 
“end of 
November” 
2008 
Ministers first alerted to a potential problem with the capital programme (Secretary 
of State speaking in the House on 12 March 2009) 
16 December 
2008 
Ministerial review with the LSC Chair and Chief Executive takes place. According to 
the 2009 Foster review (para 44), the capital programme is discussed for the first 
time at one of these meetings 
17 December 
2008 
LSC Council meets and agrees to a three-month pause in consents to proceed with 
Approval in Principle (AiP) and Approval in Detail (AiD) applications (para 39) 
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January 2009 David Hughes, then London Regional Director, is quoted in LSC’s ‘the magazine’ as 
follows “For the last couple of years we have been accelerating the approval of big 
capital schemes in colleges across London. We want the colleges in London to be 
good to look at, good to learn in and offering modern facilities and kit. That’s what 
today’s learners demand: exciting, modern, aspirational environments with cutting-
edge facilities and carefully designed learning and social spaces […] There’s a strong 
association between new buildings and high achievement” (para 76) 
16 January 
2009 
LSC chief executive, Mark Haysom, writes to all college principals stating that there 
is no freeze in the programme but that the LSC is reviewing all projects in its 
pipeline (para 39) 
27 January 
2009 
Sir Andrew Foster commissioned to review the College Building Programme 
Finances (para 2) 
3 February 
2009 
Secretary of State says during Opposition day debate “There are schemes in the 
pipeline that have not yet been fully approved, and the LSC has put further 
approvals on hold until it has assessed the whole programme. The LSC has not yet 
provided a full analysis of all those schemes, but I need to be frank: many more 
schemes are currently in preparation than can be funded in this spending round” 
(para 2)  
4 March 2009 LSC Council meets.  Following the meeting, John Denham announces that the LSC 
has decided to give approval to eight capital projects which had been recommended 
for approval by the LSC Capital Committee (para 105) 
23 March 
2009 
Senior official from DIUS tells the capital summit organised by the AoC that the LSC 
capital budget for College modernisation is fully committed.  Mark Haysom resigns 
(Ev 40) 
1 April 2009 2009 Foster Review published (para 2) 
22 April 2009 LSC Council meets.  Approves a new process for prioritising projects.  Chancellor 
announces that an increase in capital funding for the LSC of £300 million to enable 
it to fund a limited number of further projects, starting in 2009/10 (Ev 40) 
24 April 2009 Acting LSC Chief Executive, Geoff Russell, writes to all College Principals outlining 
the process and timetable for prioritising capital projects.  His letter explains that 
the LSC National Council meets on 3 June 2009 and hopes to support £750 million of 
new schemes (Ev 40) 
29 April 2009 Capital Reference Group of Principals and Chairs of governing bodies meets for the 
first time to review the prioritisation process (para 107) 
8 May 2009 Colleges return questionnaires to the LSC indicating the extent to which projects are 
ready to start in summer 2009 (Ev 40) 
1 June 2009 Acting Chief Executive writes to Colleges to say no decisions to be taken on 3 June 
(para 115) 
3 June 2009 LSC National Council meets 
15 June 2009 Capital Reference Group meets for the second time 
26 June 2009 LSC announces 13 colleges through to next stage of the process (para 117) 
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Appendix: LSC Organisational charts 
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Formal Minutes 
Monday 6 July 2009 
Members present: 
Mr Phil Willis, in the Chair 
Mr Tim Boswell 
Dr Evan Harris 
Mr Gordon Marsden 
 Dr Brian Iddon 
Ian Stewart 
Graham Stringer 
The Committee deliberated.  
Draft Report (Spend, Spend, Spend?–the mismanagement of the Learning and Skills 
Council’s capital programme in further education colleges), proposed by the Chairman, 
brought up and read. 
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph. 
Paragraphs 1 to 152 read and agreed to. 
Summary and Annex agreed to. 
Papers were appended to the Report as an Appendix. 
Resolved, That the Report be the Seventh Report of the Committee to the House. 
Ordered, That the Chairman make the Report to the House. 
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the 
provisions of Standing Order No. 134. 
Written evidence was ordered to be reported to the House for printing with the Report. 
 
[Adjourned till Wednesday 8 July at 9.00am 
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Oral evidence
Taken before the Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee
on Wednesday 13 May 2009
Members present:
Mr Phil Willis, in the Chair
Mr Tim Boswell Mr Gordon Marsden
Mr Ian Cawsey Ian Stewart
Dr Brian Iddon Graham Stringer
Witness:MrMarkHaysomCBE, former Chief Executive of the Learning and Skills Council, gave evidence.
Q1 Chairman: Could I welcome this morning Mark
Haysom CBE, the former Chief Executive of the
Learning and Skills Council, to this topical inquiry
which the Committee is having on FE college capital
expenditure. Could I ﬁrst, by way of introduction,
thank you very much indeed for coming this
morning, Mr Haysom. I realise that you are no
longer the Chief Executive of the Learning and Skills
Council butwe thought it was absolutely crucial that
we heard your view about events to be able to put
them into our inquiry. We are grateful to you. Could
I start oV by saying the Foster Review has now been
completed and I wonder if you agree in principle
with the Foster Review and its criticisms of the way
the Learning and Skills Council managed the FE
capital programme. Do you agree and where do you
disagree?
Mr Haysom: Before I get into answering the
questions, can I just say, Chairman, I am very
grateful for the Committee ﬁnding the time to
accommodate this session outside of the timetable
you had previously agreed. I am grateful for this
opportunity. I thought it might be helpful, if it is
okay with you, just to make a few remarks to set
some context to the questions that you have already
started to ask.
Q2 Chairman: As brieﬂy as you can, please, because
we are tight on time.
Mr Haysom: I understand that. What I wanted to
say was I enjoyed six very successful years at the
Learning and Skills Council. We were enormously
proud of what we achieved in that time. It was not
the most robust organisation when I joined, but
working with a group of exceptional people we
turned it round and made a very great contribution
to employers and learners right across the country.
We achieved an awful lot of other things that this
Committee will be very aware of, reducing the costs
of the administration and so on. That did mean that
making my decision to step down as the Chief
Executive of the Learning and Skills Council was
very, very diYcult indeed, as you may imagine. It
was a decision that I agonised over, and I am sure the
Committee will want to come back tomy reasons for
making that decision. I thought it would be helpful
just to summarise very quickly the two key reasons,
which takes me to the answer to your question. The
ﬁrst is that, although I am not personally culpable
for what has happened in terms of the diYculties
with the capital programme, I am or I was ultimately
accountable, as the Chief Executive of the Learning
and Skills Council. I put great store by that
accountability, I took that very seriously, and I felt
that the issues were of such seriousness that I should
step down. Those issues, as described by Sir Andrew,
I recognise as being fundamentally the right ones.
The second reason I decided to step down was that,
if you are going to try andmanage your way through
diYcult situations, and it was obvious that there
were diYcult situations tomanage yourway through
here, then it was very important that I felt that I had
the support of ministers and, in particular, of the
Secretary of State to do that. And, despite all of the
achievements of the Learning and Skills Council, I
was not sure that I did have that support at that
stage. I felt, in fairness to the Secretary of State, that
it was really important that he could choose a Chief
Executive to carry the organisation forward and to
manage the way through these particular issues, so I
wanted to give him that opportunity. The ﬁnal thing
in terms of the capital programme is that, as many
of you will be aware, this is a programme that was
incredibly close to my heart. When I joined in 2003,
I was, frankly, appalled at the physical condition of
the FE estate and I got very close to this programme
and put a lot of myself into that programme. We
were very proud of what had been achieved by what
was, fundamentally, a well-managed programme for
ﬁve of the ﬁve and a half years that I was there. I
always saw, as the biggest and most enduring part of
the legacy of the Learning and Skills Council, what
we had done in terms of the physical estate. And it is
a great sadness to me that that legacy has been
tarnished and that colleges have experienced
diYculties as a consequence of what has happened
with this programme.
Q3 Chairman: But it, clearly, went wrong, and the
Foster Review said it went wrong, so can I bring you
back to that central question: do you agree with
Foster’s conclusions and where, if anywhere, is he
wide of the mark?
Mr Haysom: I agree with an awful lot of his analysis.
Where I would disagree would be at the margin, and
I could argue about individual, small things, but I
cannot see any value in that. I would not choose to
express things in quite the way he has on occasions,
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but, fundamentally, I agree with him. I would put
greater emphasis on some things than he perhaps has
done within that, and I can talk about that if that
is helpful.
Q4 Chairman: Well, we will come on to some of that
detail, but I think it is important just to establish that
you were in agreement, broadly, with the Foster
ﬁndings.
Mr Haysom: In broad agreement, yes.
Q5 Ian Stewart: Mark, the ﬁrst thing to say is that I
do not think you should assume that this Committee
automatically accepts your analysis of your own
culpability in this. I think some of us actually think
there is a good news story about the LSC about the
years you have been in charge, so our questions are
not necessarily a conﬁrmation of how you feel
personally, but we do have to ask the questions.
Now, could you help to clarify when the potential
problems with the LSC capital budget were directly
brought to your attention?
MrHaysom:Themajor issue that Sir AndrewFoster
addresses was brought to my attention in December.
Up until that point we were dealing with other issues
around capital. There were in-year budget pressures
that we were seeking tomanage and there were other
issues with the Department about splitting the
budget and so on, but the fundamental issue about
whether there was suYcient money left in the budget
to take the programme forward only became clear in
December.
Q6 Ian Stewart: What was your reaction? What did
you do at that point?
Mr Haysom: Well, we were pretty shocked because
where we had got to is that, if I can give a bit of
background here, the speed with which the situation
changed is one of the most extraordinary things
about the whole episode.Up until the summer of last
year, the world was pretty much as we had
understood it to be for the previous ﬁve years where
we had a very successful programme that was
running within budget and where our biggest
challenge was making sure that there were suYcient
projects in the pipeline that would come to fruition
in a timely fashion so that they could be delivered in
future years. And that was the situation right the
way through the summer of 2008. That was the
situation, incidentally, that was conﬁrmed by a
National Audit OYce Report at that stage.
Q7 Ian Stewart: Did you have any information in
2008?
Mr Haysom: We had an in-year budget pressure of
£110 million to manage and we were in active
discussion with the Department to manage that.
Q8 Ian Stewart: In hindsight, was that information
right or wrong?
Mr Haysom: The £110 million was the right
information and we could see that very clearly, but
the way that we had anticipated managing that £110
million overspend was through end of year
ﬂexibilities. That was not something that proved
possible, but that situation was resolved when the
budget was brought forward from 2010/11. So that
in-year problem was resolved during that period.
However, the bigger problem, the problem that we
are now here talking about, the ﬁrst indication that
there may have been something that was worrying,
in truth, only came in November . . . .
Q9 Chairman: Sorry, but just before you go on to
that point, in February 2008 the LSC commissioned
the Capital AVordability Review which clearly said,
according to Foster, that “the continuation of the
current payment proﬁle of projects is unaVordable to
the Council”. Did that not set warning bells oV as
early as February?
Mr Haysom: Sorry, I was asked very speciﬁcally
about when I was aware and that report was not
escalated within our organisation to the extent that
it reached my desk. So I was never aware of that
report, and that meant that neither I nor senior
DIUS oYcials nor anyone else was aware that that
report existed.
Q10 Chairman: So a major report which says that it
was unaVordable never got as far as your desk, as
Chief Executive?
Mr Haysom: It did not, and that is one of the big
failures that has occurred here, that failure to
escalate that information.
Q11Chairman:Was that the starting point?Was that
the key point?
Mr Haysom: The key point in?
Q12 Chairman: In terms that it had been picked up
in February 2008.
Mr Haysom: Yes, if we had been able to identify the
issue in February 2008, there would still have been
an issue to manage, but it would have been a very
diVerent issue to manage.
Q13 Ian Stewart:We are trying to work out what the
implication of this situation that you found yourself
in was for colleges as well. Now, we are being told
that some colleges were aware of this problem as
early as October 2008, but others were not. Is that
the case and, if it is the case, Mark, why were some
of the colleges left in the dark about that?
Mr Haysom: I am not clear how some of the colleges
could have been aware in October 2008. Alarm bells
may have started ringing for some colleges in
November when the Council met to consider
applications and at that stage there were concerns or
not concerns, but there were questions about, “Hang
on, there’s an awful lot of applications coming
through now and we need to be clear about long-
term aVordability”, so there were no real alarm bells
ringing, as such, but there was a genuine—
Q14 Ian Stewart: So you are not aware of any private
conversations between people from the LSC and
some colleges?
Mr Haysom: I am certainly not aware of that in
October.
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Q15 Mr Cawsey: As I understand it, for projects
which were estimated to cost up to £10million where
the Council’s contribution was 50% or less, you had
the delegated authority to approve those.
Mr Haysom: Yes.
Q16 Mr Cawsey: What sort of value did you
approve?
Mr Haysom: In total, I am sorry, I do not have that
information to hand. I can ﬁnd that for you.
Q17MrCawsey:Could youwrite to the Committee?
Mr Haysom: I can certainly provide that. The LSC
can do it on my behalf because I do not have access
to that information.1
Q18 Mr Cawsey: Whilst it is not on your watch
anymore, I think, as a Committee, we would be
interested to hear your views on what should now
happen to put things right.
Mr Haysom: I think the recommendations that Sir
Andrew makes are, fundamentally, sound, and I
obviously discussed those with him at the time and I
understand that those actions are being followed
through. It is probably more appropriate at your
meeting with GeoV Russell, David Hughes and
Chris Banks, I think, for them to describe where they
have got to with that.
Q19 Graham Stringer: You have repeated, not
verbatim, but more or less, the sentiment of your
statement when you resigned: “No matter where
those mistakes have been made and no matter how
many people have been involved in the capital
programme, as the Chief Executive of the LSC, I am,
of course, ﬁnally accountable”. That begs a lot of
questions. Where were the mistakes made and who
should have stepped in?
Mr Haysom: You will understand perhaps that I am
not really interested in pointing a ﬁnger at
individuals within the LSC; I do not think that is
helpful at all.What I would say is that I worked with
a group of people in the LSC who were
extraordinarily dedicated and committed and no
one there who was involved in the management of
this programme set out to do a bad job, no one there
was negligent, they were just overtaken by events.
Although, I am sure, they regret that, I really do not
want to talk about individuals.
Q20 Mr Boswell: Although they were frightened of
bringing forward bad news? There is always a danger
about, “Do you want to manage it at our level or do
you need to escalate it?”
Mr Haysom: Tim, I worked very hard in the LSC to
try and create a culture which was really open and
where people could actually come directly tomewith
their concerns, and I made myself extraordinarily
available to the whole organisation where I was out
and about with staV and so on. So there was nothing
within the organisation that should have led that to
have happened. There was a breakdown here that
happened and some of that is diYcult to explain as
1 See Ev 48
to why the report, in particular, was not escalated all
the way, but I do not think it was the case of someone
being frightened of sharing bad news.
Q21 Ian Stewart: But we have a statutory
responsibility to try and review what has gone on.
Mr Haysom: Absolutely, and I understand that.
Q22 Ian Stewart: It is really important that you do
not take it in personal terms, but that you really try
and answer Graham Stringer’s questions.
Mr Haysom: Forgive me, I was not taking it
personally at all, not at all. What I was saying is that
I do not think it is helpful. Individuals made some
mistakes here, and my point is, and I think Sir
Andrew says the same thing, that individuals made
mistakes, but there is no point in pointing ﬁngers at
individuals.
Mr Marsden: But we are trying to establish the line
of responsibility and management, Mark. That is
not a question of putting blame on individuals, it is
trying to understand and analyse the structure of
your organisation.
Q23 Graham Stringer: In my experience, and I
suppose I have been in charge of a number of capital
programmes, most mistakes are a mixture of system
mistakes and people mistakes, and it would be
remiss of us, as aCommittee, not to try andwork out
what the balance is with that, so I would like to push
the question, and I do not expect you to say that it
was Fred Bloggs’ fault because it was obvious that
you have paid the ultimate price in terms of this
particular job, but I would like to get a deeper
explanation as to why the report in February did not
end up on your desk and was not sent to DIUS.
What went wrong? Was it a system failure?
Mr Haysom: My understanding, and this is
obviously an understanding well after the event, is
that what happened was that the report was
commissioned by the Director who was responsible
and he took that to the Capital Committee, which
then existed. We had all sorts of governance boards
within the organisation to make sure that there were
checks and balances in the organisation, and they
did the right thing and took it to the next level, which
was the Finance Performance Committee. At that
stage, I understand, the Committee there were not
convinced that what was being said was robust
enough and, at that stage, it broke down. At that
point, if it had come forward, then it would have
been a diVerent matter, but, I have to say, that was
almost exactly at the time as we received an NAO
Report, where they had been crawling all over the
organisation, which found no really immediate
cause for concern. There were some very helpful
things in that report, but there were no immediate
causes for concern.
Q24 Chairman: But that was in July.
Mr Haysom: Yes, that was in July, but, forgive me,
by the time it got to the Finance Performance Board,
it was the summer, so—
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Q25 Mr Boswell: So it took four months to get one
level of escalation?
MrHaysom: I think the ﬁrstmeeting that considered
this was in April, so it was not four months, it was
from April.
Q26 Graham Stringer: Did you not think it part of
your responsibility, when you knew that there were
the diVerent committees in your organisation
looking at this report—
Mr Haysom: No, forgive me, I did not know they
were looking at that report.
Q27 Graham Stringer: Well, do you not think you
should have done?
Mr Haysom: How would I have known? I had not
commissioned that report. That had been
commissioned by the people in my organisation.
Q28 Graham Stringer: Well, I ﬁnd that a curious
answer and I would like you to expand on it. Are you
saying, as Chief Executive, when you have got
ﬁnance committees and governance committees,
that you did not have sight of the papers going to
those committees?
Mr Haysom:Forgive me, I was running a £12 billion
organisation and I could not possibly have had sight
of all the papers going to all the committees.
Q29 Graham Stringer: But the capital programme is
a signiﬁcant part of what you were doing.
Mr Haysom: It was important.
Q30 Graham Stringer: I would not expect you to be
reading reports about whether a clerical oYcer was
promoted from whatever grades there were, but I
would expect a chief executive to be looking at
reports about amajor part of your business. I do ﬁnd
it curious and I would just like to know why you
were not. You cannot look at everything—
Mr Haysom: No, I cannot look at everything.
Q31 Graham Stringer:—but this is not trivial.
Mr Haysom: It is not trivial and no one would
pretend that it is, but it was not the most signiﬁcant
thing that we were doing, by any stretch of the
imagination. It was one of many programmes that
we were responsible for and I think it needs to be
seen in that context. I had run the organisation in a
particular way very successfully for six years and I
had people in place whowere doing those checks and
balances and who would bring to me and to the
Management Group the papers that were required
so that we could then consider them. There is no way
that I could reach down right the way into the
organisation and be looking at all issues at all times.
Q32 Graham Stringer: Is that still your view, having
reﬂected a great deal on what has happened?
Mr Haysom: Is it still my view that?
Q33Graham Stringer:That it was the right thing not
to have stepped in?
Mr Haysom: Well, the way I managed was that I
would be doing performance reviews with diVerent
parts of the organisation all the time and I would be
scrutinising management information with the
executive teams and I would be meeting with them
on a regular basis and talking to them about their
issues at any given moment so that I had a full
understanding of what was going on. And it did not
surface. That approach has served me throughout
my whole career very, very well and to try and do it
the other way round and try and read everything in
the organisation to anticipate issues, I am not sure
that is do-able.
Q34 Chairman: Mark, are you the senior oYcer
responsible for accounting within the LSC?
Mr Haysom: I was, yes.
Q35 Chairman: On Graham Stringer’s question
about the capital programme, in this year that we are
talking about it was £1.1 billion, but you did not feel
that it was necessary for that to be reported directly
to you as to whether it was on track?
Mr Haysom: Forgive me, the regular meetings I had
were demonstrating that it was on track and I sat on
the Council obviously and so on, so it is not that I
was in the dark.
Q36 Chairman: You did not make that clear to
Graham at all.
Mr Haysom: Forgive me, I am sorry, I thought you
were asking a very speciﬁc question as to why I did
not see that particular report at that particular time
and why I did not read the papers from that
particular committee.
Q37 Graham Stringer: I was, and I suppose the
implication of my question or my understanding is
that that report, the Capital AVordability Report,
would have been key to understanding what was
happening in the capital programme.
Mr Haysom: It would, would it not.
Q38 Graham Stringer: That is why I keep coming
back to the point, that do you not think you should
have read that report?
Mr Haysom: If I had known it existed, then
obviously yes.
Q39 Graham Stringer: So you did not even look at
the agendas of the committees?
Mr Haysom: Well, forgive me, but I do not know
whether the paper outlines all the remit of the LSC
and all the committees that exist, but there is no way
that I could have seen all of those.
Q40 Graham Stringer: I just do not accept that, I
simply do not. Having sat on top of an organisation
probably more complex than the LSC, you can look
at all the agendas.
Mr Haysom: Well, the way that I had run an
organisation very successfully for many, many years
was that I met with the management teams, the
executive teams, on a regular basis to review
performance and we would sit down and we would
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consider all of the issues that were surfacing, and
that issue never surfaced. That is the way that I ran
the organisation and not by reading agendas.
Q41MrMarsden:Mark, can I just follow up the last
point. You just said that you met on a regular basis
with the management teams and all the rest of it, but
what was your relationship with the LSC’s
management board? How often did you meet them?
Mr Haysom: The Management Group?
Q42 Mr Marsden: The management board.
Mr Haysom: Themost senior board that we had was
the Management Group and that was a monthly
meeting.
Q43 Mr Marsden: Because the LSC’s management
board received a paper on capital issues at its
meeting on 13 May 2008—
Mr Haysom: It did.
Q44 Mr Marsden:—which warned of “increasing
pressures on the capital budget—alerting to expect
advice on short- and medium-term priorities at the
meeting of 12 June”. Were you aware of that report?
Mr Haysom: Of course, yes, and we considered that
at that meeting, but it was very much focused on
those short- and medium-term issues as that was the
in-year—
Q45 Mr Boswell: That was the in-year funding?
Mr Haysom:—£110 million.
Q46 Mr Marsden: So you did not hear any alarm
bells coming out of that?
Mr Haysom: No. If I had have done, Gordon, then
it would have been a very diVerent story.
Q47 Mr Marsden: I want to take you on a little bit
in terms of the chronology of this and ask you about
your relationship in terms of following through the
project because obviously I understand the point
that you make, that you cannot micro-manage, and
clearly your own style was not to micro-manage, the
organisation, and we know that, as part of your
tenure, you devolved a great deal of responsibility to
the regions and things, and I want to ask you some
questions about that. If you were not the person in
the LSC who was supposed to be on a day-to-day
basis on top of this project, who was and how often
did you meet with them?
Mr Haysom: Well, the way this worked is that there
was a director directly responsible, the Director for
Infrastructure and Property, I think, is the job title,
who had done the job very successfully—
Q48 Mr Marsden: That was Phil Head?
Mr Haysom:—through my whole time with the
LSC. He, in turn, reported to the Director of
Resources, and the Director of Resources was
supported by the Finance Director because he had
the ﬁnance team and was, as well, managing that. So
that is the line of management, and then I would be
meeting with the Director of Resources on, very
often, a daily basis, but certainly weekly and I would
be meeting with Phil Head on a very frequent basis
during the year.
Q49 Mr Marsden: So, even if you were not aware of
some of these pressures, one can assume, unless there
was a completely fundamental breakdown of
responsibilities within the organisation, that your
Director of Resources was and that Phil Head,
presumably, certainly was. Did they at no time
indicate some of the pressure points which Foster
has uncovered and did you at no time ask any
questions about them?
Mr Haysom: We talked consistently about the in-
year issues that I have described.
Q50 Mr Marsden: So you never got from your
Director of Resources any suggestion of the long-
term problems that were already being identiﬁed in
papers within your organisation?
Mr Haysom: I think everyone was focused on trying
to solve the in-year issues.
Q51 Mr Marsden: So, in fact, no one, it is fair to say
on the basis of what you have said, was looking
beyond the short term and the day-to-day?
Mr Haysom: I think that is probably overstating it
a bit.
Q52MrMarsden: Is it, because I have asked you and
I have given you the opportunity to say whether at
any time the Director of Resources or your day-to-
day Manager, Phil Head, raised those issues with
you? You have told us earlier on that you had a
culture of openness in your organisation which you
had tried to promote in which you wanted people to
come to talk to you, so why did these people, who
had these burdens potentially on their shoulders for
beyond the day-to-day, not come and talk to you
about them?
Mr Haysom: I think that is very diYcult for me to
answer. Given the other pressures that we had been
under as an organisation, I think there are some
reasons that you could speculate about—such as the
fact that the Machinery of Government changes, in
particular, had changed some fundamental things
about the LSC. You could speculate as to the impact
that had had.
Q53 Chairman: Whilst you have answered both to
Gordon Marsden and to Graham Stringer about
your absence of information on this programme,
was there anyone from DIUS who was actually
plugged in because, after all, the Permanent
Secretary has the overall accounting responsibility
for the DIUS budget, of which £1.1 billion seems to
be a reasonable amount of money that he should be
interested in? Was there someone from DIUS who
was actually plugged in at a lower level than chief
executive that should have been aware of this
programme that was going wrong?
Mr Haysom:Tomy knowledge, there is nothing that
the LSC does, there is no management information
that the LSC has, that is not shared with DIUS and
the level of scrutiny has always been intense. And,
Processed: 10-07-2009 22:37:04 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 430288 Unit: PAG1
Ev 6 Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee: Evidence
13 May 2009 Mr Mark Haysom CBE
just to return to my comment a moment ago about
the Machinery of Government, it had become even
more intense thereafter.
Q54 Chairman: So, and this is really important,
Mark, in your view, that information, which was at
a lower level in your organisation, including the
Capital AVordability Report which appeared in
February of 2008, you believe, would have got
through to DIUS?
Mr Haysom: I believe that there was a DIUS oYcial
who had had sight of that report. I only know that
now.
Q55 Chairman: There was a DIUS oYcial?
Mr Haysom: Yes, but it obviously did not surface at
a senior level within DIUS.
Q56 Mr Marsden: Youmentioned very helpfully the
issue of Machinery of Government changes and I
want to ask you a straightforward question: given
that some 49% of the income into this sector comes
fromDCSF, although the sponsoring Department is
DIUS, did you at any time over that period have
discussions formally or informally with oYcials or
ministers in DCSF?
Mr Haysom: About?
Q57 Mr Marsden: About the capital programme?
Mr Haysom: I cannot recollect during 2008 having
discussions.
Q58 Mr Marsden: So no discussions with no—
Mr Haysom: Not about the overall state of the
programme.
Q59 Mr Marsden: So no involvement with DCSF
at all?
Mr Haysom: There were discussions going on about
the fact that we—
Q60 Mr Marsden: But you never sat down with
senior oYcials atDCSF ormet with them informally
or discussed informally any of the aspects of the
capital programme?
Mr Haysom: We discussed the split that had
occurred in the budget and the actual pressures that
had happened as a consequence of that and we
discussed the fact that we could have been in a
situationwhere therewas potentially pressure on one
side of the budget and underspend on the other, but,
beyond that, we did not have any discussions.
Q61 Mr Marsden: I want to quote to you something
from Andrew Foster’s Report where he says that
DIUS monitored the LSC during the period, as you
have said, and most of the information was actually
collected and held centrally by the LSC. “Senior
staV”, this is what Foster says, “in DIUS could have
probed more actively the robustness of the forward
projections of future funding commitments”. Who
do you think the senior staV were that he was
referring to there?
Mr Haysom: I do not know who he was referring to
there. You would have to ask him.
Q62 Mr Marsden: So let me come on to the
ministerial meetings that, we are told, you held,
according to Foster, on 16 June, 21 October and 16
December 2008, and only at the 16 December 2008
one was the capital programme discussed. I am
picking up, I am afraid, what Graham Stringer and
the Chairman have said. Given that this was such a
signiﬁcant part of your overall activities, why were
there no discussions at themeetingswithDIUS prior
to 16 June and 21 October? Did it not occur to you
that, since this was a major part of your overall
programme, it might be reasonable to put it on the
agenda and raise with ministers even the fact that
this all appeared to be going well?
Mr Haysom: I think the truth is that, because this
programme had been going very well for a very long
time, it was felt that there was no need to discuss it
on agendas which were always very full. There is a
huge range of issues, and you know, as a Committee,
the range of issues . . . ..
Q63 Mr Marsden: I am aware of that.
Mr Haysom: The agendas were always very, very
full.
Q64 Mr Marsden: I understand that, but let us just
take one, 21 October. By 21 October, you had had
the Capital AVordability Review, you had had the
management board paper, you had had the LSC
Council in July, you had had all of these areas and in
all of those areas warning signs were coming up. You
are telling us that no one in your organisation at any
stage indicated any issues there which made you, or
made the people putting your agenda together,
think, “This might be something we should raise
with ministers, even if it’s only to clear our backs”?
Mr Haysom: We were talking with ministers about
the in-year pressures.
Q65 Mr Marsden: Well, I just want to come to a
couple of other points then, if I may, because on
November 17 you gave evidence to the Public
Accounts Committee, and you gave that evidence
alongside Susan Pember, your Director of FE and
Skills Performance Group, and also alongside Ian
Watmore, the Permanent Secretary, and we have a
number of extracts from the uncorrected transcript
both of what Ian Watmore said and of what you
said.You said, and, in the light ofwhat you have told
us today, perhaps it is not surprising, “I think that at
the moment we are content, given the scale and
nature of this project, that we are in good shape”.
Now, clearly, you said that in good faith, but again,
in preparing for your evidence session with the
Public Accounts Committee, did you not discuss it
because you must have realised that you would be
asked questions about the capital project, so did you
not go back to your line managers and say, “I want
to know everything about this, the good and the bad.
I’m not just there to tell them everything is
wonderful, but I need to be prepared for diYcult and
probing questions; the Public Accounts Committee
is not a patsy”? Did you not do any of that? Did you
not get any of that in time?
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Mr Haysom: Forgive me, yes, of course I did all of
that and there were no warning signs and, if there
had have been, I would have answered in a very
diVerent way. I think I did refer in the Committee to
the fact that there had been a very dramatic increase
in the number of projects coming forward. I seem to
recall that, but I have not gone back to that since.
Q66 Mr Marsden: Again, Mr Watmore gave
evidence on that occasion, so did you not have any
informal conversations withMrWatmore before the
evidence session? Did he not ask questions about the
robustness of the situation? Did that not also act as
a prompt within your organisation to ask about
where the capital programme was up to?
Mr Haysom: I think, from recollection, that I had
one preparatory meeting with Ian when we went
through what were identiﬁed as the ‘major issues’
and went through the work that had been done to
help us to prepare and to consider that.
Q67 Mr Marsden: I have referred to the regional
assessment process and the strength that you put on
the regional structure. Did you never at any time ask
your regional directors to give you region-by-region
reports on the state of their programmes in terms of
the committedness of the funding and any potential
over-committedness?
Mr Haysom: Yes, you will be aware from Sir
Andrew’s Report that we did that on a regular basis,
and one of the things that had happened was that we
had gone round all of the regions, asking what was
in the pipeline and for their best estimate of future
demand. And in 2007, I think, the ﬁgure that came
back was that there was £8 billion worth of activity
in the pipeline. One of the things that happened in
2008 is that, when that came back again, and I think
that was in the September, having reviewed it, that
number had leapt to £16 billion. So we were very
anxious about that and started to talk about how
feasible that was, and it obviously was not going to
be manageable, but the NAO Report had looked at
the overall aVordability of this project within the £8
billion over a period to 2016—
Q68MrMarsden:But,Mark, you are a businessman
and you ran a highly successful business, I think it
was Trinity Mirror, before you came here. If
someone comes to you and says that it is £16 billion
when they have added up all that aggregate, despite
what the NAO or anybody else must have said, did
that not lodge a warning light in your mind to ask
about some of these issues?
Mr Haysom: Absolutely, and we were saying at that
stage, but, forgive me, you are now in a situation
where you are in September, I think, but I do not
have the information in front ofme, and at that stage
we were saying, “Well, that is obviously not
aVordable. We’ve got to go back to the regions and
we’ve got to work that through to get back to amuch
more sensible number”, so that is what we were
saying.
Q69 Mr Marsden: Finally, can you tell me who was
at the ministerial meetings in October and
December?
Mr Haysom: Which ministers?
Q70 Mr Marsden: Yes.
Mr Haysom: Not oV the top of my head, no. I would
have to ask the LSC just to conﬁrm that as there was
a diVerent cast of ministers at diVerent times.
Mr Marsden: Can you come back to the Committee
with that conﬁrmation?
Q71 Chairman: You can ask the LSC for that?
Mr Haysom: Yes.2
Q72 Mr Boswell: Brieﬂy, Mark, I think you will
appreciate that the main interest of our Committee
is not raking over the past, but looking, in this case,
for your take on lessons for the future. I have four
rather targeted questions and, if I sound to lead, it is
in order to try and get a conclusion or response from
you. Firstly, it seems to me, from your evidence, that
this was seen as a tactical, in-year adjustment
situation rather than a strategic or systemic risk to
the activities of the capital programme. Is that your
understanding and, further, would you say from that
that it may well have spooked any later
consideration of this as having escalated into a
serious risk, that it had been read as one type of
problem, but in fact it was another?
MrHaysom:As I have said, wewere entirely focused
on trying to resolve that in-year issue and it was seen
to be an in-year issue. In terms of the longer-term
strategic issue, and this is the point earlier that I
touched on with the Machinery of Government, I
think actually that the way we were thinking about
the future had changed pretty dramatically. We were
in the business of steering the organisation towards
an end point of April 2010, and that kind of longer-
term strategic thinking, I have been thinking about
this a lot since I stepped down, suVered. As a
consequence of that the whole organisation becomes
focused on that end point rather than managing the
way that you would previously.
Q73 Mr Boswell: Secondly, are you disturbed
historically by the time-lags between the diVerent
levels that you have described in your evidence, and
is that an important point for the future, that at least,
as issues escalate, they escalate reasonably
promptly? You are talking about, even on your
account, a two-month delay between one level and
another.
Mr Haysom: What should happen in any well-run
organisation is that, if there is a serious issue which
emerges, then it should escalate very quickly indeed,
regardless of what the governance structure within
that organisation might suggest.
Q74 Mr Boswell: Thirdly, in terms of risk analysis
and the boards I sit on, we spend all our time on this,
but do you have, or did you have, or should you have
had, a traYc light system which is green, steady
2 See Ev 47
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state, amber, “We need to be looking at this”, and
red, the bells are ﬂashing? Do you need a graded
assessment?
Mr Haysom: Yes, absolutely, and we revisited our
whole risk management approach during 2008
because it was not as robust as it should have been
previously—and the Audit Committee were doing a
very good job for the LSC and ﬂagged that up. So I
put in place very prompt action to address that and
we put in place, what I considered to be, a pretty
robust risk management approach. Next question:
why was the capital programme not on the risk
register? I think, well, I know, because it was seen to
be a success, that ﬂipping into, in record time, a
situation of over-demand was not seen to be an issue
on the radar. I am sorry, but it was not.
Q75 Mr Boswell: That is helpful. Lastly, clearly, and
you will appreciate that I have sat on the other side
of the table from your predecessor in the FEFC on
this matter, there is a very complex set of
relationships between NDPBs and their sponsoring
ministers and also, of course, the stakeholders in the
sense of colleges and so forth. On reﬂection, have
you got any messages to relay to the Committee
about the ideal future structure of that tripartite
relationship? Was there historically a
communications problem within the three? Could
messages have been sent from the Minister more
eVectively? What sort of frequency or other mode of
communication change is required to eVect a quicker
readjustment if a situation like this arises in the
future?
Mr Haysom: I think that the lessons that I would
draw on, in particular, from this is that the
relationship with the two departments that we were
involved with, from the Machinery of Government
changes onwards, changed pretty dramatically and,
not surprisingly—
Q76 Mr Boswell:Do youmean they crawled all over
you after this particular thing?
Mr Haysom: Yes, but they had a perfectly legitimate
cause for doing that because they were going to have
to pick up responsibility, one way or another, for
everything the LSC did from an end date, so it was
a perfectly legitimate ‘crawling all over’, if you like.
But the impact of that was a kind of paralysis in
terms of the ability of the Learning and Skills
Council to take its own decisions, so I think—
Q77 Mr Boswell:You went from a sort of autonomy
to becoming a colony.
Mr Haysom: Well, “autonomy” may actually be
overstating it because there has always been an
intense level of scrutiny, but there was certainly a
much greater feeling of being in control of your own
destiny. Whereas, from that point on, everyone was
then working towards this end date and towards a
pretty complex transition process, and it did change
the nature of the whole relationship and it had to, it
was inevitable. I do think that, if it were not for the
Machinery of Government changes, the situation
would have played out in a very diVerent way. I think
the Machinery of Government changes had those
kinds of impacts in terms of the relationships with
the departments, but they also had a huge impact in
creating a surge of demand, which is at the root of all
of this. Colleges were so anxious to get their projects
through in the lifetime of the Learning and Skills
Council that the projects came through much more
quickly than we had anticipated, and that would not
have happened, I do not think, otherwise.
Q78Chairman:Can I just pick up, ﬁnally, one or two
very, very brief points, and it is picking straight up
from your last comments. In the Westminster Hall
debates and questions in the House, I think, it has
been fairly clear that many colleges that had modest
capital programme aspirations were encouraged to
beef them up into mega capital programme
aspirations and were given the green light to do so.
Was that as a direct result of you, as the Chief
Executive of the organisation, telling the
organisation, “Get out there and build up these
bids”?
Mr Haysom: No, not—
Q79 Chairman: Where did it come from?
Mr Haysom:—not to build up the bids. I was giving
very clear messages, as were ministers at the time,
that this was a once-in-a-generation opportunity to
rebuild the capital estate and that what we wanted to
do, where it was possible, was to create great
buildings and what we did not want to do was to just
put up buildings that replicated the existing
buildings, just a bit more modern.
Q80 Chairman: You are saying that this came from
ministers to you?
Mr Haysom: No, I am saying that jointly we were
saying that this was a fantastic opportunity and
ministers were keen to be part of the opportunity. It
was something which, as I have said, from 2003
onwards, I was absolutely passionate about.
Q81 Chairman: So ministers were saying this, yet
they were not saying to you, “We need to have a
handle on the expenditure” as it was going through?
Mr Haysom:Forgive me, but we had a handle on the
expenditure all the way through so that every year
we had to account for expenditure and we were
monitoring that all the way through, and that served
us very well right up to the spring/summer of last
year, but the world changed at that point and, as Sir
Andrew points out, there was this enormous, I think
he calls it a “tsunami”, but this surge in demand and
that was a fundamental change, it was a
discontinuity and that—
Q82 Chairman: What I am saying is that that surge,
that tsunami of demand, was deliberately engineered
by ministers and yourself, as an organisation.
Mr Haysom: I do not think it was “deliberately
engineered”. We were not engineering a surge in
demand. What we were trying to do was to—
Q83 Chairman: If you are asking people to go from
modest bids to major bids, is that not engineering it?
Processed: 10-07-2009 22:37:04 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 430288 Unit: PAG1
Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee: Evidence Ev 9
13 May 2009 Mr Mark Haysom CBE
Mr Haysom: I do not think we were asking people
to go frommodest to major. The signal that we were
giving was, “If we’re going to put up new buildings,
can we make sure that they are buildings that are
right for the community, right for learners and right
for employers and use this opportunity, wherever
possible, to create great buildings”. That is the
message that consistently went out.
Q84 Chairman: The NAOReport in July 2008, were
you surprised by it or did you say, “This is a seal of
approval for our organisation”?
Mr Haysom:Yes, theNAO is not given to praise and
I actually thought it was a very positive report. I was
the one that suggested that the NAO came in and
looked at the capital programme because I felt that
it was a programme that was signiﬁcant, important
and that it was something that we could feel good
about. They veriﬁed that.
Q85Chairman:Whydid they do such a hopeless job?
Mr Haysom: I do not think they did a hopeless job.
Q86 Chairman: Well, they never picked up the
February 2008 document. Does that mean that you
did not give it to them? Did you hide the key
information from them?
Mr Haysom: I cannot answer that. I obviously did
not hide anything from them.
Q87 Chairman: You did not hide anything from
them, but, given that clear steer in February and the
fact that in-year problems were arising which were
causing you signiﬁcant cause for concern, yet the
NAO produce a report which says that everything is
hunky-dory?
Mr Haysom: I do not think they actually produced
a report which said that everything was hunky-dory.
I think they produced a report whichwas careful and
considered.
Q88 Chairman: It did not highlight any of the risks.
Mr Haysom: It talked about the need for
prioritisation further down the line. It says, “If
you’re going to deliver this programme to 2016, you
will need to prioritise”, so it talked about that. It
talked about the fact that we needed more robust
management information systems within it as well
and it made a number of other recommendations, so
I think to characterise it in the way that you are is,
frankly, not fair.
Q89 Chairman: Unfair?
Mr Haysom: Yes.
Chairman: Okay, I stand rebuked. On that note,
could I thank you verymuch indeed,MarkHaysom,
for coming this morning and say that we are
genuinely appreciative of the fact that you found
time to come before us.
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Q90 Chairman: Could I very very strongly welcome
our ﬁrst panel of witnesses this morning: Martin
Doel, the Chief Executive of the Association of
Colleges; andGrahamMoore, the Principal of Stoke
College and Chair of the 157 Group. Could I say,
Graham, this session was as a result of the 157
Group actually putting in a request to the
Committee for one of our topical sessions.
Mr Moore: I am ever so glad you mentioned that,
Chairman!
Mr Marsden: Be careful what you wish for!
Mr Boswell: So far so good.
Q91 Chairman: And ﬁnally, we welcome Dr John
Blake, the Principal of Sussex Downs College. We
are very tight on time and I am ﬁnishing spot on two
minutes before ten so if you could be as brief with
your answers as possible. I wonder if I could start
with you, Martin. When were you told about the
problems with the LSC capital programme and who
told you?
Mr Doel: The ﬁrst occasion when I was spoken to
about the problems with the capital programme was
in December when I received informal notice of the
Council decision to suspend the programme.
Q92 Chairman: But we are told that colleges were
already informing the AoC, and indeed the 157
Group, as early as October 2008 of problems with
the capital programme, so why did you not act on
that?
Mr Doel: As represented in October and into the
autumn it was about cash ﬂow in terms of
availability of funds to pay bills due around capital
builds. When we enquired at that time we were
advised that this was simply a cash ﬂow issue, there
was no question of bills not having been paid.
Q93 Chairman: So you did in fact respond to those
comments coming from some of your members?
Mr Doel: We followed up through my Director of
Funding and Development, Julian Gravatt, to ask a
question about why these bills had not been paid
on time.
Q94 Chairman: With the LSC as well as the DIUS?
Mr Doel: No, the LSC only.
Q95 Chairman: What about you, Graham?
Mr Moore: I think there were two stages. OYcially
we did not know anything until December when the
process ground to a halt and there were a lot of
rumours and discussions. My colleague down the
road at the sixth form college was one of the colleges
involved in that process and they were simply told
that decisions were being postponed. I think it is fair
to say that in the sector before that period there was
a general feeling of unease growing because we are
all intelligent people, so are the local LSC oYces,
and so on, and we could see that the volume was
building up. I am one of the colleges in that group of
70-odd colleges between approval in principle and
approval in detail, and at a meeting in September
2008 we received approval in principle for £96
million and Bradford College, who were also there
on the same day, received approval in principle for
over £100 million. It does not take a genius to work
out that those sorts of ﬁgures cannot go on for very
long given the ﬁnite size of the budget.
Q96Mr Boswell:Did that not occur to the other side
as well?
Mr Moore: You would have to ask the others how
they perceived it but it did seem to me that pressure
was certainly building up. I think it was perfectly
understandable why it had. The early bidders had
got quite a lot of reserves and therefore could put a
lot into the pot. Themore diYcult cases, and perhaps
one would say the more needy cases, were then
coming on stream, places like Bradford, in diYcult
urban areas without the same sort of reserves, and
they were making big demands on the LSC funding
pot. However, I would have to say the capital cases
were very strong.
Q97 Chairman: John, do you want a quick word
here?
Dr Blake: Just as a speciﬁc example, the history of
last year is interesting for us. In July last year we had
a meeting where a £175 million project was basically
approved to go through in terms of AiP. In
September we were told that maybe it needed to be
phased so we began to be a little bit concerned about
what that meant. In December you hear rumours
that things have happened at National Committee,
but it is not in fact until I get back to the college on
the ﬁrst day in January that I get an email telling me
that things are on hold. We had obviously taken
some prudent decisions internally within the college
in order to take account of where we thought things
were moving.
Q98 Chairman: You are saying in July there were
rumours?
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DrBlake: In July there is a huge tick for a big project,
in September there is talk of phasing instead of one
large project, but it is not until January that I get a
statement saying do not spend any more money, put
it on hold.
Q99 Chairman: In terms of the September who was
giving you the evil eye at that point?
Dr Blake: That is the LSC process.
Q100 Mr Marsden: Can I just ask on that question,
you say it was the LSC process, I am going to press
you on that: Phil Head, who was the national
organisation guy who went round to all the colleges,
did he come to you and was it Phil Head who
advised you?
Dr Blake: Yes, he did come to the college.
Q101 Mr Marsden: And was it Phil Head who
advised you of the scaling down?
Dr Blake: Yes.
Q102 Mr Boswell: But it was still presented as an in-
year adjustment problem?
Dr Blake: It was an adjustment to the scheme that
was originally planned so it was still the same scheme
but it was in a number of phases rather than one
fell swoop.
Q103MrBoswell: I wonder if I can askMartin—and
I do not think it is unfair because he has previous
experience of administration—it seems to me just
looking at this to have been a serious
communications problem. First of all, in terms of
your present organisation, do you think you could
have been more proactive in asking the Department
or the LSC, “Houston, we have a problem,” and
conversely were the mechanisms in place or do you
think they could have been improved to make sure
that that amber light if not a red light ﬂashed much
earlier so that people were not embarrassed in the
way that clearly they have been? Is this a failure of
structure or is this something else?
Mr Doel: I think it is a failure of structure and
process within the LSC which would make it very
diYcult with the way that they were operating for
any external organisation to have any reliable
picture of the ﬂow of funds and cash towards the
people that were due to receive those monies.
Q104MrBoswell: So theywere not really in dialogue
with you in terms of it?
Mr Doel: The only dialogue that I would have had
or oversight that our organisationwould have had in
terms of capital ﬂows or funds for capital would
have been talking directly to our own colleges and
collating a picture to understand what was
occurring. That is what we sought to do as soon as
the suspension was notiﬁed.
Q105 Mr Boswell: Only ex post? I think John had
said, or perhaps Graham said, that there was
beginning to be concern and conversations in the
sector, but actually it really did come like a bolt from
the blue?
Mr Doel: I would share Graham’s view that there
was beginning to be some stirring of unease but
because of the opaqueness of the way in which the
LSC was doing its business at that time—and there
was a good deal of opaqueness on many matters,
including Train to Gain funding—actually trying to
work through that to understand where you are
would have been very diYcult.
Q106 Mr Boswell: Or to register your own concern?
MrDoel:And also to go and ask the collegeswithout
due cause at that time would have been to induce
more concern, arguably, and also some of them
would have been reluctant, even to a trustedmember
organisation, to give full details of their ﬁnancial
exposure at that stage. It was only when it became
clear that there was something serious happening
that they became more open to sharing information
at the individual institution level, and that then we
could begin to form a picture of what we believed to
be the seriousness of the situation.
Q107 Chairman: I think we have got a reasonable
handle on the chronology but one of the big
problems seems to have been thismassive bidding up
of projects that started oV, and you mentioned
Bradford as a good example, and I know quite a bit
about Bradford, who wanted a fairly modest
development andwere told to bid up.Where did that
culture come from, Graham? Where did that arise?
Is it just hearsay?
Mr Moore: I think Mark Haysom led the LSC with
a big ambitionwhich he sold to theGovernment that
the FE sector urgently needed modernisation and I
think that was one of the key planks on which he led
the LSC.
Q108 Chairman: He was right.
Mr Moore: And he was absolutely right. To begin
with I think he was frustrated with the sector that
they were not coming forward fast enough. They
were not prepared to take enough risks as a sector to
make this happen, so what he was getting was
modest proposals for changes tinkering, if you like,
with the estate structure. I suspect, although I do not
know from the inside, that he sent out instructions,
or his team sent out instructions, to the regions and
to the local areas for them to go out and talk to the
colleges about their plans and asking were these
plans transformational enough. I know in the West
Midlands, for example, in 2007we were all invited to
share with the local LSC and the regional LSC what
our expectations and hopes were, so there was a
regional capital plan. What it could have been was a
capital plan that was based on need and business
case and so on. What I think it was was actually a
wish list of what colleges wanted to do. That was in
2007. It still was not coming through fast enough. I
know in my own college we were asked about what
should we do. I am always reluctant to say that
buildings that are relatively new should go. This is
publicmoneywe are talking about here. I knewwhat
my priorities within the structure were but I was
Processed: 10-07-2009 22:37:04 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 430288 Unit: PAG1
Ev 12 Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee: Evidence
20 May 2009 Mr Martin Doel, Mr Graham Moore and Dr John Blake
constantly questioned, “You are missing an
opportunity. This is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity
for the sector.”
Q109 Chairman: Let me stop you there because
where is the evidence for all of this? We cannot ﬁnd
any evidence that any instruction went from the
Learning and Skills Council to the sub-regional
learning and skills councils and from them to
colleges to say, “This is a letter which says, Mr
Moore, we want you to put in a Rolls-Royce
proposal rather than . . . ”
MrMoore:That is not how the process works. There
is somebody appointed in each local area oYce who
had a remit for capital and it is the way those people
in each local oYce operated with their colleges and
the view was, “So-and-so down the road is doing
this; are you really doing enough?”
Q110 Chairman: So it is all word of mouth? John,
you are about to explain.
Dr Blake: Again just to give an exemplar of it, about
three and a half years ago we had a quite modest
project of about £8million to replace one of our sixth
form colleges. At the beginning of the LSC process,
the point that Graham talked about, it went up to
£30million, then it went up to £90million, and at the
end it was £175 million, and in the end most of that
was a bigging-up process, and that happened
through the regional LSC property process.
Q111 Chairman: Which division are you in?
Dr Blake: South East Region LSC.
Q112 Chairman: So it was the director?
Dr Blake: The team probably. I can remember going
to a meeting with the LSC in Sussex where all the
principals and all the chairs were basically told that
they were being too conservative.
Q113 Mr Boswell: Is that meeting minuted?
Dr Blake: I have no idea.
Q114 Mr Marsden: Can you just conﬁrm, John, you
said it was the regional infrastructure director who
gave you this—
Dr Blake: The regional property adviser would visit
colleges and would suggest that we should be more
aspirational with our projects.
Q115 Mr Marsden: The national Director of
Infrastructure and Property, Phil Head, he visited
your college?
Dr Blake: Only last August at the point when—
Q116 Mr Marsden: And that was when he was
coming to tell you the bad news about scaling down?
Dr Blake: About phasing.
Q117 MrMarsden: So he never at any stage as far as
you are aware—
Dr Blake: Not prior to that, not that I am aware
of, no.
Mr Moore: I think the regional estates oYcers have
actually done a very good job within their remit
which is to look at the proposals and see whether
they make educational sense, to see whether or not
the property case is there. I think that process has
been done very well by the LSC at that level but it
was not within any overall context, it seems to me.
Q118 Mr Marsden: You cannot have projects
without a budget, can you?
Mr Moore: And I do not think that regional oYcers
were asked to take account of the budget
implications of what they were doing, I think that is
the issue.
Mr Doel: Gordon picks up the point about the
National Capital Team and I have spoken to several
colleges who all say that the National Capital Team
came to them and discussed their needs and
encouraged them to be forward-looking and
properly aspirational, they would have said, in terms
of their rebuilds.
Q119 Mr Boswell: Just for the timing of that, that
would have been at least 12 months ago?
Mr Doel: That would have been in the summer of
last year.
Q120 Mr Boswell: Even right up to the summer of
last year?
Mr Doel: Those conversations were still going on
and that was the National Capital Team coming
round to say, “No, it is not sensible for you to leave
part of your estate untouched, you should be coming
up with a plan to refurbish the whole of the estate.”
That may have been through phased development.
The other phenomenon which is worth bearing in
mind is the connection to merger activity. Several
merger proposals would have gone through last year
which would have associated capital expenditure in
relation to their merger proposals and on those
capital expenditure programmes we had several
letters to that eVect noting the requirement for
capital support in order to see through the merger.
Those were about providing modern, high-quality
buildings, ﬁt for the 21st century and there are
statements to those types of eVect. The ﬁnal thing I
would say is a term which has been bandied around
a good deal during this period—and I understand it
and I was there—is that this was a “once-in-a-
generation rebuild”, a “once-in-a-generation
opportunity”. I have to say in that period I did raise
with the LSC in the middle of last summer the fact
that I was not seeing a once-in-a-generation
maintenance programme to go with this once-in-a-
generation rebuild of the estate. That was the only
exchange I had with the LSC about infrastructure
matters ahead of September.
Q121 Dr Iddon: Sir Andrew Foster has used the
expression there was a “champagne moment”
culture and certainly the ﬁgures that you have just
given, Dr Blake, £8 million for a modest bid up to
£175 million, would astonish anybody. Can you
explain what they were encouraging you to jump to
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at £175 million? What were you bidding for at £8
million that you really needed and what were they
preparing to deliver for you at £175 million?
Dr Blake: £8 million was just to replace the worst
piece of accommodation at the college, which is a
sixth form college called Park College, and the
process was essentially to say that this aspirational
culture leading to world-class buildings, as Martin
was saying, meant that all of our campuses and all
of our accommodation stock should be replaced or
renewed, and that is how you eventually get to
£175 million.
Q122 Dr Iddon: How many colleges would that be?
Dr Blake: That is three sixth form colleges and three
parts of the college that deal with 19-plus activity.
Q123 Dr Iddon: It has already been intimated this
morning that people realised with the astonishing
bids that were being encouraged by the LSC that
things could not go on in this way. Do you think the
collegemovement had some responsibility for saying
to the LSC, “We are in dreamland here”? Did
anybody ﬂag this up as a serious issue?
Mr Moore: Can I say that the issue I think is
transparency. If this information had been published
and was freely available then there could have been
an informed dialogue between the Government, the
LSC and colleges. As it was it was all on a one-to-
one basis. You were encouraged to think about your
needs for your college in your community and you
were not encouraged to think about the totality of
the picture nationwide. What would you do with
colleges around you being encouraged to improve?
You would want to make certain that you had the
best facilities for your students in your community,
so your focus as a college was very much what is the
educational case—and we did have to make a strong
educational case—what was that going to cost, what
would we like to do. Most of those bids were bigger
than I think they should have been if we had taken
account of the constraints that the budget was
placing on us and our expectations for the future. If
the expectations for the future were that money
would continue to ﬂow then this was a good idea.
Q124Dr Iddon:Many colleges had proceeded before
they got approval in detail and incurred quite
considerable costs. Why did they not wait?
MrMoore: I think it is very important to understand
if you want to get to approval in principle you have
to have plans at stage C. You have to engage a
professional team of architects, civil engineers and
so on to get to that point. If you get approval in
principle you then have to spend a large tranche of
money to get to approval in detail because this is a
fully costed contract where if you get the money you
sign the contract and you start work the following
day, the “shovel-ready” concept which we hear
about. That is not done cheaply. In our case it would
cost about £5 million. We had spent £2.7 million
when we were told to stop and other colleges were in
the same situation. Some colleges might have
decided to demolish certain life-expired properties in
preparation for that work. Their corporations
would have known that that was at risk and they
would have decided within their budget whether or
not they could aVord to take that risk. I do not think
any corporations felt that they were taking
signiﬁcant risk, in fact it was a requirement: if you
wanted to get AiD and you got AiP you could do
nothing but spend that money. That was absolutely
essential.
Q125 Dr Iddon: Perhaps in coming in, Martin, you
can give some estimate of how much money has
been, I guess, wasted in some cases by having to stall
so many schemes? How much money have we
incurred that might have to be incurred again?
Mr Doel: Certainly in the sector, and this is self-
reported to us, we estimate that £220 million will
have been expended by colleges on capital
programmes. If those programmes go forward and
that expenditure is capitalised then clearly that
money is used. Some part of that, though, if we do
not move forward on all those programmes, will be
sunk costs.
Q126 Mr Boswell: Can we just unpack what that is.
Is that largely the kinds of costs that Graham was
talking about, the pre-contract costs for the
professionals, consultants and so forth, or in certain
cases is it actually for example demolition and
building costs?
Mr Doel: In some cases it will be things like land
purchases, it will be planning permissions which
have limited periods of times, and prefunding. What
I would say in terms of the programme as a whole is
one of the keys of success in delivering projects at the
individual project level on time and to budget has
been the fact that money has been committed
forward to the tune of somewhere around 15% ,in
order to establish cost certainty and delivery. That in
itself put colleges in a risky position but on the
individual projects did allow them to deliver on time
and to spec. It will be a combination of professional
fees, plans and enabling works. Also I think you
need to take account of the fact that in some of these
programmes they are multi-phased developments so
therefore the programmewas rolling. Theywere split
into those phases, successive AiPs and AiDs, so it
made sense to continue these things.
Q127 Mr Boswell: So you had some upfront
expenditure?
Mr Doel: Yes, that is right.
Q128 Mr Boswell: As we have opened this issue, it is
obviously very important to the inquiry, can I ask
you a little bit more how this dialogue is now going
on with the LSC and DIUS. I do not think anyone
is canvassing for legal action if we can avoid it but is
this something that the sector is taking on and
having a dialogue on? Is it a matter of negotiation
with individual colleges to resolve their issues? To
put it crudely, are there writs ﬂying around or is there
a hope that there will be an understanding to resolve
and, if possible, recover or meet some of these costs?
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Mr Doel: We are waiting for greater clarity as to
what will be allowed as recoverable costs for
colleges. There has not been clear guidance on what
will be recoverable for those colleges.
Q129 Mr Boswell: Is that in contrast to the future
scoping of the capital?
Mr Doel: The LSC are currently in the process of
understanding what costs colleges have committed
and what they would consider to have been
reasonable in that process up until January.
Q130 Mr Boswell: Have they admitted “liability” at
least in terms of reasonable costs?
Mr Doel: They have acknowledged that there is a
fees remission scheme that they would observe but
where the additional costs and where the balance of
remission lies, if you like, we have yet to see. That
will be one of the key elements after the forthcoming
Council meeting where they may announce further
expenditure for some colleges. The key point for us
will be what clarity colleges will have on the funds
returned to them and how that will be treated on
their balance sheets in order that they can begin to
work out their own responses to the situation that
they ﬁnd themselves in and having that clarity
going forward.
Q131 Mr Boswell: Two very quick and technical
issues. One is delivery: is anybody not being taught
who would have expected to have been because
facilities have been removed in anticipation? That is
question one. The other one for time I will do
together: is there a possibility that some of this cost
recovery that we have just been talking about will
come out of the pot of money that was announced in
the Budget?
Mr Doel: On the ﬁrst, I am not aware in this
academic year of anyone who is not receiving
training or education who would have aspired to
have received it. Next year will be more diYcult in
terms of the plans that colleges will have made in
order to expand their provision to meet growing
needs, and therefore the hiatus may put a ceiling on
their ability to respond, but inmost cases colleges are
very resilient and responsive andwill do the very best
to support the communities within which they work.
In terms of the allocation of the funds for fees
remission and costs, I would have to say that not
withstanding there has been greater involvement in
the sector representative bodies in the LSC’s
considerations in this matter, which has been very
welcome indeed, I do not have the clarity on what
funds would be available in order to remit fees and
whether or not that will be part of the extra funds
granted within the Budget or part of the LSC’s
normal running. It is just not capable of being
known at this stage.
Q132 Mr Marsden: Graham and John, can I just
come back to you on this business of how the whole
thing was scaled up and how you were encouraged
in a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity, et cetera. Did
either of you when that was being communicated to
you by LSC oYcials have it put in the context of
your region in the sense of, “It is £500 million going
in to our region; you could put a bid in for 70,” or
whatever? I just want to know whether was any
regional context put on this.
Mr Moore: I think there was an attempt to do
regional planning but that fell by the wayside as the
quantity of bids increased.
Q133 Mr Marsden: No-one ever came to you and
said, “You had better put this in because there is only
so much money available in our region”?
Mr Moore: I was aware that they built up a regional
picture from the individual colleges but it was not the
other way round.
Q134 Mr Marsden: I am sorry to press you but you
never got any ﬁgures?
Mr Moore: We did not.
Q135 Mr Marsden: Was that true of you as well,
John?
Dr Blake: We were never aware of any co-ordinated
approach like that.
Mr Moore: Chairman, I am very conscious that we
are running out of time and there are one or two
points that we would like to make if possible which
look forward because we have been spending all the
time looking backwards.
Chairman:We are coming on to that.We have plenty
of time, do not worry!
Q136 Mr Boswell: Just to go back on a point on the
structural issue rather than the cost issue. From
somethingGraham said a little bit ago, and the exact
words may have escaped me at the time, what I am
not clear about is, ﬁrst of all, whether a concerted
dialogue, whether it be on capital or maintenance or
tuition costs or current costs, was ever really
conducted between the colleges and the LSC,
because the inference was that there was no sort of
mechanismwhereby this could be brokered early on.
That is question one. Then there is also an issue
which concerned us last week on which we heard
evidence, the question about whether the underlying
agenda of the wind-up of LSC in 2010 was in a sense
playing into this?My question to put it simply is: has
there been a face-to-face relationship? If there had
been, was there a change in that relationship and, if
so, was that change in the relationship occasioned by
the fact that the LSC was no longer continuing but
was a body in the process of winding down and
dissolution?
Mr Doel: Having looked at the evidence of other
people to this Committee, and also the Foster
Report, even if there had been transparency last
year, I am not persuaded that the LSC had the
processes and procedures in place to understand
where the cash ﬂowwas and they were not managing
the matter in an eVective manner.
Q137 Mr Boswell: Although they are the largest
spender?
Mr Doel: I do not think it was managed in an
eVective manner such that they would be able to
communicate a comprehensible picture to the
Processed: 10-07-2009 22:37:04 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 430288 Unit: PAG1
Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee: Evidence Ev 15
20 May 2009 Mr Martin Doel, Mr Graham Moore and Dr John Blake
colleges. Point one. In terms of the winding up of the
LSC and in terms of attention being elsewhere,
which I think was advanced by some as a signiﬁcant
factor in this, I would put it as a contributory factor.
If the risk management processes, cash ﬂow
management processes and oversight processes were
in place management would have had no alternative
but to give attention to what was one of the largest
programmes running within the LSC. The failures of
the processes in place played into the
communications problem, which then played into
the inability to communicate the situation to
colleges. Having said that, I am still concerned about
the lack of transparency and the way the LSC does
its business. If I give you an example in that regard.
HEFCE publishes within a very short period after
each of its Council meetings the full minutes of those
meetings in consideration to the sector that they
support and fund. The LSCdoes not. Theminutes of
the Council meeting in December were only released
after a Freedom of Information Act request. I have
requested a copy of theminutes of themeeting of the
National Council in March and have yet to see the
full minutes of that Council meeting despite having
requested them. In that regard, even though that is
slightly in rear view mirror terms, that speaks to a
way in which business is done which is not helpful at
all. I do believe the way in which the LSC is now
conducting its business is changing in that regard,
but it does speak of a lack of transparency in the way
that they do their business.
Q138 Chairman: Can I pick up on that, Graham,
and really pick up the point that you were trying to
make earlier. The Capital Reference Group met on
29 April to actually plan the use of the current
remaining capital and also the additional resources
which were being put in by the Budget, the extra
£300 million. Given the comments that Martin has
made and looking forward now are you content that
that Capital Reference Group has actually (a)
prioritised and (b) given the sector the sorts of
assurance it needs in order to be able to now deliver
what after all is a pretty exciting overall programme
of refurbishment and redevelopment of the FE
estate?
Mr Moore: As John is our representative on that
group—
Q139 Chairman: John, I should have asked the
question of you, it was very remiss of me.
Dr Blake:We have only had one meeting. That is the
ﬁrst thing to say.
Q140 Chairman: This is the April meeting?
Dr Blake: Yes. I think it was a good start. I feel that
the new regime in LSC terms is heading in the right
direction, without sounding patronising.
Q141Chairman:Can I interrupt, were theminutes of
that meeting published?
Dr Blake: I do not know if they have been published.
I have certainly had a copy. I am not sure of the
status but I can check that.
MrDoel:Theminutes were published in conjunction
with the LSC.
Q142 Mr Boswell: When is your next meeting,
because that was only three weeks ago?
Dr Blake: I think it is mid-June. There are some
dates being canvassed at the moment, after the LSC
meets on 3 June to decide on this ﬁrst phase of
money. I think they have made a good start in terms
of being more open and more transparent and more
involving. They have still got to produce some of the
evidence that has been asked for but at least it has
been said that it will be produced. They were talking
at the ﬁrst meeting about the process to be used to
decide how the extra money that is available this
year will be allocated on 3 June at the National
Council meeting. It was an objective process. It was
much more needs-based than previously. I think if a
number of colleagues have got a concern it still has
the risk of being about ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served, which
is what we feel has happened so far. Shovel-ready
basically means you have to have been lucky in the
capricious process that got you this far in the LSC
capital funding process to date so the 30 or 40
colleges who were successful may not be the most
needy but they may be the ones who just happen to
be ready this August.
Q143 Chairman: Sir AndrewFoster makes that clear
in his report, this lack of prioritisation and in fact the
issue that Gordon Marsden has been particularly
interested in, the regional prioritisation as well,
because there are two dimensions to this. Is this new
capital group actually looking at the multi-
dimensions of delivering a programme?
Dr Blake: Yes, they are making big strides in the
direction of having a needs-based system in the way
that you describe, but they are dealing with the
residue of a system which was not like that, so there
is lot of gear changing going on at the moment. I
think it will be better in phase two—and phase two
is dealing with all the other colleges who are not
successful on 3 June—and I think that a more
logical, needs-based, regionally assessed process will
come out of that. Of course, there is no guarantee of
any funding for phase two at all at the moment and
I suppose the biggest concern of colleges who are at
the Reference Group is where will the funding for
phase two ever come from? The other concern—and
this is being addressed at the next meeting—is the
costs. The £200 million-plus that has been risked
with no guarantee of success is going to be talked
about at that meeting in terms of a process for
paying colleges back in some way. That is positive.
Q144 Chairman: I know you want to comment here,
Martin, but could you also address the issue of what
I call “overhang” from existing programmes and
whether in fact the stuVwhich the Capital Reference
Group are now trying to deal with is actually
including the overhang from a programme where
clearly the cash ﬂow was going badly wrong?
Mr Doel: First and foremost, you need to
understand the role of the Reference Group. It is to
inform the criteria that will be used. It is not to have
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one set of principals judge upon another set of
principals’ projects to see which will go forward. It is
to produce an objective set of criteria and to inform
that process so that they are applied in a way that is
fair, transparent and can be seen to be proper.
Q145 Mr Boswell: So it is a kind of working party to
draw up a series of guidelines?
Mr Doel: For the criteria and the process, not to
judge individually between the programmes because
I think that remains the duty and task of the agency
appointed by government in order to spend the
monies.
Q146MrMarsden:That is the lobster pot really into
which DIUS tried to draw you originally which
you resisted?
Mr Doel: I think it would be inimical for a
representative and membership organisation to be
judging between each of its members in terms of
where funds and resources ought to go. Quite clearly
throughout this I have been saying that our role is to
inform the process and, if necessary, challenge that
process but not to carry out the process, so in that
sense it is not deciding how the money will be spent,
it is deciding on the criteria that will be applied to
how that money is spent. In terms of overhang, I
think this manifests itself in terms of the money that
will be available on 3 June to be allocated, it will
depend on what overhang exists already, and what
funds are available in order to pay for new projects
to start. In terms of the overhang, it is not visible or
transparent to me how much overhang is being
carried forward. The line will be how much money
there is for allocation on 3 June. As John has said,
the next thing we really do need to think about is
what happens to all of those colleges that do not
receive the go-ahead or the prospect of going ahead?
The word we have so far is that there will be no new
starts on current plans until 2011, and funding for
that is uncertain. There will be a considerable period
of another hiatus here and what we are very
concerned to ensure is that, ﬁrst of all, costs
remission occurs in that period so that colleges can
identify their own way forward and have some
certainty in terms of what they plan there, but also
what we have been arguing for is a small amount of
money for a capital innovation fund so that people
can ﬁnd alternative means of funding their projects
in the meantime, perhaps on a scaled-down size or
through refurbishment, in order to meet their
essential and immediate needs, and in order to
respond to the demands that have been placed on
them in the face of the recession and 16-19 growth
and other factors that apply. It is a long period from
now through to 2011 if there is no prospect of
moving a signiﬁcant number of these projects
forward.
Q147Mr Boswell: I think I have understood this but
I just want to be clear. What you are saying is that
notwithstanding the criteria which are now being
developed by the Capital Reference Group the
monies which are available are likely to be required
to deal with the overhang and that whatever the
pressing needs of a new project, at least on the face
of it so far, new projects could not be initiated for
another two years in eVect?
Mr Doel: The amount of money that is going to be
used on existing projects going forward is still not
transparent to us, so we do not know how much of
the monies within the LSC’s gift currently will have
to be allocated to that and how much will be
available for new builds.
Q148 Mr Boswell: But the inference is that new
build, as it were, from cold without a previously
presented project, may well have to wait a couple
of years?
Mr Doel: As presented now and our view within the
Capital Reference Group is that there is unlikely to
be any further funding allocated until 2011. That
may not prove to be the case because there might be
economies found with existing programmes and
existing works and as funds become available they
may be released earlier than that, but what I am
concerned about particularly—and I think all of us
would be—is what happens after 3 June for those
colleges that are not, if you like, in the mix
immediately for the allocation of funds? They need
to have some clarity and transparency to release
what is the innovation within the sector to ﬁnd
alternative solutions to the issue that they face.
Q149MrMarsden: I agree that it would be invidious
for theAoC to comment on individual projects in the
way you described it, and I take what you say about
the Capital Reference Group and the provisional
nature of what it is doing, but does the AoC agree
with what Foster says in his conclusions across the
sector that a key element for these criteria must be
the regenerative eVect and context of the proposals
that come forward?
Mr Doel: I think that is as acknowledged by the
Capital Reference Group and as by the criteria that
are being applied that is one of the factors that is
being taken into account, and I think that is right.
Weighting between factors will always be an issue.
Othersmight say, “Ifmy building is falling down and
I cannot teach my students next year, even though
that is not a regenerative eVect is also a factor,” so
these are a complex mix of factors that will apply.
Q150MrMarsden: I understand that, but what I am
just trying to get out of you is that the AoC are not
holding to the principle, I want to be absolutely
clear, that ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served and shovel-ready
should be the guiding principle as to where we go
now?
MrDoel:Absolutely not and I havemade knownmy
concerns both to DIUS and also to the LSC about
the requirement to be shovel-ready and the money
being applied only on that criterion at this stage.
Mr Moore: May I just add to that that I think the
LSC under GeoV Russell’s leadership fully
understands the needs-analysis that needs to go on
and about the educational case being paramount.
There are property issueswhich have to be taken into
account. The 157 Group would argue also that it is
not about a little bit for everybody, it is about
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proportionality to reﬂect the size of the task that you
are being asked to do by theGovernment to serve the
community. I think things are heading in the right
direction. I think the Committee would be missing a
trick if it did not actually look going forward at the
capital vision for education and howFEﬁts into that
vision. Since the two departments have split apart
there is almost a rivalry as to who gets the capital
budget, for schools or for colleges. When you
actually think about it schools and colleges are often
dealing with the same particularly tricky 16-19
issues, increased participation and so on, so there is
a real need to think together as two departments on
the capital investment.
Q151 Chairman: With the greatest of respect, ﬁrst of
all, that is not part of our immediate remit so I will
stop you in mid-ﬂow, but also that has been a
problem ever since, quite frankly, the Learning and
Skills Council was set up when there was that
division post-16. There is nothing new in that case. It
was very frustrating formany colleges that you had a
Building Schools for the Future programme which
Witnesses: Mr Chris Banks CBE, Chairman, Mr GeoV Russell, Acting Chief Executive, and Mr David
Hughes, National Projects Director, Learning and Skills Council, gave evidence.
Q152 Chairman: Can we extend an immediate
welcome to our second panel this morning in this
topic of inquiry into FE college capital expenditure
and, again, explain that we are very tight on time
with three-quarters of an hour allocated. Can we
welcomeChris Banks, theChairman of the Learning
and Skills Council, GeoV Russell, the Chief
Executive of the Learning and Skills Council, and
David Hughes, the National Projects Director of the
Learning and Skills Council.Welcome to you all and
thank you very much, at relatively short notice, for
coming to join us this morning. Can I start with you,
Chris? Is it all right to call you Chris?
Mr Banks: Yes.
Q153 Chairman: You have run a large company, in
fact you have run a number of large companies, and
you chair a network for chairs of public bodies to
improve eYciency and eVectiveness. How could you
have presided over such a debacle?
Mr Banks: Thank youChairman, and thank you for
this opportunity. It is worth just reﬂecting on how
the LSC operates. There is the National Council,
which is a corporate body of almost entirely non-
executive members plus a chief executive, and we
took the decision early on that we would delegate all
the day-to-day operations of the organisation to the
executive team, if you like, the experts, and also the
people who are working day in day out on the detail
of these, and I think it is worth having that model in
mind because it is a diVerent model from business or
some other agencies or organisations that people
have seen.
Q154 Chairman: With the greatest of respect, which
means I am querying what you say—
did not include colleges even though they were going
to have a signiﬁcant number of the same students.
Can I assure you that your thoughts are not lost on
this Committee and there is an inevitability that at
some time in the future, probably around 2020, that
somebody will return to this idea of why have we got
two separate departments because we keep coming
across the same problems time after time after time,
but that is not our fault!
Mr Moore: I appreciate that. Another issue that I
think comes out of the Foster Report is that this can
happen again, and we have with Train to Gain at the
moment all the signs that we might be in the same
sort of situation but under diVerent management
and leadership. It is being tackled with a degree of
gusto, albeit a bit late, but I thinkwemust learn from
Foster about the way in which we deal with these
funding issues.
Chairman: On that happy thought that the Train to
Gain programme might go the same way, we will
thank Martin Doel, Graham Moore and Dr John
Blake. Thank you very much indeed for being
splendid witnesses this morning.
Mr Banks: I understand.
Q155 Chairman: —if you were the Chairman of a
private sector company, irrespective of what your
chief executive wanted, would you not want a
reporting structure which gave you clarity in terms
of the objectives of the organisation and particularly
the way they are delivering a multi-billion pound
programme?
Mr Banks: Absolutely; I would do.
Q156 Chairman: So did you?
Mr Banks: We did, I did and the council did, and we
had an arrangement in place which provided regular
reports and updates to the council on what was
going on. Clearly what you have seen, and you have
heard it from evidence and from Andrew Foster’s
report as well, the system did not work, it broke, and
the mismanagement, if you like, of the capital
programme did not come to the attention of the
National Council at the right time and in the right
way for us to act on it. What did happen, though
(and I think this is again worth bearing in mind) is
that, in response to questions that the council asked
at its November meeting and subsequently at the
December meeting, the extent of the problem
became clear, and as soon as we knew about it, we
did take what was the only appropriate action at
the time.
Q157 Chairman: You are talking about November.
It was actually in February when people within the
organisation were saying, “This is going badly
wrong”, and a report was coming forward, and yet
your structures did not pick that up until very, very
late on in the year. Something was not right, was it?
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Mr Banks: Clearly that is right; the system failed. I
suppose I am trying to make it clear that, as soon as
the council was aware of what the issues were, it
acted, I think, appropriately and decisively, but you
are right, there was quite a long period there where
the issue was becoming clearer and clearer to people
and we were unsighted on it.
Q158 Chairman: It is like saying we have a crash and
we then decide to put seatbelts on, is it not?
Mr Banks: I think to say we slammed on the brakes
at the last minute, would be a closer analogy.
Q159Chairman: So you have not looked through the
window yet!
Mr Banks: We were not aware.
Q160 Mr Marsden: Chris can, I conﬁrm: you were
appointed chairman in 2004, were you not?
Mr Banks: Yes.
Q161 Mr Marsden: The appointment is a part-time
one, approximately two days a week, and the salary
for that is approximately 51,000?
Mr Banks: That is correct.
Q162 Mr Marsden: We know with part-time
appointments of this sort that sometimes chairmen
do a lotmore than two days aweek.What would you
characterise your own weekly involvement with the
LSC, in terms of hours, on an average basis?
Mr Banks: I have deliberately taken the view that I
do not divide it into days and just say this day and
this day are LSC days.
Q163MrMarsden:Over a year, is it two days aweek,
on average, or not?
Mr Banks: It is more.
Q164MrMarsden: So you are actually being a fairly
hands-on chairman. You have not just been there
to titivate?
Mr Banks:No, I am a regular, engaged chair in daily
contact with the business.
Q165 Mr Marsden: That is ﬁne. One of the things
that we found puzzling, not least when we had the
evidence from Mark Haysom, is the disconnect
between all these people doing various things—and
the Edwards Report is a classic example of them—
and nobody seeming to communicate. Mark
Haysom told us when he came before us the other
week that he had an open-door policy where various
people from senior management could drift in and
tell himwhatever problems theywere worried about.
Do you have a similar policy?
Mr Banks: I do. It is a diVerent role.
Q166 Mr Marsden: I am aware of that.
Mr Banks: Yes, I am regularly in mainly the London
oYce, but I am regularly in the business and
regularly talk, of course, to the chief executive and
other members of his team.
Q167 Mr Marsden: Do you have any on-going
relationship with Phil Head, the Director of
Infrastructure and Projects? Howmany times would
you have met Phil in the course of the year?
Mr Banks: It would be more infrequent than
frequent directly with Phil.
Q168 Mr Marsden: How often, roughly?
Mr Banks: Quite infrequently.
Mr Marsden: How often?
Q169 Chairman: Did you ever meet him?
MrBanks:Yes, I havemet Phil. They aremore issues
based rather than—
Q170 Mr Marsden: I will tell you the reason I am
pressing you on that point. We have heard in the
previous session about the role of the infrastructure
and projects both nationally and locally in terms of
talking up this whole process, but we have also heard
therewere concerns expressed, andwhenwe come on
to talk about the Edwards Report we will see how
that came about. No-one anywhere in the
organisation came and talked to you about the
Edwards Report from February until the autumn
when it was all out in the open.
Mr Banks: No. To be very explicit on that, I was
unaware of the existence of that report, I am afraid,
but you should know. The earliest I might have
known would be December, it may have been later
than that, 2008. So I was not aware of it. No-one
mentioned it or raised it with me. The key issue that
we were looking at within the council actually on an
on-going basis was the in-year expenditure, and that
is the thing that was being reported as the key
pressure point.
Q171 Mr Marsden: We are very aware of that, but
the chief executive is the person who is supposedly
looking after all the day-to-day stuV; you have a
potential strategic role to look further. Did you not
at any stage ask questions about the broader issues
beyond the day-to-day stuV?
Mr Banks: The time when that happened, really, was
the November period.
Q172 Mr Marsden: So there was no point between
February and November where you took your head
away from the real problems there were on the in-
year budget. There was no time for you to look
beyond that.
Mr Banks: Speciﬁcally in relation to the capital
programme, no, the focus was trying to deal with
that and, at the same time, and you know because
you have heard it from lots of other people—
Q173 Mr Marsden: Forgive me, you may think this
is unfair, but you founded a company called Big
Thoughts—we have all been told about your
broader achievements in that area—and yet at no
time in that period did you appear to have any big
thoughts about where you were going beyond the
in-year.
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MrBanks: I think that is unfair actually, but, I think,
speciﬁcally in relation to the capital programme, one
of the main things here, of course, is that this is an
ambitious programme overall, as you know.
Q174 Mr Marsden: Indeed; it is 15% of your
overall budget?
Mr Banks: Absolutely.3
Q175Mr Marsden:But you did not look beyond the
in-house spend?
Mr Banks: No, I and the council signed oV and
approved the overall capital strategy, which again
you may have seen, but it is a paper that came to the
council for overall direction, whichwas to encourage
and accelerate the programme of improving the
facilities within FE as part of our continuing drive
towards improving the skills of people in the
country.
Q176 Mr Marsden:Can I ask you a ﬁnal question as
to your relationship with Mark Haysom. Obviously
you had formal meetings with him as part of the
process. Did you have informal conversations over
that period of time at which there was either an
opportunity for you to arrange beyond the in-year
problems or for him to talk to you about them?
Mr Banks: There were lots of times that we met
informally where there would have been that
opportunity.
Q177 Mr Marsden: But it never arose?
Mr Banks: No, that is the key point, it did not arise,
and, again, it is just a fact, I am afraid, that it was in
the November period when we put together the in-
year pressure that the council was looking at—
Q178 Mr Marsden: That is when all was revealed.
Mr Banks: —with the growing number of proposals
that were coming through, and it was at that point
actually that the council and I said, “Hang on, are
we sure?”
Q179 Mr Marsden: We understand that, but it was
not until November?
Mr Banks: No, it was not. You are right.
Q180 Mr Boswell: Speciﬁcally, while we are
discussing board responsibilities, before we widen
this out, while I understand that it is very
commendable that you did not want the board to be
micromanaging the organisation, do you not accept
that it is a cardinal responsibility of any board which
you chair to manage the risks or to have satisﬁed
itself it has got a proper risk management and
reporting system?
Mr Banks: Yes.
Q181 Mr Boswell: Therefore, is there an implied
criticism of the board that this did not appear to be
in place?
3 Note from the witness: Capital programme expenditure
amounted to 4.4%of the LSC’s total budget in 2007–08. This
ﬁgure is expected to rise to 7.2% in 2008–09 and 9.2% in
2009–10.
MrBanks: I absolutely do acknowledge that that is a
key role of the board, or the council. Again, Andrew
Foster was quite explicit here, and I agree with him
that the way that we managed risk at that time with
theAudit Committee clearly did not do the right job,
because capital was not on the risk register at that
stage. Again, as I think you also know, because of
the various changes that were going on and the
uncertainty, we did instigate, prior to the capital
issues and prior to the Foster Report, a full review of
all of our risk management so that we could get a
better grip on it, but you are right, it failed, and that
is why we have had to take action there as well.
Q182 Mr Boswell: Given that your CEO walked the
plank, did you consider your own position?
Mr Banks: Of course I did. It would be only natural
to, would it not, in the circumstances, and I do want
to put on record my personal apologies as well as
those of the organisation to all of those people who
have been aVected by the diYculties that we have
had and the consequences to everyone else, but my
belief is that, as the day-to-day responsibility for the
management of that programme rested with the
chief executive and that he has resigned as a result of
this, that is the right thing, and my job is to try and
ensure that this organisation delivers all that it
possibly can between now and the time when it is
dissolved in the spring.
Q183 Dr Iddon: Mr Banks, you were appointed for
two days. Admittedly, you have said you put more
than that in.My simple question is: do you think two
days is enough, with all of your other commitments
whirling around in your head, to manage an
organisation like the LSC?
Mr Banks: I am saying really that I put more than
two days into it. I think it deserves that, and you will
understand, particularly in terms of the very wide
remit that the LSC has and the very wide number of
stakeholders and partners that we work with, I have
been pleased to make that time available and
fortunate enough, as an independent businessman
rather than working for someone else, to be able to
make that time freely and positively available.
Q184 Dr Iddon: Is the answer to my question, no,
then, that two days is not enough?
Mr Banks: I think you can do the job in two days if
you have to. I just think I could do it better by
making more time available, and so I did, and do.
Q185 Graham Stringer: In answer to Tim’s question
you said that the day-to-day management was the
responsibility of the chief executive, but actually
when we had the chief executive before us what he
said was that he did not know anything about it and
that the problems were about communication. As
chairman, when there are reports within the system
that are screaming that there is a problem, is it not
your responsibility to have ensured that there were
structures so that you would know about them?
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Mr Banks: Just a word on the word screaming, to
pick up on it. I have read the report now—I expect
you have as well—and actually I am not sure it says
screaming; it does identify the issue.
Q186 Graham Stringer: There is a huge problem
building up in your capital programme.
Mr Banks: In answer to your point, I would have
expected the management to respond to that and I
would have expected, in due course, for Mark or a
member of the team to have alerted us, and me
personally, to that issue, yes, you are right, and that
is part of the failure, I think.
Q187 Graham Stringer: I think you are missing the
point. Clearly the chief executive did not think it was
his job to read the report, because he told us that
when he was here, that he did not want to read all
these reports, he left it to other people. The point I
am making is should there not have been
communication systems in place that said, if you
have got a problem, if there is a major report, then it
should get into the chief executive’s oYce and into
the chairman’s oYce?
MrBanks: I agreewith that, and as a business person
and somebody largely in the private sector, the
ability to surface, escalate issues, make sure that
people are aware of them and then deal with them as
quickly as possible is one of the things that enables
you to deal with the market better than ever.
Q188GrahamStringer:Whydid you not ensure they
were in place: because that really is your
responsibility?
Mr Banks: The escalation within the management
team, I think, is the responsibility of the chief
executive. I can only say that I think that part of the
management process would have to be run by the
chief executive. I did not know, and I should have
known, that those issues were going on and, given
my time again, I suspect, like you, I would have
asked those questions and tried to put those pieces
of data together more quickly, but I think there is a
general understanding that the information coming
to me and, indeed, other members of the council was
really imperfect and did not allow us to us make
those connections and, I agree we should have done.
It would have been much better.
Q189 Graham Stringer: Hindsight is a very precise
science.
Mr Banks: Indeed.
Q190 Graham Stringer: The most precise science
there is. We have analysed the communication, the
structures, Foster has analysed them, but there is a
deeper question that lies behind it, is there not?
Should the LSC exist? Should these large capital
programmes be dealt with by primaries?
Mr Banks: All I can say, really, is that since the LSC
was established, 618 projects have been any initiated
or completed, actually, totalling nearly six billion
pounds, and 89% of colleges have participated in
that programme; so during that period the system, I
think, was recognised and acknowledged as working
well. I think what went wrong was that the
mechanisms that had been used, which were largely
about encouraging demand and responding to it,
because there was less demand than there were
capital funds available, was not changed the at the
time when it became clear, or because it did not
become clear that the equation was working the
other way, and there was then more demand than
there was money available. So I think that these
organisations can, and this organisation did, run
that programme well for a long period of time.
Q191 Graham Stringer: It is really whether you are
better. You are in competition with local authorities,
which have a democratic mandate, and it is often
said that quangos are more eVective and that local
authorities are patchy as to whether they can do this.
This has been a minor catastrophe, has it not? It has
perverted the Government’s priorities in where
money is going within the system. It has meant that
projects have been delayed. Do you really think you
are better than local authorities at doing it?
Mr Banks: I am afraid I am not really in a position
to comment on that because—
Q192 Graham Stringer: It is pretty fundamental, is it
not? Should you exist or not?
Mr Banks: ---there is such a wide variety. The reason
I got involved in the LSC in the ﬁrst place, and
remember that I was one of the business people who
got involved before the LSCwas set up, was because
the previous system was so much more complicated
and diYcult and I could see the opportunity for
bringing together these various and disparate
programmes and activities into one place and I think
that over a period of time that has served people
well. I think it is now clear that what we have got to
try and do as we prepare for a new way of working
is just do our bit to make the transition work as well
as possible.
Q193 Chairman: Can I turn to you, David Hughes.
I think somebody else would like to come in on this,
but as a precursor, you have been there throughout
this period of time and you, eVectively, were the
regional director of the LSC London region. You
also had a key role chairing the cross-cutting group
in terms of this capital programme. So you not only
had a key regional role, you were chairing the cross-
cutting group that was reporting directly to the
board, because you had a seat on the board.Why did
you not alert the chief executive to the fact that
things were going wrong? Why did you not tell him
that the February report, which came to you, was
predicting disaster for the programme? Did the buck
stop with you?
Mr Hughes: I do not think it was predicting disaster
for the programme. What it said was there were
some serious problems on the horizon.
Q194 Chairman: Serious problems with a multi-
billion pound project.
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Mr Hughes: It had two conclusions. It said we
needed £100 million for the year 2008/2009, and if
you remember that the end of May was the period
when we were just talking about the potential
underspend on the capital programme—
Q195 Chairman: I am sorry; this was February.
Mr Hughes: No, we saw the report on, I think, 28
May, and at that point we had just been discussing
an underspend on the capital programme for 2007/
2008. Hindsight is a very precise science, is it not?
Q196 Chairman: I wish I had not said that actually!
Mr Hughes: It is fantastically true, is it not?
Q197 Mr Marsden: Foresight is a rare quality.
Mr Hughes: It is, and we did not have foresight, and
that was the mistake we made, but, very clearly, at
that point we had been overseeing a programme that
for years had been underspending and we had been
struggling to get projects through, so the whole
setting was very diVerent. It is not an excuse, it is just
part of the context. So when we saw this report, it
said: you need £100 million in-year to manage the
budget. We had a very strong assurance, unoYcially,
that we would end up with that money.
Q198 Chairman: From whom?
Mr Hughes: From oYcials.
Q199 Chairman: Your own oYcials?
Mr Hughes: We were in discussion about a budget
that we believed, and in the end there was £110
million brought forward to make sure that we did
overspend in-year; so that foresight was right. The
second conclusion was: there are some actions we
need to take, including prioritisation, including
limiting the grant paid by the LSC and a number of
others that we can see in the report, so we said we
need to do that, and we referred that, quite
understandably, to the Capital Committee and
asked the Capital Committee to take that on. They
did not do that until September. If you look at the
Foster Report, Foster says there was a delay of two
or three months.
Q200 Chairman: You are passing the buck again.
Mr Hughes: No, I am not passing the buck.
Q201 Chairman: I want to ask you a speciﬁc
question. You had a key position here. The chief
executive’s door was always open with the coVee on.
Mr Hughes: Yes.
Q202 Chairman:You wandered in and out regularly.
Mr Hughes: Yes, I met Mark regularly.
Q203 Chairman: Why did you not say to him, “Hey,
Mark, there is clearly quite a diYcult bit of
information we have here. The programme is going
up the spout”?
Mr Hughes: It was not going up the spout. Read the
report and read the conclusion. The conclusion says:
we can manage this with some amendments to the
programme.
Q204 Chairman: Did you tell him that?
Mr Hughes: I do not remember whether I had that
conversation with him. A year is a long time. I
genuinely cannot remember, butwe had a report that
said: “There are problems on the horizon. You need
to do something about it.” We said, “We will do
something about it”, and we had been doing those
things; we did it too late.
Q205 Mr Marsden: We interviewed Mark Haysom
last week and, obviously, we pressed him on these
issues as to why the focus had not been on the capital
side of it. He said because he was doing lots of other
things as chief executive. Given that this was 15%, or
thereabouts, of the entire budget, so I understand,
did you have the same priorities as a regional
director for it as he had as chief executive?
Mr Hughes: I was overseeing a budget of about 1.9
billion as regional director for London, and I have
always accounted for that money absolutely. We
would never overspend.
Q206 Mr Marsden: That was not my question.
Mr Hughes: No, but my point is we were overseeing
that budget and we did that properly. Within that
some of it was capital and we had responsibility for
making sure good capital proposals were coming
forward, and we did that well.
Q207 Mr Marsden: Can I take you forward on the
regional budget issue. As I say, as the Chairman has
pointed out, I will not say unique, but you had a very
good combination of responsibilities and talents
because you were both the regional director but you
were also chair of the Finance and Resources Board,
so you could see it from both ends of the telescope,
if I can put it that way. We have heard from the
evidence session previously (and I appreciate now
that no college heads came forward from your
region) that at no time did they have any sense that
their region had an actual budget for the capital
programme, it was just a wish-list. What was the
situation in your region?
Mr Hughes: It was a national budget to which we
were pushing through projects, so we had no
regional budget.
Q208 Mr Marsden: You did not have at the back of
your mind, or even on a sheet of paper somewhere,
“I have got X hundred million pounds for this
budget”?
Mr Hughes: It did not work like that.
Q209 Mr Marsden: So you did not have that:
understood. There was also reference in the previous
evidence session to the role of regional directors of
infrastructure projects in talking up this whole
exercise, and the rest of it. What was your
relationship with your regional director of
infrastructure and projects and what advice or
feedback did you get from him or her about how
they could communicate this programme with
colleges?
Mr Hughes: In point of fact, we do not actually have
regional directors of infrastructure.
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Q210 Mr Marsden: That is what we were told. Let
me put it another way. Phil Head is the National
Director.
Mr Hughes: Yes.
Q211 Mr Marsden: Who is the regional person who
does that?
Mr Hughes: He has nine regional property advisers.
Q212 Mr Marsden: So it is a question of
nomenclature?
Mr Hughes: No, it is more than that, because we
would work up projects through our management
scheme, through our directors, so we were really in
contact with colleges making sure that the schemes
were proportionate, making sure that they were
good value for money, making sure that they were
properly devised.
Q213 Mr Marsden: You have a regional property
adviser. That is the title?
Mr Hughes: Yes.
Q214 Mr Marsden: Did you have, at any stage,
conversations with him along the lines of whether it
was reasonable and realistic to advise colleges to go
for this once in a lifetime opportunity to build up or
anything like that?
Mr Hughes: I have heard a lot of anecdotes about
this, but I have seen no evidence, and Foster said the
same. I have never talked up a project, I have never
bigged-up a project, I have never suggested to a
college---. I am absolutely conﬁdent that no-one in
my team ever did that. What I am clear about is that
there was lots of ambition in the sector and there
were lots of iconic schemes being put up, and other
colleges looked at those and, I think, thought, “We
want one of those.” I do not think we were in the
game of saying, “Go away and re-write and make it
two or three times as big.” I certainly have never
done that.
Q215 Mr Boswell: Conversely, you were not in the
game of saying, unless there was some incoherence
in the project, at this point we need at least to reﬂect
on the overall implications for the budget or
otherwise?
Mr Hughes: On the contrary, at project level I can
think of many examples where we have gone back to
a college and said, “We think you are being over-
ambitious with the size and cost of your project.” In
London I can think of some examples of that.
Q216MrMarsden:Can you clarify something?Who
in the LSC physically commissioned the Edwards
Report?
Mr Hughes: That was commissioned by Phil.
Q217 Mr Marsden: By Phil Head?
Mr Hughes: Yes.
Q218 Mr Marsden: As Director of Infrastructure
and Projects?
Mr Hughes: Yes.
Q219 Mr Marsden: Did you have a conversation?
We have not got Phil Head before us, but it seems to
me, on the basis of what has been said, that there is
an implication there that he was concerned at a very
early stage about the potential, not the actual, road
crash, and that is one of the reasons why he
commissioned this report. When that report had
appeared before your committee, did you have
formal or informal conversations with him
subsequently as to what his thoughts were on it?
Mr Hughes: Yes.
Q220 Mr Marsden: What did he tell you?
MrHughes:He shared the concernwe had, and there
were two concerns: there was the in-year spend
which we have and we have always managed and,
therefore, the car crash did not quite happen, but the
big problem was the focus was on in-year was at the
expense of the forecasting of the ﬁve-year horizon,
and that is the bit we got wrong. I think Foster made
it very clear that we got it wrong by a few months.
There was a surge of demand halfway through the
year, and we missed that.
Q221 Chairman: I cannot let you get away with that,
with the greatest of respect. You actually reﬂected
what the Edwards Report says. You are quite right,
it is the terms of its conclusions, but I wonder if you
ever read the report, because paragraph 21 says this:
“From 2010 to 2013, however, if current policies did
not change and the tempo of capital projects is
maintained, the demand for capital grant payments
moves in 2010/2011 up to 450 million above the
funds available for FE projects”, and it went on to
say, “This simply proves that the continuation of the
current payment proﬁle of projects is unaVordable to
the council.” It was not just an in-year problem, the
signiﬁcance of the Edwards Report is that it was
saying, unless there was signiﬁcant change, this is
unaVordable.
Mr Hughes: The changes were set out in the
recommendations, and we said we need to
implement the recommendations and we need to
move forward, which is, with respect, what I said
earlier.
Q222 Chairman: No.
Mr Hughes: So it is really important. We said two
things: we need tomanage in-year and we need to do
the prioritisation, we need to limit the grant, we need
to think about phasing in over ﬁve years rather than
three, as is set out here.
Q223 Chairman: But it seemed to be that, despite
this, the message was going out, and you were a part
of this cross-cutting group at the time—you might
say it did not happen in London, but it clearly
happened everywhere else—that people were told to
beef up their projects.
Mr Hughes: I am not sure there is any evidence that
that happened.
Chairman: Why did they do it then? Was it osmosis?
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Q224 Mr Marsden: Unless you are going to say that
the previous witnesses are not being accurate. We
have had evidence from the previous session.
Mr Hughes: I missed that; I apologise.
Q225 Mr Marsden: No, we are not saying that, but,
please, for the record, understand that the reason we
are asking these questions is that we have had two
college representatives before us this morning who
have already said exactly what the Chairman has
said, that these projects were talked up by regional
LSC advisers, and that is why. You must have been
an oasis of rectitude compared to the rest.
Mr Hughes: As I said, I can conﬁrm that absolutely
we did not do that.
Chairman: No. Okay, that is your word and that is
exactly right.
Q226 Graham Stringer: When I looked through the
whole of the capital project list of what has been
agreed and spent and what is likely to be spent,
compared to the Building Schools for the Future
scheme it seems to me that large capital projects are
going to places like Bournemouth and Poole, with a
£102 million project, and not to the areas of greatest
need and most deprivation. How did you account
for that balance in your projects compared to my
constituency, inner city Manchester? How was that
prioritised against Dorset and Poole or Stockport
within Greater Manchester?
Mr Hughes: I think that is what Foster set out; that
it was a demand-led scheme. The ﬁrst schemes that
came through got considered—
Q227 Graham Stringer: I know what Foster said.
Mr Hughes: I am just backing him up. They were
rigorously assessed at scheme level but they were not
assessed in terms of need. That is why we have taken
on the Foster recommendation and we are doing a
prioritisation against need rather than saying let us
have a look at your proposal and check it is fantastic
value for money.
Q228 Graham Stringer: Did it not occur to anybody
within the LSC that this was a rum way of going
about the thing?
Mr Hughes: It did, and that is why we were starting
to move towards a prioritisation scheme.
Q229 Dr Iddon: Mr Russell has been very quiet, so
we will bring him into the debate, I think. You are an
auditor. Is that correct?
Mr Russell: Yes.
Q230 Dr Iddon: What is your perspective, as
someone with a fresh pair of eyes, on what went
wrong at the LSC during 2008?
Mr Russell: You will forgive me, of course, starting
out by saying that I have been focusing most of my
attention on the future rather than the past, other
than, of course, wanting to make sure that we learn
the lessons, and Andrew Foster’s report was
extremely helpful to me in that respect. It was a clear
analysis and it also made some very sensible
recommendations. Obviously, I have listened to
Chris and David. I think they both touched on what
I think are a number of contributory factors to
where we are today. Andrew Foster also mentioned
(and I suppose this is more in my area of expertise)
that the LSC did not have as good a strategic level of
ﬁnancial management, as they should have, and I
can only agree with that.
Q231 Dr Iddon: Were the auditing procedures
suYcient, in your view, and, if not, have you
changed them?
Mr Russell: I do not really think it is an audit issue
per se. I think what public sector auditors do is not
necessarily to assess the strategic level of ﬁnancial
management. Having said that, to answer your
question, in the private sector it would be
unthinkable not to have the chief internal auditor
report directly to the chief executive with a dotted
line to the chairman of the Audit Committee, and I
think it was probably less than two weeks before I
was in position before I made that change.
Dr Iddon: Let me turn now to what might happen to
colleges who have lost money that has been laid
down for the reasons that the previous panel said,
and for the beneﬁt of David Hughes it was for
employing architects, surveyors and even, in some
cases, demolishing buildings ahead of projects
proceeding. The LSC and DIUS are said to be
developing a policy position on reimbursing colleges
who obviously put money out that they probably
needed for other purposes.When will this procedure
be ﬁnalised andwhat encouragement can you give to
the colleges who have lost money in that way? I am
not who sure who to direct that to, but the chief
executive or the chairman.
Q232 Chairman: I think probably to the chief
executive.
Mr Russell: Andrew Foster recommended that we
have a transparent process engaging with the sector.
We have done that. I think I probably met with
Martin Doel within 45 minutes of my appointment,
fortunately he happened to be in the same building,
and that was the beginning of a conversation which
has continued over the last twomonths. With regard
to your speciﬁc question on some costs, Foster
recommended that we needed to engage on that
front. It is clearly an informed issue. It is important
to some degree by who gets to go ahead and who
does not. The more that get to go ahead, the smaller
the sunk-costs issue will be. The LSC has clear rules
that set out what colleges are allowed to spend
money on at each of the stages. The external advisers
that we have appointed are assessing that very issue
for each college and we will have the position for
each of them within days. Once we know who is
going forward, we will turn to the issue of sunk-
costs. We will do it in a sympathetic way, because
clearly the LSC shares a great deal of responsibility
for this and, as ministers have said, no college is
going to be allowed to go bankrupt as a result of
capital issues.
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Q233 Dr Iddon: So at this point in time you have not
any idea what this reimbursement process is going
to cost.
Mr Russell: As I said, it will depend on who goes
ahead and who does not. I think we have a pretty
clear idea of what the total quantum of those sub-
costs is.
Q234 Dr Iddon: Are you prepared to say?
Mr Russell: I think various ﬁgures are ﬂoated
around, but my understanding (and I cannot say
precisely, I have not seen the analysis) is that it is in
the order of a couple of hundred million pounds
potentially, but it depends uponwho goes ahead and
who does not. Clearly, the ones that go ahead, to the
extent that they are shovel-ready, are the ones that
could well have spent the greatest amounts already,
so that might get rid of a fair chunk of the problem.
There also has to be a judgment taken based on the
analysis as to which colleges, if any, went beyond the
guidelines of the LSC and what is a fair way of
dealing with those costs.
Q235 Mr Boswell: I have got two quick what might
sound like business school questions, but I think
they are very germane. GeoV, you have the
exquisitely diYcult job of a run-up strategy for an
organisation which is coming to an end, and this was
already announced and applied in your
predecessor’s time. How do you envisage dealing
with that situation, and have you made some
changes, in the light of this experience or more
generally, as to how you are handling that?
Mr Russell: The answer to the ﬁrst question, how do
I want to deal with it, is as quickly as possible. There
was a plan in place when I arrived that said by
September we will create shadow YPLA, SFA and
people will start engaging with local authorities.
Given the size and complexity of this organisation,
and it is a huge organisation, plus the additional
little problems we are dealing with, this one being an
example, it seemed to me that the best way of
managing that risk was to accelerate the process of
getting ourselves into those new organisations. So
even before any new management has been
appointed, we have appointed transitional
management within the organisation, we are going
through the process of allocating people to where
they should go and, as soon as humanly and
operationally possible, we will try and get those
organisations up and running in the most realistic
way we can and see where the kinks are.
Q236 Dr Iddon: The second question is: how you
manage relationships, and whether those have
changed, with your key stakeholders and partners at
DIUS and DCSF at one end through to the college
sector at the other? How do you see that and how
much have you changed it?
Mr Russell: When you are in a crisis, I think the only
logical thing to do is to communicate, and
communicate, and communicate, and somy job is to
be engaging with all our key stakeholders. I have
spent lots and lots of time with DIUS and DCSF at
a ministerial and oYcial level multiple times a week.
Q237 Dr Iddon: So if Mark Haysom had an open
door, your door is even more open, is it?
Mr Russell: I do not wait for people to come in my
door.
Q238 Mr Marsden: Do you prowl the corridors?
Mr Russell: In some cases. I am glad not to see all of
my regions right now.
Q239 Mr Marsden: Again, a very quick question to
you, GeoV, on the basis of what you have heard
already about the process having been demand-led,
about there not having been a regional budget
structure. Obviously you do not know the pot of
money you are eventually going to end up with, but
are you now looking to having a regional budget
structure or a prioritised budget along diVerent
priorities as opposed to just a pot of money that is
being doled out on a ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-served basis?
Mr Russell: One of the other things that happened
quite quickly for me is that I got a copy of Andrew
Foster’s report. People may take issue with me, but
my view is, for all sorts of reasons—the economy,
value for money—we need to move from demand-
led to needs-based, not just in capital but across our
programmes. We also need to get the balance
between the very successful regional structure that
we have, very good regional relationships right
between that and national oversight and co-
ordination, not just in capital, which we have done,
but in all programmes, because the world has
changed. We have moved from an environment
where it was, “How much do you want?” to “This is
what you can have.Where is the best place to put it?”
Q240 Mr Marsden: So that will mean you having to
give a much clearer directive to your regional
structures and regional directors as to how they
proceed with whatever money is available in future.
Mr Russell: Absolutely. David is in charge of capital
nationally. I have someone in charge of Train to
Gain nationally. There will be someone in charge of
every single programme we have nationally.
Q241 Graham Stringer: Is the implication of what
you have just said, apart from the capital
programme being demand-led and not need-led,
that you accept that the funding methodology for
student learning numbers is one view and in the
distance sending money towards the areas of
greatest need?
Mr Russell: It is partly an issue of semantics. If you
ask oYcials in DIUS what they mean by demand-
led, they will say it is where we put the money to
where there is a need for it and, therefore, we should
respond to those demands. It is a slight change in
emphasis, in truth, but I think the change in
emphasis is around the fact that we do not have as
much money as we have had in the past, so we need
to be a little more active in terms of deciding and
playing a greater role in decisions about where we
want to place our bets.
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Q242 Graham Stringer: So do you accept that the
methodology is not sending money towards the
areas of greatest need?
Mr Russell: I am not sure I can say that I have the
knowledge to look back and say how well bets we
have placed in the past have played out. As to the
college programme, you have heard that it was kind
of who was ﬁrst in the queue. Clearly we need to
move away from that. We have moved away from
that in capital; I think we have to move in the same
direction on all our programmes.
Q243 Chairman: Chris, one very brief question. Do
you have a good relationship with DIUS?
Witnesses: Rt Hon John Denham MP, Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills, and
Mr Stephen Marston, Director General, Universities and Skills, gave evidence.
Q246 Chairman: We come to our ﬁnal session this
morning, part of this topical session which was
suggested by the 157 Group as part of our open
consultation on what the committee should be doing
about the FE college capital expenditure. We are
particularly grateful to the Right Honourable John
Denham MP, Secretary of State for DIUS, for
appearing yet again before the committee. You
should have a regular slot and a special chair in order
to do this! Your ability to give us your time is much
appreciated, John, and we thank you very much
indeed for that. We welcome, again, an old friend of
the committee, Stephen Marston, the Director
General of the Department for Innovation,
Universities and Skills, someone who looks after
universities and skills issues. I wonder if I could start
with you, Secretary of State. Are you able to tell us
who knew, and when, in DIUS, that things were
going wrong with the LSC capital budget and, in
particular, who ﬁrst saw within your department the
February Capital AVordability Review document?
When did that come to light?
Mr Denham: Chairman, I think it is fair to say that
I have not, I am afraid, for the committee, tried to
construct a precise week by week timeline, but when
that document was produced within the LSC, at that
time, or very soon afterwards, it would have been
seen by at least one oYcial from my department. As
the Foster Report makes clear, there are quite
regular interchanges between my oYcials and the
LSC at a number of diVerent levels, and what I think
Foster sets out very clearly is that there were
opportunities in the LSC, and I guess in my
department, if people had done things diVerently, for
action to have been taken earlier. One of the reasons
for getting Sir Andrew to produce this report was to
understand more clearly what might have happened
at an earlier stage. That is not to say (and I did not
try and make this judgment and nor did Sir Andrew
Foster) that it was glaringly obvious to people that
they should have done something diVerent—it is
always easier to make those judgments in
hindsight—but there is no doubt that, as the
Mr Banks: Personally?
Q244 Chairman: Yes.
Mr Banks: Yes, with oYcials and, indeed, with
ministers. We have always had good, open, lively
and frequent contact with them.
Q245 Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. Can
I thank you very much indeed. Chris Banks, you
have been very straight with us today, GeoVRussell,
the Chief Executive, you have been straight with us
today, and David Hughes, you have been straight
with us today, in case you take any inference from
that as the Projects Director. Thank you all very
much indeed and thank you for that very quick
canter around some very diYcult issues.
discussions went through the LSC, some at least of
the information on which people might have acted,
had the signiﬁcance been understood, was shared
between the two organisations.
Q247 Chairman: When you have a report, Secretary
of State, which actually says that the 2011 budget
moves up to £450 million above the funds available,
that was a very signiﬁcant comment within that
report and yet the oYcial who saw it within your
department did not see ﬁt to actually then say,
“Hang on, what are we doing about this?”
Mr Denham: I think, to some extent, Chairman, it
would be fair to bring Stephen Marston in on some
of the detail of this, but my understanding of that,
from all the discussions that we have had and, I
think, from those set out in the Foster Report, is that
a report was produced which showed potential
problems. That was not universally accepted as the
only analysis of the situation, but there were
continuing discussions about the ability to manage
the problem which carried on over a period of time,
and those discussions which could have been
brought to a head in the early summer were not
crystallised and decisions taken. So there is no
challenging Sir Andrew’s conclusion that
opportunities were missed; the one thing that I
would say, in fairness, is that that report appears not
to have been accepted universally from the outset as
the only possible interpretation of the facts. Just to
put it on the recordChairman, so far asMinisters are
concerned, none of this (and I think this is accepted)
reached Ministers until November, and it is also fair
to say that the thrust of the concerns that were raised
with Ministers in November were more about the
phasing of payments and howwell theywouldmatch
the planned capital payments than they actually
were about the problem which subsequently
emerged, which was the sheer scale of the number of
schemes in the pipeline. So even at that stage, despite
all of these discussions, the problem had not been
clearly and properly deﬁned in the way that we now
understand it.
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Q248 Chairman: Can we bring Stephen Marston in
here. Were you the responsible oYcer within DIUS
then that should have picked this up?
Mr Marston: As theDirector General, yes, all of this
was within my area of remit.
Q249 Chairman: Was it brought to your attention?
Mr Marston: No, it was not, I am afraid, and I
deeply regret that it was not escalated, but I was not
aware of the report until November. What did
happen is it was a member of my staV who attended
the meeting—I think it was actually in April—that
ﬁrst looked at the February report, and, as the
Secretary of State has said, I do not think it is quite
right to say it was just ignored. I think a number of
things followed from it. People did take the message
that there was an issue about whether we had
suYcient budget cover in the year in question, the
short-term issue, and people did react quickly to
that, and thatwas one of the reasonswhywe brought
forward £110 million spending. So reaction number
one to this report was, right, we must sort out the
short-term position. The second reaction to it was,
“It is right that we are going to have to think about
prioritisation”, this key ﬁnding fromAndrew Foster
that we were running a demand-led programme and
it needed to switch to be a prioritised programme. If
you look, for example at the capital strategy
document that we issued, it did say hypothetically
theremight come a time, if demand rises fast enough,
where we will have to apply prioritisation. but we
were working in the context where we thought what
we were dealing with was continuing to need to
boost demand on what had been an underspent
programme. The bit that we clearly just failed to get
right was the speed of understanding that we were at
a tipping point, the whole programme was changing
and we did not react fast enough.
Chairman: That is a very ﬁne response and we thank
you for that, Stephen.
Q250 Mr Boswell: I think Stephen has ﬁlled me in,
but I want to conﬁrm the impression I am getting
that in a sense almost the short-term in-year
management problem, which was identiﬁed then,
and I think that is incontestable, almost distracted
people’s attention from the long-term. That is not
quite consistent with what Stephen said, but is there
a sense in which you could say maybe that is over
and we are onto the next?
Mr Denham: The understanding that I had from
November, when this ﬁrst came to our attention, was
that was seen as a pressing issue, that actually
whatever might lie down in the future, which would
have to be managed at some point, the real issue we
needed to do was short-term; but I think we all have
to accept that as this became clear over the next
couple of months, nobody had centrally an overall
picture of the state of the capital programme,
because when things came to a head in December a
huge amount of work then had to be done to
construct a complete national picture, and one of the
things I found in discussing this issue is it is
sometimes described as though there were a group of
people who knew exactly what was going on and
they did not tell other people exactly what was going
on. I am afraid the problem was there was a group
of people that we might have expected to knowwhat
was going on who did not themselves have a full
grasp of it and, therefore, could not communicate
the problem to us.
Q251 Mr Boswell: Perhaps, in an eVort to build
empathy, I can say, having sat in the department in a
junior capacity, I have had one of these too, but it is
a long time ago. With hindsight is there a way of
operating a risk-management system within the
department dealing with its agencies and mirroring
what is or might be done in agencies which makes
this less likely to happen: because I am sure, with
retrospect, youwould express concern that it was not
escalated to your level until November but it would
have been very much easier to deal with had you
known about it some months earlier, and can you
actually build in a better system without telling the
LSC what to do, at least to make sure that is
manageable?
Mr Denham: I think there are, and I think there are
two ways that we need to tackle that. One is that we
came oV the back of the Foster Report, and this was
not actually a recommendation directly in Foster,
but I asked the Permanent Secretary to carry out a
review of all of our accountability arrangements
with all of our NDPBs. As you know, Chairman,
from your committee’s business, we run almost
nothing directly. Everything inmy department is run
through arms’ length bodies. Part of that has got to
be to clarify the responsibilities of oYcials from my
department who are representatives to those
organisations, because Foster was right to say it had
never been: are they executive, are they there to
intervene, are they there to report back? Those need
to be clear, and that piece of work is important. The
second thing is that I think we need to build up the
capacity to analyse future risks in our overall policy
better. If you wanted me to pull out, frankly, a
generic problem here, we are trying to move the skill
system to a much more demand-led and responsive
system from a system that most people have
regarded as too centralist, bureaucratic and rigid.
The truth is that bureaucratic, centralist and rigid
systems are very controllable and I think that one of
the things we need to recognise is that, as you move
to make it more ﬂexible and more responsive, which
is what everybody thinks should happen, you do
increase your levels of risk and the delivery of the
programme, and I think one of the things that as
Secretary of State I will expect the new Permanent
Secretary and the board to do is tomake sure that we
have looked properly at those risks tomake sure that
we have understood them in advance and we can
deal with them with all of our agencies.
Q252 Chairman: John, on this particular
programme, back in September 2008 the LSC
External Advisory Group minutes said that
ministers were considering risks associated with a
capital programme. It says ministers were doing
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that, so what risks were ministers considering at that
point which did not come to your attention until,
really, November, December time?
Mr Denham: I have to say, Chairman, I do not know
and I have never known what that refers to.
Q253 MrMarsden: Stephen, can I come back to you
about this obviously lamentable situation whereby
the person who sat on the policy group did not take
it any further? Obviously, I am not asking for the
individual’s name, but could you tell me what level
of responsibility in the Civil Service?
Mr Marston: She was a team leader, depending on
the terms you use, a grade seven, or principal.
Q254 Mr Marsden: Would you classify that as
someone who was higher grade, middle grade, or
what?
Mr Marston: Middle grade.
Q255 Mr Marsden: The reason I am asking that
question is it was clearly a key responsibility and,
taking on board what the Secretary of State has said
about looking to the future, in hindsight is that the
sort of grade of oYcial that ought to be sitting on a
committee like that which has such key
responsibilities?
Mr Marston: I believe it is, because there are lots of
committees, lots of groups, lots ofmeetings, and I do
not think this is an issue about the grade or status of
the oYcial. For me the critical issue is the conﬁdence
to escalate, to err on the side of escalating if you see
a problem, even if the group conclusion in that
meeting you are attending is, “It is okay. Let us keep
it under review. It is going to be all right.” That is
what went wrong. I do not think it was her status.
Q256 Mr Marsden: I do not want to get hung up on
the status, but what I am concerned about is the
actual structural process within the Civil Service and
DIUS to escalate an overview of that sort of thing.
The Secretary of State has rightly said, and we know
this as well, that there was some debate as to the
validity of the Edwards Report, but would it not in
hindsight have been a reasonable thing for your
department and for your oYcials to say, “Look, we
have had this report. It is quite alarming. It talks
about what policies could cope with this level of
demand and makes reference to the continuation of
payment proﬁle projects being unaVordable to the
council.” In private business, I would have thought
that would have triggered oV at least a second
opinion to go back and say, “Do these guys know
what they are talking about?”, but clearly it did not
in your department.
Mr Marston: That is fair. We have touched a bit on
what the response was to the report. What my
colleague did know was that the conclusion within
the LSC was a set of actions that we have talked
about, the short-term issue and being ready for
prioritisation at some later stage, and an
understanding that actually the primary escalation
route was through the LSC about the management
of the capital programme. I do not say that as any
sort of excuse, it is really not meant to be. It is just
trying to say there is a dynamic within the two
organisations and perhaps we did not make it
speciﬁc enough who was escalating what in which
organisation.
Q257 Mr Marsden: The truth of the matter is that
you already knew within the department, over a
period of time, that riskmanagement in the LSCwas
deﬁcient?
Mr Marston: That came out at council level, you are
quite right, and, again, there were clearly risks here
that we failed to spot, and I do regret that. We
thought we were doing our best to understand what
the real risks were that we were facing. So we knew
there was a risk of in-year budget andwe tried to sort
it out.
Q258 Mr Marsden: Can I move you on. Of course,
the ﬁrst warning sign was the Edwards Report, but
there was also a management board report on 13
May to the LSC warning of increasing pressures
both on the capital budget and expecting advice on
short and medium-term priorities. Was your
department represented on that management board
in any shape or form?
Mr Marston: I think one of my deputy directors was
represented. There is a capital funding committee
that also has a role in this, I think.
Q259 Mr Marsden: Would your deputy director
have been at this management board on 13 May
2008?
Mr Marston: I can check that. I am afraid I do not
know.
Q260 Mr Marsden: Could you check that and
conﬁrm it to the committee?
Mr Marston: Yes, I will.4
Q261MrMarsden: I want to alsomove you on to the
evidence hearing that the Permanent Secretary
attended in November 2008 before the Public
Accounts Committee. When we had Mark Haysom
before us last week, I asked him questions about the
nature of his preparation for that session because, of
course, he and the then Permanent Secretary gave
the Public Accounts Committee on that occasion the
impression that most, if not all, things in the garden
were rosy, and they did that perhaps to some extent
reﬂecting the previous NAO report; but I asked
Mark Haysom, “You must have realised you would
be asked questions about the capital project. Did
you not go back to your line managers and say, ‘I
want to know everything about this—the good and
the bad. I am not just there to tell everything is
wonderful, but I need to be prepared for diYcult
probing questions?’” Did you do that with the
Permanent Secretary? Did you go through what we
4 Footnote by witness: The LSC Management Group is an
internal LSCmeeting and there was noDIUS representation
either on that date or at its other meetings.
TheLSCFinance andResources Boardmet on 29May.That
Board does have a DIUS observer and the Deputy Director
of the Finance and Performance Division attends. The May
Finance and Resources Board considered papers on FE
capital including the Edwards Report.
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might call a SWOT analysis in business—strengths,
weaknesses, opportunities, threats—or did you say,
“Look, we ought to look at this because this is 15%
of our budget”?
Mr Marston: We certainly did, as we always do, a
very thorough brieﬁng and discussion with the
Permanent Secretary, but I was looking back at the
NAO report yesterday and it is one of the
characteristics of this—
Q262 Mr Marsden: Can I not allow you to take us
on to the NAO report, interesting though that is,
because I am talking very speciﬁcally about the
appearance before the Public Accounts Committee
in November, which, of course, was subsequent to
that report. I accept that that report might have
lulled a certain sense of security, both into your
oYcials and also into the LSC, but, nevertheless,
knowing within your department that there were
these other things going around, would it have been
reasonable to go back and ask about this Edwards
capital report, “Where has it got to?”, and all the rest
of it?
Mr Marston: When preparing for that PAC hearing,
I certainly was personally not aware.
Q263 Mr Marsden: And there was no feed-through
mechanism from your oYcials, medium or higher
ranking, to say to you, “The Permanent Secretary
really ought to be aware of the on-going issue of this
report which has now surfaced in two or three
diVerent bits of the LSC.” There was no programme
percolating up to you to prepare the Permanent
Secretary for his session before the Public Accounts
Committee.
Mr Marston: Not on that issue, no, because what we
thought we were doing was examining, addressing,
responding to the ﬁndings and conclusions of the
Edwards Report.
Q264 Mr Marsden: I am trying to look at future
structures. Do you think in hindsight that, when
people like the Permanent Secretary appear before
committees of that nature, it might be useful if there
was a little bit more bottom up in the organisation as
well as top down?
Mr Marston: I am sure that is right, yes. We must
learn a number of lessons from this whole situation,
and that is one of them, that in preparing for that
sort of session we need to try and grab hold of all of
the information and understanding that we have in
the organisation that is relevant to that discussion. It
may just be worth saying, though, that even at that
stage, even in November, as the Secretary of State
has said, understanding the full depth of what was
going on was really quite elusive. We knew we had a
problem; we really did not at that stage, even then,
after all that that happened, know the scale of what
was going on.
Q265 Graham Stringer: On that point, you have
both said that the conclusions of the Edwards
Report were not accepted. Who were they not
accepted by, on what basis were they not accepted
and did that lack of acceptance get into any brieﬁngs
to the Permanent Secretary in any way?
Mr Marston: I apologise; I am being unclear. I do
not think it is quite right to say, ﬂat out, it was not
accepted. It was understood. People received it, they
read it, but the follow-up actions they took were as
we have described and, with hindsight, they were not
the right actions. We should have moved faster, we
should have moved more urgently to say this is
ﬂagging something potentially very serious, we must
understand and we must investigate that, but I do
not think it is quite right to say no action was taken.
Mr Denham: What I understood Sir Andrew
Foster’s report to saywas not that it was rejected but
that some of its conclusions were challenged; they
were debated; people were arguing about the
analysis and whether this was the correct description
of the problem. I did not mean to suggest that it had
been rejected in terms of there is nothing here, but I
think the Foster Report actually sets out that there
was a debate. One of the critical issues was it was
never brought to a head.
Q266 Graham Stringer: I understand the
communication issues. What I am trying to get at,
perhaps rejection is too strong a word, but what was
the evidential basis that that original capital
programme report doubted?
Mr Marston: My understanding is that it was on the
basis of the information that people had at the time
that was very, very far from complete. If you like, the
above-the-surface, visible bit of all of this was what
was coming through to the capital committee in
terms of projects that were quite a long way down
the pipeline, and if you look at that bit of the process,
certainly what I was seeing in the LSC papers, it had
every appearance of being rigorous, robust—all of it
was costed, everything was carefully scrutinised, it
was all vetted, for value for money. It looked as
though it was a secure, robust process of you just
took that little chunk of the whole sequence. What
I think the Edwards Report was getting at, and we
simply did not have the management information to
conﬁrmor deny, was right down in the pipeline in the
less formal bit, all building up very, very rapidly, and
no-one had that bit of information to oVset against
Edwards. If you just looked at the formal bit, we
could still manage, as we have managed, within the
budget we had each year.We have not overspent our
budget, because the formal bit set against the budget
we have is still matching.
Q267 Graham Stringer: John, this is a story of a
capital budget essentially getting out of control, and
that happens from time to time, but there is another
side to it that appals me. How can a Labour
Government allow a capital programme to be
demand-led so that money is spent—I have got
nothing against Poole and Dorset—in great
quantities in Poole andDorset and is not spent in the
centre of Manchester or Birmingham? The Building
Schools for the Future programme was very clearly
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focused on areas of deprivation and need. Why did
a Labour Government not insist that this capital
programme went in that direction?
Mr Denham: Indeed. The history of the capital
programme was that in the ﬁrst few years when the
investment began to ﬂow, from about 2001 onwards,
the LSC and the Department had actually had great
diYculty in spending the capital that was available.
There was a need but it was not then that there was
a huge ﬂow of schemes coming forward. This may in
part be that for a very long period of time the centre
had been denied any public sector capital, so the
only people who thought about investing were
people with land to sell or buildings to sell or they
could re-invest. So, going back even two years, the
problem was, in part, seen as one of driving up
demand, in which case demand-led responding to
entrepreneurial colleges was seen as a reasonable
thing to do, and within the regions—because one of
the problems, we now know, was a very devolved
programme—LSC staV engaged with colleges to
bring programmes forward. Obviously, the speed at
which that worked and the acceleration that took
place created a situation where, as Foster has said,
the schemes in the pipeline were there on the basis of
the demand and not on prioritisation. With
hindsight, had we understood how the system was
going to accelerate and how demand would exceed
supply, we would have taken a diVerent approach,
but at the time, going back a year ago, at the
beginning of the spending review, when we had the
money to talk about, that was not seen as the initial
problem. Had we had better feedback on what was
already out there, then we would have taken a
diVerent view.
Q268 Graham Stringer: That is a slightly strange
answer, is it not, because even if the programme
needed kick-starting, a Labour Government, surely,
would always prioritise areas of greatest need? There
is always a ﬁnite amount of money, but if you are
allowed to be demand-led, then you are going to get
some very strange results.
Mr Denham: All of the evidence from the PAC
report was that the individual schemes that were
coming forward were meeting genuine educational
need and were producing good designs and good
value for money, and actually I am fairly certain that
in Poole and in Dorset there are real educational
needs that would be represented by any Labour
Government. It is true, the programme has not been
limited to, for example, a set of the most deprived
constituencies in the country—that is not the
approach that we took—but we did take comfort
from the independent views of this programme, none
of which raised any questions, and the PAC report
did not raise any questions that we were diverting
capital to areas where it was not really necessary or
it was not going to produce good educational results
for people who really needed to beneﬁt form it. I am
quite prepared to accept, with the beneﬁt of
hindsight, given what we know about demand and
supply, we could have taken a diVerent approach,
and we have now to look at prioritisation of the
programme as it goes forward, but I do not think
that it was an unreasonable approach to take.
Q269 Graham Stringer: Obviously, where there are
young people there is educational demand
throughout the country, by deﬁnition. Do you think
the department should look at its deﬁnitions of
demand, because we heard from earlier witnesses
that there was actually a deﬁnitional problem? You
can have demand anywhere, but I would say as a
Labour MP that we should be looking not just at
demand but very acutely at where there is
deprivation and need to override that: because, not
just on the capital programme, but on the funding
methodology and student lending numbers, there is
evidence, not that there is not demand, there is
clearly demand, but that it is going
disproportionately to more aZuent areas.
Mr Denham: Can we unpick that? Certainly in
prioritising the money that we now have available,
issues like those are going to be—and I am not sure
what has gone on in previous evidence sessions—
clearly among the criteria that now have to be
applied to the programme to get fair and acceptable
results. So we do have to prioritise it and we do have
to take criteria like that into play. We also have to be
careful about our deﬁnitions. Regeneration is an
issue that has often been raised in the House as a
criteria. You can actually regenerate a market town
or you can regenerate a deprived inner city area, so
you have to be clear what you are talking about
when you are talking about regeneration, but I think
that prioritisation is necessary. I have not seen an
analysis yet, it may be the committee has, that
suggests that large amounts of money have gone to
places where you really would not have wanted to do
something. I think we need to say that, whilst this
has been a demand-led programme, I have not yet
been to see a college that has been done under the
programme where I have come away thinking why it
is that—
Q270 Chairman: I think the point is, if you look at
Bradford, which is one of the most deprived areas,
my particular region, the fact that it has got
absolutely nothing when it could have got what it
wanted in terms of a limited bill, that is the bit,
Secretary of State, that we ﬁnd it very diYcult to
understand.
MrDenham:Chairman, there is an issue here that we
may need to think about. A demand-led system, or
any system actually, even one which has
prioritisation, depends on colleges having the
capacity to put proposals forward. Colleges, as you
know, Chairman (and this is quite important) are
independently led and autonomously run and
colleges do need to have the initiative to put
proposals forward.
Q271 Chairman: They need helping, do they not,
Secretary of State?
Mr Denham: They do need helping, but it is quite
clear that that is what LSC staV have been doing
rather too successfully, actually. Maybe that is part
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of the criticism. They have been out there
encouraging the people to put ideas in, but there has
to be 50% at least that comes from the colleges
themselves. I would also say, Chairman, that is not a
particular reﬂection on Bradford, because I have not
studied the position inBradford and so I do notwant
those in Bradford to be taking that as a criticism of
those particular colleges. I do not know the situation
there in detail.
Q272 Graham Stringer: I will not bore you with the
details of where I think the money is going, but I will
write to you about it before this committee reports,
and I would be grateful for a reply, but I turn to my
ﬁnal question. You said in your opening remarks
that you are not in control of very much.
Mr Denham: We do not run very much.
Q273 Graham Stringer: I am sorry.
Mr Denham: I would like to put that on the record.
I do not directly run very much, Chairman.
Q274 Graham Stringer: You do not directly run,
which makes control diYcult, I guess, in those
circumstances. From this experience, which is not a
happy experience, do you think there is anything to
be learnt? Are quangos the way forward or should
some of this business be brought back into local
authorities? There has always been a competition.
DiVerent governments have taken things out of local
authorities and open democratic control and they
have put them into quangos. That debate will go on
for ever. Do you think there is anything to be learnt
from this experience?
Mr Denham: Even before this experience we had
taken the decision that for adult skills the LSC
would be abolished and we would have a skills
funding agency which would not be an NDPB, and
obviously part of that was stimulated by the
machinery of government changes. But when we
came to assess what we would want as a
replacement, I could not see that the complexities of
an arms’ length body added anything to the ability
to take good decisions. Patently obviously, the
theory of NDPBs when they were ﬁrst set up, that
they protect Ministers from the political ﬂack when
things go wrong, does not appear to work as well as
some of us might have liked, and Mr Boswell is
nodding. So you do not get in any way insulated
from this because there is an arms’ length body, at
the end of the day you are still the Minister; and I
have been to the House to apologise for this. My
conclusion is you should use NDPBs where they are
necessary, but not otherwise. I do think on the
university side, for a whole host of reasons which I
do not want to go into now because we have
discussed them just recently, there is an enormous
advantage in having the Higher Education Funding
Council as a buVer between central government and
the universities. But in this area I think the SFA will
show that we will have simpler decision-making,
clearer lines of accountability, and you can never be
sure about these things, but a better prospect of
making sure this does not happen again.
Q275MrBoswell: I think, by nodding, I have set into
the text that you spoke of my experience. Can I
advert back to the general interface between the
department and LSC?We know that they are a body
in run down and they will be transformed, for the
reason you have explained. In one of the more
colourful phases of evidence, Mark Haysom said
that your staV are “crawling all over the LSC”, and
that is obviously much wider than the engagement
with the capital programme which should have
taken place. I just wonder if you would comment
more generally on how that process is being
handled? Will it be handled, as you mentioned,
through Stephen or will it be handled by somebody
else so there is, as it were, a single point of reference,
or is it handled at Secretary of State and Chairman
level, and, if I may add to that a ﬁnal point, there is
another player in all this—we have not, of course,
had evidence from them before us—and that is
DSCF, who have a very strong interest. So in the
process ofmoving fromwhere wewere, which I think
is acknowledged to be not entirely satisfactory, to
where we would like to be in the way that you said,
Secretary of State, how is this all being managed? A
by-product of that may be that this problemwas not
picked up as it should have been, but can we have
some conﬁdence that there is a coherent view which
is taking us from where we were to where we are
going to be?
Chairman: Because it could be an even bigger mess.
Q276 Mr Boswell: Somebody already mentioned
Train to Gain this morning as an example, although
I do not want to lead you into that.
Mr Denham: No, although I actually acknowledged
in the debate on Monday that some of the issues
about a move towards a more demand-led system
when you have ﬁxed budgets are not exactly the
same as in this case, but they raise the same
questions.How can you free up your systembut do it
in a waywhich is still compatible with proper control
and public ﬁnance? So I acknowledge, Mr Boswell,
that we need to be ahead of this. I cannot now recall
the context of Mark Haysom’s comments. I think
there are two issues. There is at the moment, of
course, a great deal of discussion between the LSC,
my department, DCSF and the emerging YPLA
about staYng structures, responsibilities, how
ﬁnances will work, and so on. So there is a huge
amount of engagement that is led day-to-day by
Susan Pember, personnel issues and giving staV the
chance to choose between a number of diVerent
organisations in which they might develop their
careers and so on. The second area is that I think,
inevitably, for example, the funding of skills, the
relative prioritisation, say, that you give to Train to
Gain the ﬂexibilities you do or do not give providers,
inevitably are of concern to the Department and
Ministers because we are accountable for the overall
impact of the skills policy, and I am quite sure it is
the case that parts of the LSCwould say, “Iwish they
would just give us a cheque at the beginning of the
year and tell us to run the best skills policy we can
and then come back at the end of the year.” It cannot
work like that. Indeed, one of the reasons for saying
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that when the LSC is replaced we want a skills
funding agency just acknowledges the reality that we
are bound to take an interest in how money is
prioritised and how policies are developed. I wonder
if Stephen can say a bit more about the management
processes.
Q277 Mr Boswell: That would be helpful.
Mr Marston: On Mr Boswell’s speciﬁc question on
how we are handling the transition to the new
structure, my opposite number in DCSF, Lesley
Longstone, and I chair a programme board which
also involves the LSC chief executive, colleagues and
the local authorities, and that is where we try to
understand everything that we need to do.
Q278 Mr Boswell: And that has got a risk
management system presumably built in?
Mr Marston: Yes, and capital is now on the risk
register.
Q279 Dr Iddon: John, what prospects are there still
for colleges that have received approval in principle
but not in detail for the future?
Mr Denham: As you know, Mr Iddon, we received
some extra funding at the Budget—an extra £300
million for this spending review, so that is this
current ﬁnancial year and next—and the ability to
plan into the next spending review period which we
had not had previously. So that does produce some
scope to allow some schemes to go ahead. The
position at the moment, as I suspect Mr Russell
described to you, is the LSC are developing the
criteria which should be used for prioritisation, are
currently working through the exercise of how they
will apply those to the existing schemes and are
looking the schemes that this will be applied to, to
make sure that in each case we can get value for
money and that the investment that we make in
individual schemes strikes the right balance between
getting schemes under way and making the best use
of money and getting as many schemes as possible
into the system.
Q280 Dr Iddon: Thank you. On the question of
reimbursement of costs for the colleges that have
been stalled and are not likely to get approval in
detail, can you give those colleges some assurance as
to when they might be reimbursed at this stage?
Mr Denham: The LSC are looking actively at how
that should be handled. We have already made, I
think, the most important initial commitment that
no college will go bust or go under because of the
commitments that they have entered into. I cannot
today say exactly how we will respond to all of the
many diVerent colleges which are in many diVerent
circumstances and have taken diVerent actions, but
we will stick to that initial commitment we gave. I
know the LSC will want to develop its approach for
those colleges as swiftly as possible, but, I think, if
we can send a message out about the security of the
colleges’ position at the moment, that is a critical
thing to have done at this stage.
Dr Iddon: Finally, I want to pick up Graham’s point
about need. I must declare an interest. It is not all
bad news. We are having all our three colleges
replaced and one is open and has proved highly
successful.
Chairman: It is always the same, Secretary of State.
Q281Dr Iddon:My concern is, if we have not looked
across the whole of the estate, I know that colleges
are autonomous, but there must be some colleges in
areas of high need where, for one reason or another,
the principal is not thrusting, the management is not
thrusting enough, they have not even hit the radar
screen yet. Does the LSC have some idea of the
condition of the estate outside those that have come
into the demand system?
Mr Denham: I am glad you recognised the
investment has taken place, because I sometimes feel
it is a debate that, although we know that there have
been 700 schemes in 330 colleges, you can never ﬁnd
them, but they are there and they are very, very good
by and large. Let us be honest about where we are at
the moment. We have schemes in a pipeline some of
which are in an advanced stage of development and
in a position to go ahead, and we have some money
which is for this spending review period and for the
next few years. In an ideal world, givenwhere we are,
you would stop the clock, go back and do a zero-
based system of prioritisation, but I think that is just
not a possible thing to do. We would end up not
spending anything probably for the next two or three
years while you did that exercise. I think the honest
answer is that for the immediate period we are going
to have to work as fairly and transparently as we can
on those schemes that we know about in the pipeline
which are at an advanced stage of development.
What we do want to do is to look into the next
spending review period and beyond at how a system
which more eVectively prioritises people’s place in
the pipeline can be applied, and I think that is
something the college sector as a whole would like us
to be able to do, but I think we are going to have to
move from where we are to that; we cannot just stop
the clock and start again.
Q282 Mr Marsden: Secretary of State, that is
understood, and obviously, as one of those who have
a college in the pipeline, I would be very interested
to see the regeneration and other criteria that come
forward, but, again, for the future and the future
structure, when you acquire your new permanent
secretary, will it be one of your key instructions,
discussions, or whatever, to make sure that in future
the forward looking nature of things, the risk
assessment and the proactive aspects of the
organisation in DIUS, are stronger than they have
been apparently in this case?
Mr Denham: Yes, they will. As you know, Sir Jon
Shortridge starts as the Acting Permanent Secretary
on Tuesday next week, and as an Acting Permanent
Secretary I do not expect him to make big structural
changes. I thinkwewill start from the very beginning
for him to come in as a very experienced senior civil
servant to look at what we have in place and the way
the board works and to make sure that we are taking
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the measures that we can now to strengthen or to
address any issues within our structure so that when
the new Permanent Secretary takes up post—they
have not yet been appointed so we have not got a
date for that—we have addressed the more obvious
issues that need to be addressed.
Mr Marsden: I am sure, Chairman, we will look
forward to interviewing the new Permanent
Secretary.
Q283 Chairman: We certainly will. Secretary of
State, I did give you notice that I would like to ask
you a question about the science budget allocation
letters. Just for the record, I have let you know that.
We accept that you are not going to publish them,
but the reason we want to see them is that there is a
suggestion that the Government is taking an overly
prescriptive role in determining the way the
Research Council spend their money. Given the fact
that the Osmotherly Rules state, July 2005, that the
Government is committed to being as open and as
helpful as possible with select committees and that,
indeed, during your time as a select committee
chairman you received from Charles Clarke, the
then Home Secretary, papers which were very
sensitive but were relevant to a committee inquiry,
could you give us an explanation as to why you are
digging your heels in and not allowing the committee
to have those on a conﬁdential, not to publish, basis,
and will you reconsider?
Mr Denham: Chairman, I would never refuse a
request from you to reconsider, so I promise you I
will go away and look at it again. The view that I
have taken up to now is that it does raise a precedent
for the release of papers which were intended to be
conﬁdential which I am concerned about. I would
say two things. I will go and consider it again,
because you have raised it with me quite fairly. I
would also say to you, Chairman, this may come as
a surprise to my oYcials, but as we look forward to
the next allocation process, which we have already
discussed with you as to ways in which we can make
that more consultative, perhaps we can ﬁnd a way
which avoids this situation happening again.
Q284 Chairman: When Peter Hain came before the
Liaison Committee he made it clear to all the chairs
of the select committees that there should be a
presumption for disclosure of documents, and I am
grateful to you for reconsidering that. This is not an
attempt to trap the Secretary of State—I am sure
there is absolutely nothing in these innocuous
documents—but we would like to see them to
complete that piece of the inquiry. Thank you very
much indeed.
Mr Denham: Thank you, Chairman.
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Written evidence
Memorandum 1
Submission from the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills
The FE Capital Programme
Background
1. This memorandum refers to the Further Education capital programme and recent events relating to
its funding and administration.
2. The purpose of the programme is to support the refurbishment and renewal of the FE college estate.
The Learning and Skills Council is responsible for the administration of the programme. DIUS is
responsible for policy regarding the programme and for monitoring LSC performance.
3. Since 1997 around £3 billion has been invested in modernising FE facilities. This involved more than
700 projects in 330 colleges, covering the vast majority of the FE estate. Only a small minority of colleges
have not received any capital funding.
4. Towards the end of 2008 it became clear to the LSC’s governing Council that there had been an
unsustainable rise in demand from colleges. The Council therefore decided to defer all approvals of capital
projects until detailed work had been undertaken with colleges to establish a fuller understanding of the
situation.
5. The deferral did not aVect projects that had already been given ﬁnal approval for funding and which
had not yet completed.
The Foster Review
6. The Secretary of State and the chair of the LSC jointly commissioned Sir Andrew Foster to conduct
an independent review of the causes of the increased demand for funding, the LSC’s internal processes and
the lessons to be learnt for the future. His report was published in March 2009.
7. Sir Andrew found that the programme was slow to gather momentum. As recently as in 2007–08 it
was under spent. But by 2008–09 the rate at which proposals came forward began to increase. So did their
cost, and the share of the cost borne by the LSC. Demand for capital funding began to outstrip supply. And
the absence of a proper long term ﬁnancial strategy and inadequate management, information and
monitoring led to delay and confusion in addressing the issue.More detail on the recent history of the further
education capital programme is set out in the Foster report.
8. DIUS accepts Sir Andrew’s conclusions—in short, that this is an excellent programme which has
successfully beneﬁted students and communities—but that it has been mismanaged. This mismanagement
resulted in there being substantially more applications in the pipeline than could be funded in this Spending
Review period. 79 projects had received the ﬁrst stage of approval in principle with a funding requirement
from the LSC of £2.7 billion and there was a further requirement of £3 billion for proposals that had been
submitted for approval in principle.
9. Sir Andrew made several recommendations regarding open and early consultation with the sector and
improved information and management. He also said that the priority was “to agree how the present
demand-led approach to the programme is replaced by a needs-based approach with explicit priorities and
choice criteria.” DIUS and LSC accepted the recommendations in full and they are now being implemented.
Changes in the Learning and Skills Council
10. On 23 March, in recognition of the deﬁciencies in how the LSC had managed the programme, Mark
Haysom resigned as Chief Executive. GeoVrey Russell was appointed as acting Chief Executive, with the
immediate task of urgently increasing the certainty and clarity around the programme.
11. GeoVrey Russell appointed an external team from Grant Thornton to review the ﬁnancial data held
by the LSC about capital projects. He also appointed a new Director of National Projects to take
responsibility for the capital programme and to work with a new sub group of the Council charged with
overseeing the programme.
DIUS
12. Sir Andrew found that the scrutiny byDIUS of LSCmanagement of the capital programme had been
insuYciently rigorous. The Secretary of State therefore asked the Permanent Secretary to carry out a review
of the DIUS’s relationships with all of its Non-Departmental Public Bodies to ensure that there is clarity
about accountability and responsibility. This is underway.
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Budget 2009
13. On 22 April Budget 2009 announced additional capital funding for FE colleges of more than £300
million in the current spending round. In addition, recognising the long-term nature of capital projects, the
Government is planning a continuing FE capital investment in future years. The planning assumption is
£300 million a year from 2011–12 to 2013–14, to be conﬁrmed at the next Spending Review. This provides
a provisional £1.2 billion in total to 2013–14 which should allow around £750 million for new schemes.
14. The additional investment will allow a limited number of projects to be taken forward in this spending
round—that is, those that are most urgent and with the greatest needs. It also allows for planning for a
limited future programme of projects running into the next Spending Review period based on a stringent
assessment both of need and value for money.
Next steps
15. On 24 April GeoVrey Russell wrote to all college principals describing next steps. He set out the
proposed new criteria and process for selection of projects to go forward in this spending round. In line with
the Foster report, consultation with the college sector is taking place through a panel of college Principals
that has been convened with the support of the Association of Colleges. The LSC are also consulting with
the Local Government Association and the Regional Development Agencies.
16. In addition to selecting a limited number of projects to go forward in this spending round, the LSC
will develop a process for establishing a new needs-based priority list of projects that will be considered for
funding in the next spending review period. Projects will not receive approval for funding, however, until
after the outcome of the next Spending Review has been announced.
17. The LSC will work with independent property consultants to assess expenditure incurred by colleges
in developing projects and how the longer term value of that expenditure can be maximised. That will
provide the basis for identifying cases where a contribution to potential liabilities by the LSC is appropriate.
Through its normal ﬁnancial intervention process, the LSC will continue to ensure that no college is unable
to meets its ﬁnancial obligations as a result of decisions on capital projects.
18. For the future, the Government will work to ensure that the arrangements for management of the
FE capital programme under the Skills Funding Agency and Young People’s Learning Agency reﬂect the
recommendations in the Foster report.
April 2009
Memorandum 2
Submission from West Cheshire College
Summary of Main Points
Any delay would impact on the project in the following ways:
— Delay in providing specialist vocational facilities to support the diplomas, local schools and
employers (as we are sole provider in the area).
— Additional expenditure on 12,000 sq metres of temporary accommodation for students, external
accommodation rented for specialist areas and costs of storage for specialist equipment.
— Increased costs if the College was forced to retender or redesign because of delays.
— Potential loss of contractor and/or design team if the College is subject to any extended period of
delay due to other schemes mobilised/redundancies.
— Remobilisation costs/delays.
— DiYculty binding contractor in to ﬁxed price already agreed.
— Loss of revenue from apprenticeships agreed with contractor in contract.
— Delay to the programme leaving students with a less than satisfactory learning experience.
— Potential expiry of lease on one of the College sites.
— Inability to capitalise expenditure to date leaving the College technically insolvent.
— Inability to discharge planning/106 agreements in a timely manner.
Introduction to West Cheshire College
— West Cheshire College is a specialist vocational college with campuses in Chester and Ellesmere
Port. It is a major player in upskilling, reskilling and motivating young people and adults both
through employers and as individuals. It currently provides for 20,000 students of which c 3,000
are 14–19 and constitute the major part of the College’s income:
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— It supports many young people from deprived backgrounds (in 2007–08 32% of 16–18 year olds
in College were from deprived wards with over half qualifying for Educational Maintenance
Allowance).
— It is the largest provider of apprenticeships and advanced apprenticeships in the area (including a
national contract with Unilever).
— It leads on joint curriculum developments, including the new diplomas, most of which are reliant
on vocational input and facilities in the college.
— It was one of the ﬁrst Colleges to gain the Training Quality Standard for excellence in working with
employers and works with over 1,000 employers.
— It delivers the vast majority of adult literacy and numeracy qualiﬁcations in Cheshire and
Warrington.
— Supports local industry on short time working, such as in the motor industry, and with those
making people redundant, such as in the ﬁnance sector.
— Works closely with Job Centre Plus on several initiatives to reskill the long term unemployed.
— In partnership withMacArthur Glen the College has been awarded one of the ﬁrst Skills Shops as
part of the National Retail Academy.
An Area Study for Chester conducted on behalf of the LSC noted “the College’s importance to the local
and regional area”, commenting on the “clear emphasis on employability, the links made between provision
and future employment of learners and its strong commitment to eVective partnership working”.
Factual Information for the Committee
The project is a single £72.9 million (79% LSC intervention) project involving rationalisation from four
campuses to two high quality specialist vocational campuses in Chester (c 6,000 squaremetres Technologies)
and Ellesmere Port (c 21,000 square metres Creative and Service Industries). It is extremely important that
the College capital application is dealt with as soon as possible as the College is “at the point of no return”
with a preferred contractor on site and having spent c£5 million developing the project so far.
The College received Approval in Detail to renew its campuses in 2005, but was stymied by the action of
the local authority. The College has been working on this project for over six years.
— £5 million has already been invested by both the College and the LSC.
— Buildings have deteriorated with the majority having a very limited lifespan (probably two years)
as per an updated survey undertaken by consultants in 2006.Maintenance programmes have been
limited to health and safety activities only as the buildings are due for replacement and this was
agreed with the LSC.
— The College has already vacated 12,000 square metres in order to build on its footprint due to local
political pressure, Green Belt and EMV8 regulations. After discussions with the LSC, feasibility
and enabling work has started so the College could meet the agreed planned programme in our
applications in principle and in detail (eg a substation has been moved). Progress was discussed
with the LSC on 14 January 2009 and requested information was subsequently provided to them.
— Students are in temporary buildings and oV site (virtually all of our 16–19 year olds spend at least
some time in temporary accommodation). These are not long term solutions and are costly.
The College is playing a key role in regeneration activities as it is situated in an area with economic
dependence on ﬁnancial services, automotive manufacturing, retail and tourism.
— Vauxhalls—the College is a major provider of its training, upskilling and multiskilling
programmes linked to short term working and the delivery of the new Astra.
— The Bank of America—the College is the main supplier of its external training including contact
centre and management training.
— The College withMacarthur Glen/Henderson Globalwas invited to apply to be a Skills Shop for the
National Skills Academy (retail) the “hub” of which will be in Ellesmere Port and the “spokes” in
Chester and Northwich and has been successful.
The local authority will not be able to meet its legal obligations to deliver the 14–19 entitlements in West
Cheshire as the College is the only source of specialist vocational education and training in the area. Plans
for delivery of this entitlement have been drawn up assuming resources will be available from 2010.
— Much of the new Diploma work is being led by the College and relies on College facilities for
delivery.
— Local Government Review (recently completed with the establishment of two unitary authorities
fromApril 2009) means the College is in an unknown position in terms of local authority support.
— There is a high risk of refusal if the College has to reapply for planning permission either for
renewal of temporary buildings approval or the campuses’ developments.
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The College is due to be inspected and undoubtedly will not receive a good report especially as addressing
accommodation has been an area for improvement in the last two inspections and the accommodation is
now worse.
Due to the exceptional nature of the circumstances it ﬁnds itself the College’s case is as urgent as those 8
Colleges and Rochdale which have recently been agreed. The College faces a short term future in its current
accommodation. The LSC has all the information it needs to approve this project. Time is of the essence if
the College is to survive.
Recommendations for Inclusion in Committees Report
The College recommends that the committee:
— Recommends additional funding for capital projects in the FE sector is secured to ensure all
projects with AiP can come to fruition quickly.
— Recognise the urgency of determining the applications of colleges due to have received full
approval between January 2009 and March 2009.
— Recognises that within that group there is pressure to move projects that are on site forward
immediately.
— Recognises the impact on local areas deprived of a fully operational college.
— Recognises that delay means signiﬁcant increased costs within a capital budget already under
pressure.
— Recognises the eVect on local regeneration (more sharply focussed with the recession).
April 2008
Memorandum 3
Submission from the Association of Colleges (AoC)
Capital Investment for Colleges
Introduction
1. TheAssociation of Colleges (AoC)welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the Committee’s inquiry
into the funding of College capital projects in England. AoC is the representative body for the 369 further
education Colleges in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
2. Our written evidence covers the following issues:
— background on the programme to modernise Colleges;
— the moratorium on new projects; and
— current issues, including the continuing gap in funding, the need to ﬁnd innovative ways to support
projects, concerns over capital funding for 16–19 education and the issue of compensation for
abortive work.
The programme to modernise Colleges
3. Colleges play a vital role in the education system in England. They educate twice asmany young people
aged 16 to 18 than schools, they train many thousands of apprentices, provide 11% of higher education
places and account for 49%of vocational qualiﬁcations achieved each year. The 369Colleges own ormanage
more than eight million square metres of buildings which are used for education and training.
4. Capital spending by Government, matched by funds raised by Colleges, has largely eradicated the
legacy of the 1970s and 1980s and is creating a network of 21st century buildings in every town in England.
Investment started a decade ago but was accelerated following the Treasury decision to increase capital
funding in 2005 and the publication a year later of a “Building Colleges for the Future” strategy (see Annex
for timeline).
5. Since 2001,more than 300Colleges have undertaken 700 projects to rebuild or refurbish their premises.
Each project is diVerent but the beneﬁts include:
— additional places for young people to help ensure that everyone remains learning or training to the
age of 18. The average College enrols 10% more young people than ﬁve years ago;
— facilities to give adults the skills they need to get back into work and to fuel an economic recovery;
— buildings designed by the end-user which will be used ﬂexibly because of the ﬂexible way in which
Colleges operate;
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— value formoney for the taxpayer. All projects are assessed for their economic and ﬁnancial beneﬁts.
The National Audit OYce praised themanagement of projects in July 2008. Private funding raised
by Colleges enhances themoney spent byGovernment and ﬁxes the public contribution at 50–80%
of costs; and
— employment in the construction industry, including places for apprentices (now a standard
contract condition in College projects).
6. There has been a sustained eVort by LSC oYcials to encourage College governing bodies and
Principals to be more ambitious with their redevelopment plans. The latest version of the LSC’s Building
Colleges for Future, published in March 2008,1 sets out ambitious plans to develop well-designed,
sustainable buildings with industry standard facilities, capable of meeting growing demand for learning. It
also speciﬁcally stated that the “changes outlined in the document and the substantial increase in project
volumes may all require changes within the LSC as an organisation, in order to deliver an enlarged capital
programme”.
The moratorium on new projects
7. The programme to modernise Colleges was arrested for four months in December 2008 because of
concerns about the budget. TheNational Council of the LSC suspended approval for all new capital projects
pending an internal review of the programme. The decision to suspend decision-making has had chaotic
eVects. OYcials underestimated the consequences of delay on Colleges or the number of Colleges that would
be aVected. In subsequent months, the Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills, John
Denham, commissioned his own review of the programme from Sir Andrew Foster.
8. Sir Andrew published his report on 1 April 2009 and said that “a good policy has been compromised
by its implementation. The policy intent to transform the further education estate is clear and positive. But
the implementation approach did not include a robust ﬁnancial strategy or a regional or national approach
to prioritisation.” The LSC Chief Executive, Mark Haysom, resigned on 23 March—a week before the
report was published.
On 22 April 2009, the Chancellor allocated more money to the capital budget which will allow the LSC
to approve a limited number of projects starting in 2009–10. The LSC plans to approve £500 million in
capital grant to support new projects worth £750million at their 3 JuneNational Council meeting. The LSC
funding plan assumes that the average grant rate for the approved projects will be 66%.
The continuing budget gap
9. AoCwelcomes the decision byHMTreasury to provide an additional £200million in 2009–10 and £100
million in 2010–11 and to allow DIUS to plan on the assumption that there is £300 million a year for the
following three years.2 However, the capital budget will still be insuYcient to fund many valuable projects.
There are a number of issues which the Committee may want to explore:
— There continues to be uncertainty about the full cost of projects in the College capital funding
pipeline. On 4March 2009, John Denham stated that there were 144 projects worth a total of £5.7
billion awaiting decisions. It has since become clear that the LSC undercounted the number of
projects and underestimated their cost;
— There is also uncertainty about the extent of forward commitments. It normally takes two to three
years to complete a new College building. Some of the £1.2 billion which is now available between
2009 and 2014 has already been committed to projects that have been approved;
— Although the LSC has a capital budget of £2.3 billion for the three years between 2008 and 2011,
it has to account to two diVerent Departments for the money. The DCSF controls almost £700
million of the budget and appears to have released only £80million of this towards College projects
despite the important role of Colleges in 16–19 education. It is possible that DIUS capital grants
are cross-subsidising pre-19 education;
— Colleges will undergo a rigorous assessment process in May 2009 to see if they qualify for a share
of £500 million in capital funding. The criteria by which LSC will judge projects was shared with
the new LSC-AoC capital reference group on 29 April.3 The same level of rigour has not been
applied in the spending of the capital budgets for school and university modernisation (£18 billion
and £2.2 billion respectively in the period 2008–11).
1 http://readingroom.lsc.gov.uk/lsc/National/nat-bulidingcollegesforfuture-mar08.pdf
2 Parliamentary Answer given to Phil Willis MP, Hansard, 30 April 2009: column 1477W.
3 Available here http://www.aoc.co.uk/en/Policy and Advisory Work/ﬁnance and statistics/ capital funding.cfm
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The decision-making timetable
10. After a four month period of delay and confusion, there is now a four week period in which the LSC
will assess and prioritise more than 200 College projects. There are a large number of Colleges where quick
decisions are essential to ensure that governing bodies and Principals can schedule works in the summer
holidays either to start building or to carry out emergency works on abortive projects. However there is also
a risk that decisions will be made too quickly in order to meet Treasury timetables. There are four
particular risks:
— the process may unduly advantage those Colleges who are further advanced with their projects.
After the LSC makes its decisions in June 2009, there may be no further opportunity for Colleges
to secure funds until summer 2011;
— colleges and other interested parties may believe that decision-making is being carried out with
undue haste to meet a political timetable. This could generate political and legal challenges to
decisions;
— there is still no clarity about the planned allocation of LSC funds between new projects andmoney
to stabilise Colleges by dealing with their costs;
— there is no room in the timetable for Colleges or the LSC to ﬁnd alternative solutions to their
development problems, for example by levering in new sources of funds.
Alternative funding routes
11. College redevelopment has been funded in conventional ways this decade through a mixture of
Government grants, bank loans, sale of property and cash reserves. The relative simplicity of the funding
arrangementsmay explain the speedwithwhichColleges havemodernised compared to schools. The current
economic environment is not a good one for ﬁnancial experiments but we agree with Sir Andrew Foster that
“there will be a need to explore new forms of funding that are innovative and sound”. We suggest that it
might be useful to allocate a small amount of Government funding to support College innovation in the
following areas:
— redesign of projects on a more modest scale to meet immediately pressing needs;
— project funding involving a larger amount of borrowing, perhaps supported in some way by a
College’s home Local Authority;
— sale and leaseback of facilities involving commercial partners;
— shared use of facilities with other education institutions; and
— further examination of the use ofHEFCE capital funding for Colleges.Many of the schemes which
have been delayed are in Colleges which provide a signiﬁcant amount of higher education for
example City College Norwich, Blackpool and the Fylde College and Grimsby Institute for FE
and HE.
Capital funding for wider uses of the College estate
12. Since June 2007, decision-making about Colleges has been divided between two Government
Departments. Although DCSF is the source of 49% of College income, DIUS is the sponsoring department
for the 276 Further Education Colleges and responsible for the capital funding of all 369 Colleges including
Sixth Form Colleges). A single point of responsibility makes sense but it is possible that the criteria
developed to assess projects for the current round of LSC decision-making reﬂects the immediate concerns
of the DIUS further education and skills division simply because DIUS is the route for the money. It is
noticeable that the contribution of a project towards learners aged 14–19 counts for only 5% of the score in
the assessment. Although Colleges make an important contribution to higher education provision, this does
not feature anywhere in the scoring process.
13. AoC suggests the two Departments need to pool relevant funds into a single College capital budget
in the interests of making best use of public money to meet educational, social and economic needs.
Compensation for abortive costs
14. A large number of Colleges spent money developing projects on the understanding that they would
be able to secure capital funding for part of the costs. Although it was known in spring 2008 that the capital
budget was running out, LSC oYcials continued to encourage Colleges to pursue larger projects, to extend
plans to include specialist facilities, to consider redevelopment as part of ﬁnancial recovery and to make
proposed buildings more sustainable.
15. Colleges in these circumstances have a legitimate claim for compensation from the LSC for money
they spent in good faith up to the moratorium in December 2008 and for committed costs that they are still
incurring, for example on temporary accommodation. In March 2009, AoC carried out a survey of the 79
Colleges with approvals in principle and another 120 Colleges carrying out feasibility studies to establish
some facts. 168 Colleges responded to the survey (an 80% response) and reported the following:
— £215 million in capital expenditure to date on stalled projects;
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— £187 million that will be written oV in their accounts if projects do not go forward. This will put
most Colleges in deﬁcit and wipe out their reserves; and
— £269 million in extra costs (maintenance etc) in the next ﬁve years.
16. The ﬁnal reckoning on abortive costs will come to a diVerent ﬁgure but we suggest this raises a number
of questions for Government:
— A full, fair and fast compensation scheme is needed to deal with individual Colleges. The LSC has
promised one-to-one discussions with Colleges but has set no timetable for resolution.
— Mismanagement of the capital budget by the LSC has weakened Colleges at the point where their
contribution is important in improving 14–19 education and in helping business and individual
respond to the recession. DIUS and DCSF, together need to consider further action to stabilise
Colleges and hence enable them to give their best in the face of the recession.
— The shortage of capital funding will make it more diYcult for Colleges to reduce running costs.
HMTreasury’s operational eYciency programme recommends that investment decisions are made
which “lead to a more eYcient estate in the longer term”.4 Our evidence suggests that many
Colleges will not now be able to make these savings.
May 2009
Annex
Timeline
On 16 March 2005 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, announced an increase in capital
investment for the further education sector with a commitment of £350 million in new funding in 2008–09
and 2009–10 on top of the £250 million planned for the 2007–08 ﬁnancial year.5
In July 2005, the LSC national council agreed a capital strategy. This had various updates including a
publication on 6 February 2007, Building for skills, a prospectus for the LSC capital programme.6
On 16 November 2007 the Secretaries of State for Children Schools and Families and Innovation
Universities and Skills (DIUS) jointly published their Grant Letter7 to the Learning and Skills Council
(LSC) which included a £2.3 billion budget for capital spending for the three years 2008–09, 2009–10 and
2010–11. The annual budget rose from £584 million in 2007–08 to £849 million in 2010–11. Just under £700
million of this budget fell under the control of the Department for Children Schools and Families (DCSF).
In March 2008, the Learning and Skills Council published an updated version of the Building Colleges
for the Future strategy8 with a forward from John Denham.
On 17 November 2008, the Public accounts committee took evidence on college capital funding from
DIUS permanent secretary Ian Watmore and LSC chief executive, Mark Haysom.9
On 17 December 2008, the LSC suspended decision-making on College capital projects. The LSC
approves major capital expenditure by Colleges and part-funds projects. This decision was not announced
publicly but individual Colleges were contacted and asked to cease incurring commitments.
On 16 January 2009, following growing concern about the programme, LSC Chief Executive, Mark
Haysom, wrote to all College Principals stating with information about the LSC review.10
On 26 January 2009, following a number of questions in the media and parliament, John Denham and
LSC Chair, Chris Banks announced the appointment11 of Sir Andrew Foster to carry out an independent
review of the programme.
On 4 March 2009, the LSC national council met. The LSC has not yet published the minutes of the
meeting. Following the meeting, John Denham, announced12 that the LSC had decided to give approval
to eight capital projects which had been recommended for approval by the LSC Capital committee, but
which had been stalled at the LSC national council in December. JohnDenham also conﬁrmed that the LSC
has already given 79 Colleges “approval in principle” and that a further 65 Colleges have also submitted
bids to the national LSC for “approval in principle”.
On 23 March 2009, a senior oYcial from the DIUS told the capital summit organised by the AoC that
the LSC capital budget for College modernisation was fully committed.13
4 HM Treasury http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/vfm operational eYciency.htm
5 HM Treasury, 2005 budget, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/bud bud05 index.htm
6 http://readingroom.lsc.gov.uk/Lsc/National/nat-411CapitalInvestmentProspectus-pr-060207.pdf
7 http://www.lsc.gov.uk/aboutus/grantletters/
8 http://readingroom.lsc.gov.uk/lsc/National/natbuildingcollegesforfuture-mar08.pd
9 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmpubacc/uc1201-i/uc120102.htm
10 Copy letter available from AoC on request.
11 http://www.dius.gov.uk/news and speeches/press releases/lsc review
12 http://www.parliament.the-stationery-oYce.co.uk/pa/ld200809/ldhansrd/text/90304-wms0001.htm
13 Reported in TES, 27 March 2009.
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On 23 March 2009, LSC Chief Executive, Mark Haysom, resigned, stating that he would take
responsibility for the LSC failings in the management of capital. LSC chair, Chris Banks, announced that
he was to be replaced by an interim Chief Executive, GeoV Russell.14
On 1 April 2009, Sir Andrew Foster published his report, A review of the capital programme in further
education. This report outlined some serious ﬁnancial and communication failures in the LSC and DIUS,
conﬁrmed the scale of the gap between budget and demand and made some recommendations to take the
programme forward. On the same day, John Denham accepted the recommendations of the report.15
On 22 April 2009, the LSC national council met and approved a new process for prioritising projects. The
LSC has not yet published the minutes of the meeting.
On 22 April 2009, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Alistair Darling, announced an increase in capital
funding for the LSC of £300 million to enable it to fund a limited number of further projects, starting in
2009–10, through the Building Colleges for the Future programme.16
On 23 April 2009, John Denham, stated that there was HM Treasury approval for DIUS to plan on the
basis that there is £300 million a year from 2011–12 to 2013–14 with ﬁnal budgets to be conﬁrmed in the next
spending review.17
On 24 April 2009, acting LSC Chief Executive, GeoV Russell, wrote to all College Principals outlining
the process and timetable for prioritising capital projects. His letter explains that the LSC national council
meets on 3 June 2009 and hopes to support £750 million of new schemes.
On 29 April 2009, the capital reference group of Principals and Chairs of governing bodies met for the
ﬁrst time to review the process.18
On 8May 2009, Colleges returned questionnaires to the LSC indicating the extent to which their projects
were ready to start in summer 2009.19
On 3 June 2009, the LSC national council meets.
Memorandum 4
157 Group’s initial suggestion in response to the Committee’s open call in February for topics suitable for an
oral evidence session
DIUS Select Committee Topic for April/May
Capital investment for FE Colleges
1. The 157 Group propose that the DIUS Select Committee take oral evidence on the Capital situation
within FE. The 157 Group comprises 26 of the largest GFE Colleges who are rated good or outstanding for
leadership, with a combined budget of £I billion pounds, 500,000 learners and 30,000 staV. Our members
are committed to raising the reputation and providing leadership for the sector as proposed in the Foster
Report.
Our interest in suggesting this topic is to gain a clearer and objective picture of the implications of the
current capital situation across the FE sector and to encourage valuable solutions and suggestions for the
future. Also to encourage equity of capital funding with other sectors, especially school and universities.
157 Colleges are direct beneﬁciaries of capital funding from the Government and several 157 Colleges
have undertaken signiﬁcant capital expansion projects.
2. It is timely to do so following several reviews which will be completed by the end of March but the
situationwill need further clariﬁcation to aid resolution of the complex and serious issues involved. Investing
in capital build in the public sector is a top priority of the Prime Minister, and is timely within the current
recession situation and support to the collapse of the construction industry.
3. The hearing would add value in giving clarity and transparency to an important issue which needs
perspectives, debate and insight from a range of angles to facilitate sector and public conﬁdence in how this
issue is being dealt with.
Considerable focus and investment on achieving a complete redevelopment ad transformation of the
College Estate has been started. FE has been starved of capital funding formany years and needs substantial
and sustained investment to provide an appropriate infrastructure to underpin the crucial skills agenda and
to raise participation rates particularly for 16–19 year olds.
14 http://www.dius.gov.uk/news and speeches/press releases/lsc acting ceo
15 http://www.dius.gov.uk/news and speeches/announcements/fe capital programme.aspx
16 HM Treasury http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/bud bud09 index.htm
17 Conﬁrmed in answer to Parliamentary question 30 April 2009: Column 1477W].
18 http://www.aoc.co.uk/en/Policy and Advisory Work/ﬁnance and statistics/capital funding.cfm
19 Ditto
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This highly popular and crucial investment programme would appear to be in serious jeopardy, the value
of the inquiry would be to ensure changes are being made on the best and most appropriate criteria and in
line with treatment of other sectors, especially schools.
Substantial funding contributions have to be made by colleges made up from reserves, sale of land and
borrowing, all of which has serious and far reaching implications for the future of FE and levels of debt
incurred by Colleges in the recession.
All of which are a matter of public interest and concern.
February 2009
Memorandum 5
Submission from the 157 Group
Further Education Capital Funding Inquiry
Summary
1.
— This inquiry is of critical importance to FE Colleges who have been placed in an untenable
situation which is aVecting learners, communities and the reputation of the sector as a whole.
— Sir Andrew Foster’s Report has been widely welcomed by the sector. However key issues of
funding availability, transparency and proportionality need further exploration.
— The LSC has contributed signiﬁcantly in encouraging FE Colleges above their comfort and risk
records. There is an urgent need to review LSC ﬁnancial management and to provide the sector as
a whole with a clear breakdown of ﬁnancial allocations thus far.
— No further public money should be wasted. This means urgently reviewing agreed contractual
arrangements and honouring them as a priority.
— FE colleges should not be left “out of pocket”, and should be encouraged and rewarded to ﬁnd
alternative routes to transform their own estate and “par down” agreed plans to remove immediate
pressure from the central fund.
— The principle of “proportionality” must be central in any agreed way forward.
— 157 Proposed Criteria.
The 157 Group
2. The 157 Group is a membership organisation representing 26 of the largest successful Further
Education Colleges in the Learning and Skills Sector. The group was formed in 2006 in response to Sir
Andrew Foster’s report on the Future of FE Colleges, where he argued that Principals of large successful
colleges, where the capacity exists, should play a greater role in policy making and improving the reputation
of the sector. The Group has now established itself as a signiﬁcant and inﬂuential voice.We seek to inﬂuence
policy development in education and related policy areas, act as a peer reference network and support the
sector as a whole in quality improvement. The strength and expertise of our providers gives us a particular
insight on sector developments, reinforced by our focus on ensuring that decision makers hear directly the
voice of the front line senior practitioner.We do not see ourselves as a traditional “lobbying body” but rather
an advice and opinion service.
Context
3. The 157Group are pleased that the IUSS Select Committee has chosen to scrutinise Further Education
Capital Funding, currently an issue of critical importance to the Further Education (FE) sector. It is
important, ﬁrst and foremost, to state clearly that the Building Colleges for the Future (BCF) programme
was extremely warmly welcomed across the FE sector. In recent years the extensive funding provided
through the programme has allowed the transformation of large amounts of the FE estate, with the result
that signiﬁcant parts of our sector now have world class buildings to support already excellent provision. It
is therefore more than unfortunate that the unprecedented level of investment in our sector has been
overshadowed by recent events.
4. The 157 Group was pleased to contribute to Sir Andrew Foster’s Review on Capital. We welcomed
the ﬁnal report and agree that swift and appropriate action, which is both transparent and agreed by the
sector, is now the key challenge at hand. We do not therefore wish to use this evidence to conduct a “post
mortem” into the events of the last few months. Rather we see this as an opportunity to progress the capital
issue, and consequently will use this submission to raise the key immediate priorities, often ﬁnancial, of our
members and share the 157 proposed future criteria for prioritisation. A summary of 157member individual
capital situations is available to the committee upon request.
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5. Whilst we wish to be part of a positive dialogue on the future of capital funding, it is worth noting
for the record that the recent well publicised failings of the Learning and Skills Council (LSC) in ﬁnancial
management, communication and transparency have placed numerous providers in an untenable situation,
and we call upon government and its national agencies to review the relationship between the central LSC
oYce, local LSC oYces and DIUS to ensure that such a situation cannot be repeated in future, regardless
of government reorganisation.
6. As a group 157 have reached agreement on a set of overarching criteria on which any prioritisation
should be based. Whilst we welcome the announcement on Capital funds in the 2009 Budget we continue
to seek clariﬁcation on howmuch of the commitment is “newmoney” and howmuch will be needed to fulﬁl
the commitment to the eight projects that have been given the go ahead. It is diYcult to engage the sector
in a discussion on prioritisation without providing a breakdown of the total resources available.
7. Our welcome to the capital funds announced in the budget comes with a signiﬁcant caveat. The £750
million fund allocated to future development projects equates to a tiny proportion of the £5 billion ongoing
FE capital bids; ﬁgures which do little to still divisions over the future funding of FE and concerns that as
colleges are caught between two funding departments, as a result of theMachinery of Government changes,
funding pots may be protectively guarded locally and nationally, with the college sector eVectively “falling
through the cracks”. We would urge that serious consideration is given to the proposition of creating an
overarching capital plan for education, particularly in the context of a Post MOG landscape.
8. Many FE Colleges have been placed in an impossible position by the miscalculation of funding
availability. Signiﬁcant resources have been spent upon detailed project plans and initiation, whilst large
elements of the current estate have been left to deteriorate in the expectation of investment. Colleges now
have fewer resources to undertake improvement works themselves and are having to fund the servicing of
large loans from the eYciency savings arising from only partial redevelopment of their estates. Both these
all too real scenarios are having a negative impact upon current learners, potential recruitment and staV.
The role of LSC local oYces in requiring colleges to develop extensive redevelopment plans has pushedmany
providers beyond their normal risk boundaries with moderate and timely plans being expanded into large
scale, extensive rebuilds.
9. It is absolutely critical that a collectively agreed resolution is identiﬁed and that conﬁdence in a new
process of prioritisation and fund management is built across the sectors component parts—individual
providers, national agencies and government departments. It should not be underestimated how much
recent press coverage has aVected the reputation of the sector in the view of potential learners, employers
and the broader public, potentially damaging our ability to respond to individuals and employers at this
extremely critical time. It is therefore essential that we rebuild the reputation of our facilities and
consequently our oVer.
10. To some extent every individual college scenario is a “special case” worthy of individual
consideration. We note the pragmatic approach of the LSC and their consultants to focus on shovel ready
projects to prioritise the current funding and the more measured approach for other projects that may have
a high beneﬁt to their communities but are at an earlier stage in the development. The real concern is that
currently there is no foreseeable funding for these projects in FE whilst BSF projects will continue.
Key ﬁnancial issues
11. 157 would stress the importance of applying common sense to the ﬁnancial challenge ahead. On
reﬂection it is clear that the ﬁnancial planning of the LSC in relation to capital was fundamentally ﬂawed.
It seems now inconceivable that an original funding allocation of £2.7billion could be divided and indeed
eVectively promised to such a large number of major capital projects. A matter of utmost priority must be
stronger ﬁnancial scrutiny.Wewould suggest that the LSC needs to review its internal ﬁnance capability and
ensure that expert personal are in place to oversee and regulate these critical funds.
12. 157, alongside others in the sector, believe that it is absolutely critical that where clear contractual
arrangements between providers and contractors exist they are speedily met to prevent further signiﬁcant
amounts of public money being diverted from their original purpose into the hands of lawyers and project
managers. At a time of economic downturn the wasting of valuable resources in an attempt to extricate
providers from good faith contracts cannot be justiﬁed. Whilst 157 centrally and our members have pressed
on this issue we are still seeking clarity as to how these issues will be resolved.
13. We would like to see DIUS commit to restoring the status quo ante. That is releasing funds to
providers to cover the costs they have incurred, in many cases running into millions of pounds, at the
encouragement of the LSC, up until this stage. At no stage were individual colleges given access to overall
capital data and consequently spent money in good faith on oYcers’ “promise”.Morally therefore providers
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should be compensated in a transparent and equitable manner. The situation has aVected the sector in its
entirety and we know that in some cases providers are now close to insolvency. We would of course expect
the test of reasonableness to be applied to the risk decisions taken by individual college corporations. The
157 group would want recognition for those colleges who through sound ﬁnancial management and limited
risk taking are seeking support. Equally recognising the size of the challenge some providers are seeking
support for creative solutions to improve their own estate and minimise the sector’s challenge as a whole.
14. Where appropriate, providers should be allowed to develop elements of their estate using
independently raised funding with the assurance government would recognise the signiﬁcance of such a
commitment and acknowledge these in future spending commitments. Such away forwardwould lighten the
pressure of a backlog of capital projects and, in the act of contracting and building, stimulate the economy in
and of itself.
15. The quality of existing estate is a matter of key ﬁnancial concern. Many “Category B” buildings have
been planned for demolition as part of large scale rebuilding plans; these plans must be reviewed in light of
the needs of providers with buildings that are both unsuitable and potentially unsafe.
Transparency and proportionality
16. Few within the sector would disagree that the capital process thus far has been far from transparent.
Despite wide ranging press coverage and a change in LSC leadership, confusion is still abundant. For
example, within the membership of 157, providers have been given varying messages on when feedback on
status will be given. A centrally agreed and consistently locally delivered communication strategy must be
a priority. Time is also of critical importance. Given the resource investment by colleges and already
substantial delays, a quick approval of projects is necessary to prevent planning work, plans and agreements
becoming outdated and obsolete.
17. 157 members are frustrated that capital ﬁnancial data has not been forthcoming. The sector has still
not been able to see full lists of spend per capital funding round. It is our assertion that we must understand
spending patterns this far in order to move forward. That is, we must get our history right before we decide
what the future should be. We call for a deﬁnitive statement of spend thus far year by year and future
commitments as already agreed. Providing such information would be a valuable step in rebuilding the
sectors “ownership” of capital funding.
18. Going forward it is clear that there is a need for a principle of proportionality. 157 members strongly
argue that projects shouldmatch institution size, supported by the expectation that colleges contribute funds
to the project based on realistic and sustainable aVordability criteria, to the project themselves. Such a policy
would equate to managed risk and the better distribution of funding. We are concerned that one response
to the challenge may be to spread remaining capital funds thinly across the sector, assisting a large number
of providers with a small improvement programme. It is crucial that institutions needs are assessed
independently and that those colleges which have a large estate are not eVectively discriminated against in
order to generate a simplistic news headline of assisting a large number of providers in an often insigniﬁcant
way. Additionally any new criteria should recognise the eVorts by colleges to actively reduce the size of
schemes and limit their agreed plans to alleviate funding pressure.
19. The “ﬁrst come, ﬁrst served” approach as identiﬁed by Foster must not be replicated. Transparency
and sector divided prioritisation criteria are therefore key. 157 have begun to scope such criteria.We are keen
to work with partners to co-create and move the situation forward.
157 Proposed Criteria
Overarching Criteria
Once the extent of the government’s commitment to BCF is clariﬁed, we propose the following
overarching criteria to prioritise college capital applications to ensure that the investment goes to the right
colleges for the right reasons.
2.1 Primacy should be given to the quality of the Educational Case
A strongly evidenced Educational Case, which will deliver for communities, learners and employers, must
be the key criterion in approving investment, eg:
— projects with an emphasis on 14-19 growth and contribution to key Government targets relating
to ROCPA, reduction in NEETs, Foundation Learning Tier development and introduction of
Diplomas, etc;
— projects that will have a major impact on educational disadvantage, social inclusion and
community cohesion;
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— projects which are connected to the successful development of other educational sectors and local
and regional economic and social development;
— projects that will promote collaboration and sharing across public services, eg with schools,
universities, and community and public facilities, etc.
Acceptance of the centrality of the Educational Case does notmean that the Property Case is not relevant,
as eg:
— there are many colleges where essential works are a priority to deal with old and unﬁt buildings
that often have serious health and safety issues; and
— account should be taken of plans for innovative, leading edge buildings which facilitate 21st
century learning (ie innovative delivery of integrated learning, skills and related employment
services) and score highly in terms of sustainability and environmental impact.
Such property factors should, however, have a secondary impact on the approval process. It is
undoubtedly the case that many existing applications have been delayed, disrupted, and made much more
expensive by the Property Case being seen as paramount by the LSC
2.2 There must be clear proportionality in the disbursement of capital funds. Large, successful colleges
delivering to many thousands of young people, adults and employers should receive capital support in
proportion to their size, impact and contribution to meeting national education and training targets. There
is clear evidence from the projects already approved, and through those currently in the pipeline, that
proportionality has not been suYciently recognised as a key criterion, with many smaller institutions
receiving disproportionate amounts of investment. The ﬁnancial scope of capital projects should be clearly
related to the size of a college’s revenue budget.
In this context, two other factors are also signiﬁcant:
— Sixth Form College applications, given the eVect of The Apprenticeships, Skills, Children and
Learning Bill 2008–09, should be transferred to the BSF Programme and resources should also be
transferred from BSF to BCF to take account of the costs of Sixth Form College projects already
approved under BCF.
— If capital funds for BCF do become scarce, then the extension of the programme to non-college
and private sector providers is extremely problematic.
2.3 The sharing of ﬁnancial risk and the impact on College ﬁnancial health must both be taken into account
in the revised LSC model.
— The Secretary of State has said in Parliament that many colleges have been “encouraged” by the
LSC to invest signiﬁcant revenue funding in preparing their capital strategies and projects. It has
been estimated that in 2008 alone colleges collectively spent over £100 million on the set-up costs
of their capital projects, a ﬁgure in excess of the combined surpluses of the same colleges. The total
revenue at risk is probably well in excess of £200 million (with members of the 157 Group alone
risking upwards of £100 million). Unless somemeans is found of appropriate reimbursement from
the LSC/DIUS, there is a huge risk to the ﬁnancial stability of many colleges who are well managed
and successful institutions. Legal action may be inevitable if college corporations/boards are to
fulﬁl their ﬁduciary responsibilities.
Extending the building and loan period will put further pressure on colleges for whom the LSC have
already identiﬁed maximum safe borrowing limits. It will also require a bigger contribution from ﬁnancial
institutions already struggling to respond to market demands and will lead to serious ﬁnancial issues for
some colleges.
2.4 An explicit, criteria driven and open allocation system where decisions are transparent and clearly
communicated must be the corner stone of the revised LSC methodology. Much of the diYculties and
disaVection that colleges feel with the current system is directly related to poor communications and a
reluctance to share the basis of application approvals openly with the sector. We would also comment that
the Capital support fund should only be used for supporting capital projects. Exceptional support for other
purposes should have its own transparent and separate fund.
May 2009
Processed: 10-07-2009 22:32:29 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 430288 Unit: PAG2
Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee: Evidence Ev 45
Memorandum 6
Submission from the Learning and Skills Council (LSC)
1. Introduction
This memorandum refers to the FE capital programme, the events relating to its funding and
administration up until the Foster review and the steps now in place to continue the programme.
2. Background
2.1 The purpose of the FE capital programme is to support the refurbishment and renewal of the FE
college estate. The LSC is responsible for the administration of this programme.
2.2 During 2008 it became clear there was an unsustainable rise in demand from colleges for capital
funding. In December 2008 the decision was taken to defer all approvals of capital projects until detailed
work had been undertaken with colleges to establish a fuller understanding of the situation.
2.3 On 23 March Mark Haysom resigned as Chief Executive of the LSC. GeoVrey Russell was
immediately appointed as acting Chief Executive with the immediate task to increase the certainty and
clarity around the capital programme.
2.4. GeoVrey Russell appointed an external team from Grant Thornton to review the ﬁnancial data held
by the LSC about capital projects. He also appointed a new Director of National Projects to take
responsibility for the capital programme and to work with a new sub group of the Council charged with
overseeing the programme.
3. The Foster Review
3.1 When concerns were raised about the future of the funding project the chair of the LSC and the
Secretary of State, DIUS, jointly commissioned Sir Andrew Foster to conduct an independent review. Sir
Andrew was asked to consider the causes of the increased demand for funding, LSC’s internal processes and
the lessons to be learnt for the future.
3.2 Sir Andrew Foster reported his ﬁndings on April 1st. He concluded with eight recommendations:
3.3 Recommendation 1 called for immediate “agreement on how the present demand-led approach can
be supplanted by a needs-based approach with explicit priorities and choice criteria.” The LSC support the
move to a needs-based approach. We have now worked with stakeholders to develop new criteria and
designed a process by which future bids for capital funding will be prioritised. We expect the ﬁrst stage of
the prioritisation process to be ﬁnished by the end of June in order for the LSC to approve a small group of
college projects to proceed this summer. Further information about this process can be found in section 5.
3.4 Recommendation 2 called for “an early and open process of engagement and consultation between
DIUS, the LSC and the college sector.” Since the report the LSC have already started a consultation process
including the use of a reference panel of college principals and representative college groups convened by
the AoC and we are also consulting widely with Regional Development Agencies and local authorities.
3.5 Recommendation 3 called for processes to be “grounded in fully accurate and detailed information
about capital schemes in the pipeline.” He also suggested “there should also be a preliminary mapping of
potential needs indicators to assist the discussion process.” The LSC now has detailed information on all
existing capital schemes and those in the pipeline.We have engagedGrant Thornton to independently verify
the accuracy of the information currently held. We have also worked with specialist advisers who will
independently apply the agreed criteria to projects in the pipeline to provide conﬁdence that the resulting
proposals will be fairly determined.
3.6 Recommendation 4 focused on a realistic assessment being required of individual colleges that have
incurred expenditure, with high expectations, but have no guarantee of ﬁnal approval for their proposals.”
An initial assessment of costs already incurred by colleges with Approval in Principal has been carried out.
LSC regional ﬁnance teams are working with these colleges to establish their ﬁnancial position and to
address any cash ﬂow issues. The LSC has given a commitment that no college will become insolvent as a
result of capital project delays. The LSC and DIUS are developing a policy position on how to deal with
the legitimate costs incurred by colleges where their project may not now proceed in the near future.
3.7 Recommendation 5 stated that in “order to achieve speedy implementation, it will be essential to have
a blended approach of open consultation with the sector, matched by a small dedicated project management
group which drives a highly organised programme across LSC andDIUS levels.” In response a joint project
team involving LSC andDIUS staVwas set up withDavidHughes appointed to take personal responsibility
for LSC’s capital programme, with the additional support of a senior ﬁnance director within the LSC. The
LSC will be making further changes to the way the capital programme is managed which will help in this
transition year from the LSC to the SFA and YPLA. We hope to be able to announce these changes, along
with wider management arrangements shortly.
3.8 Recommendation 6 involved talks being held with HM Treasury. The Budget on April 22nd saw an
announcement of further funding for capital projects.
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3.9 Recommendation 7 called for “future development to take place in the context of a comprehensive
and competent ﬁnancial strategy that supports needs-related planning.” The LSC is working with DIUS,
colleges and stakeholders to assess the priority needs for the future. This assessment will provide, by Spring
2010, clarity on future needs and funding requirements. On this basis, a new ﬁnancial strategy will be
developed for the SFA, YPLA and local authorities to take forward in the discussions for the next
spending review.
3.10 Recommendation 8 asked for “active consideration to be given to the future working arrangements
of the Skills Funding Agency and the Young People’s Learning Agency.” Discussions are underway with
DIUS, DCSF and local authority representatives about the future arrangements for capital in the Skills
Funding Agency and the Young Peoples Learning Agency. The new arrangements include regulation and
oversight of capital by DIUS and DCSF, a new ﬁnancial strategy and best practice procurement methods.
4. Budget 2009
4.1 TheBudget announced additional capital funding of £300m in the current CSRperiod. This will allow
the LSC to give approval to a limited number of projects starting in 2009–10. Recognising the long-term
nature of capital projects, the Government is planning to continue FE capital investment programme in
future years, with a planning assumption of £300 million a year from 2011–12 to 2013–14 to be conﬁrmed at
the next Spending Review. This provides a provisional £1.2 billion in total to 2013–14. Following the Budget
announcement the LSC has written to all College Principals detailing the new funding and how this will be
allocated.
4.2 Although such commitments into the next spending round are provisional, this is welcome news and
should allow us to develop around £750million of new schemes.We feel there are three main areas of interest
to the Select Committee moving forward.
4.2.1 How we intend to use the needs based criteria in relation to the additional £300 million in 2009–10
and 2010–11 to identify those with the most urgent and greatest need projects, as well as the approach we
intend colleges to take in prioritising projects for the next spending review period.
4.2.2 How we support colleges which have incurred costs in developing their project proposal and in
anticipation of their project being approved.
4.2.3 How we ensure we deliver greater value for money on capital projects.
5. Next Steps: Prioritising Projects
5.1 To maintain objectivity we have appointed PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to assist in the drafting
of the LSC’s project selection criteria, as well as in the development of a scoring framework and assessment
process which we hope to use for the ﬁrst time in helping the Council select a group of projects at its meeting
on 3 June 2009.
5.2 The Foster report made it clear that the criteria should be needs-based and set in the wider context
of learning and skills. The LSC has therefore put together draft criteria to reﬂect that recommendation.
5.3 The LSC proposes the following criteria are used to prioritise projects. We will be as inclusive as
possible in consulting on this, but have very tight timescales to meet in order to deal with these urgent issues;
our aim is to ﬁnalise by 15May in order to have newprojects selected at the 3 JuneNational Councilmeeting.
5.4 A key part of the consultation, based on the recommendations in the Foster report, has been
discussions with a panel of college Principals convened with the support of the Association of Colleges. This
panel met on 29th April and provided important input. We are also consulting with the Local Government
Association and the Regional Development Agencies.
5.5 The ﬁrst stage of prioritisation is readiness, Colleges with project applications awaiting in-principle
or detailed approval will be asked if they consider their projects can commence on site within three months
or so. To meet this timetable we have appointed property consultants Lambert Smith Hampton (LSH), to
review all of the capital applications currently extant. Their ﬁrst priority is to identify those projects that are
ready to be on site and building this summer. Projects which pass through the readiness gateway will then
be assessed against the other criteria.
5.6 Criteria.We propose that once readiness is agreed the following criteria are used to prioritise projects:
— Education and skills impact—this criterion assesses the extent to which the project addresses
current and future education and skills need and supports industrial activism.
— Contribution to local economic and regeneration priorities—this criterion considers the wider
economic and regeneration impact of the project.
— Co-dependency with third parties—this criterion looks at the practical implications of not
proceeding with the project and the leverage ratios involved.
— Condition of estate—this criterion evaluates the condition of the existing estate and the impact on
learners and the extent to which they are addressed by the project.
— Value for money—this criterion assesses the extent to which the project demonstrates that it has
gone through a process to maximise value for money.
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5.7 It is clear that the urgent and greatest need projects will not include the majority of college projects
which either have Application in Principle approval, or have been seeking such approval. We will therefore
have a separate process for these and other new proposals from colleges which will provide us with a new
needs-based priority list of projects. That priority list will be used to approve projects as and when funding
becomes available in the next spending review period. We expect this prioritisation process to be based on
the same criteria set out above.
5.8 We propose a swift, streamlined and transparent selection process for the ﬁrst round of project
prioritisation. This process needs to be completed quickly so that projects can start on site as soon as
possible.
6. Next Steps: Incurred Costs
6.1 The LSC recognises that colleges with projects that cannot go forward now for funding in this year
or next may have to write oV some development expenditures in their accounts. The LSC will work with
each college with the help of independent property consultants to assess how the longer term value of
expenditures can be maximised, as well as to understand the nature and extent of any liabilities. Through
its normal ﬁnancial intervention process, the LSC will ensure that no college is unable to meet its ﬁnancial
obligations as a result of decisions on capital projects.
6.2 Once we have a full analysis of the costs incurred and their nature, we will be able to identify those
cases where a contribution to such costs from the LSC may be justiﬁed. The LSC has advised colleges that
they should continue to avoid committing any further expenditure on the development of projects where
there has not been full approval to go forward.
7. Next Steps: Achieving Greater Value for Money
7.1 As with the urgent and greatest need projects, there is no doubt that there has to be a new focus on
achieving value for money as we go forward with this programme. The expectation is that all colleges will
consider the scale, scope and costs of their projects very carefully; with limited funds we will want to ensure
that we maximise the impact for learners, employers and communities in every project we approve.
7.2 We have instructed Lambert Smith Hampton to review all of the projects in the pipeline that are now
unlikely to proceed for the time being so that we can review their scope, scale and timing. We want to have
the best possible information to hand to inform the comprehensive spending review next year when there
may be a further chance to seek additional funds.
7.3 These college-by-college reviews will include detailed analysis of spending on project costs. This will
be an extensive process, as there are potentially more than 150 projects to be considered. The process will
include colleges completing a self-assessment questionnaire. Through bringing in consultants we aim to
complete the work as quickly and as objectively as possible. In the taxpayers’ interest, we will also be very
hard nosed in driving for much better value for money.
May 2009
Supplementary evidence from the Learning and Skills Council
1. TheCommittee would like to know whowas present at the “Ministerial reviews” held on 16 June, 21October
and 16 December; and also who was present at the “ﬁnance stock-take” meetings between senior managers in
DIUS and the LSC Chief Executive and Director of Resources on 12 August and 13 November 2008 (see para
44 of the Foster review).
Ministerial Review Meetings
Ministerial Review meetings are held jointly by the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills
and the Department for Children, Schools and Families. Each meeting is chaired by the Parliamentary
Under Secretary of State for Further Education, and attended by a Minister from DCSF, the Director of
the DIUS Learning and Skills Performance Directorate and a Director from the DCSF Young People’s
Directorate. The LSC is represented by its LSC National Chair, Chief Executive and its key national
directors. Other Ministers and oYcials from both Departments may also attend depending on the agenda.
Financial Stock Take Meetings
Joint DIUS/DCSF ﬁnancial stock take meetings take place approximately once a quarter. These are
oYcial level meetings, and are attended by the Director-General of the DIUS Further Education and Skills
Group, theDirectorGeneral of theDCSF’sYoung People’sDirectorate and theLSCChief Executive. Other
oYcials from both Departments, and from the LSC, may also attend depending on the agenda.
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2. The Committee would also like to know the total value of the projects authorised by the Chief Executive
under his delegated authority for projects under £10million where the LSCwas paying less than 50% of the cost.
The Chief Executive of the LSC has delegated authority to approve capital projects of below £10 million
total project cost and below 50% LSC rate of contribution.
Between October 2003 and December 2008, the total values of the projects approved by the Chief
Executive under his delegated authority were £420,643,053 in total project costs and £115,904,615 in LSC
contributions.
3. Further Education Capital Budgets (table on next page).
The “Other Sector Capital Investment” is Information Learning Technology spend (JANET costs, etc),
LEA Loans Liabilities, our own IT System Development Costs and expenditure of Financial Support for
Colleges (hence the large increase in 2009–10 where we have made an extra £70 million available to mitigate
abortive costs/impact on colleges of the current Capital Position).
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Further Education Capital Budgets
LSC Budget LSC Planning Assumptions Treasury Planning Assumptions
Financial Year 2007–08 £’000s 2008–09 £’000s 2009–10 £’000s 2010–11 £’000s 2011–12 £’000s 2012–13 £’000s 2013–14 £’000’s
Original Grant Letter Budget 595,800 694,400 819,800 849,800 tbc tbc tbc
Subsequent Amendments:
Funding Brought Forward
—Fiscal Stimulus (PBR 2008–09) 0 110,000 0 (110,000) 0 0 0
—Additional Funding (Feb 2009) 0 22,000 (22,000) 0 0 0 0
—Additional Funding (March 2009) 0 10,000 (10,000) 0 0 0 0
Budget 2009
—Treasury Investment 0 0 167,000 0 300,000 300,000 300,000
—DIUS EYF Stock 0 0 100,000 0 0 0 0
—DIUS/LSC Reprioritisation 0 0 63,000 14,000 0 0 0
DIUS/LSC In-Year Budget 36,300 1,900 0 0 0 0 0
Management
Revised Budget Total 632,100 838,300 1,117,800 753,800 300,000 300,000 300,000
Of which . . .
16–18 Capital 166,000 210,000 210,000 240,000 tbc tbc tbc
FE Capital Fund 283,000 508,887 717,600 408,100 300,000 300,000 300,000
Specialisation Funds 70,030 47,213 68,000 55,000 tbc tbc tbc
Other Sector
Capital Investment 113,070 72,200 122,200 50,700 tbc tbc tbc
Total 632,100 838,300 1,117,800 753,800 300,000 300,000 300,000
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Capital 2007–08
£’000’s Movement to:
Grant Letter 595,800
LSC Budget Change 10 "4,000 16–18 Sector Rationalisation
LSC Budget Change 20 "10,000 Capital Grants
LSC Budget Change 23 35,000 FE Capital Buildings Systems
LSC Budget Change 23 19,000 Development
Virement 08/NO/108 "3,700 from Assets Capitalised to Systems Development
632,100
Source: LSC Financial Planning 15 May 2009.
Annex B
The Affordability of Capital Contributions From Colleges and From the Learning and Skills
Council
Purpose
1. The overall purpose of this paper is to:
— Consider the aVordability of the current system of capital support (or capital grant) payments to
Further Education Colleges within the context of the current aVordability policy of the Council,
and in the light of current situation, set out options and recommend policies for consideration by
the Council.
Method
2. This paper:
— summarises the background to the current position;
— presents the evidence about:
— the rising curve of College demand for Capital funds;
— the future capital contributions likely to arise from Applications in Principle already agreed;
— the demand curve for capital funds arising from Council contributions;
— present and discuss a simple simulation model that predicts the future demand for funds from
projects agreed now and in the future, taking the pattern of capital payments and slippage
into account; and
— calculate and comment upon the emerging position about college demand for funds, if
nothing changes.
— discusses these issues;
— develops capital policy payment options which will alter the relationship between the level of
projects agreed and the pattern of payments due;
— proposes a few further calculations on college aVordability in the light of these options, and
— recommends capital policy changes that will increase the manageability of the capital payments
system and will ensure that the Learning and Skills Council can continue to manage its capital
budget within the available funds despite the increasing volatility of capital claims from colleges.
Background
3. The Government has continually funded research into the eVects of education upon employability
and income.
4. The LSC has conducted research into the eVects of new capital investment on the delivery of education
and training.
5. The Learning and Skills Council has known for some years that the level of annual capital funds made
available to the LSC are programmed to increase signiﬁcantly.
6. In response to that increase, the LSC developed an “AVordability Policy” which seeks to maximise
value for money by requiring each college to borrow an “aVordable” loan (which is aVordable in that
college’s circumstances) to help ﬁnance the capital project.
7. That aVordability concept has a second signiﬁcance, because the demand for capital funds from
colleges must be aVordable to the LSC, and the total annual demand for capital funding must be managed
within the annual capital funds made available to the Council by the Government.
8. The demand for capital funds has increased signiﬁcantly in recent years in response to that
AVordability Policy, which has created a stable regime for college investment. The two key questions are:
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— Are these increases in College capital investments enough to bring the demand for Council capital
funds into line with the supply, or are they too much or too little?
— Given the volatility of capital claims arising from capital project slippage (deﬁned as project
delivery later than planned) and the rising trend of demand for capital funding, how can LSC
policy develop in order to:
— increase the manageability of the system, while
— preserving and enhancing the conditions for the rapid capital development of the FE sector?
Evidence
The “Applications in Principle” Projects
9. There were 60 Applications in Principle (AiPs) with a total value of £2,536,270,144 and a projected
Council contribution of £1,743,413,183 (68.7%) but a closer analysis of these projects by the Regional
Property Advisors led to two of these projects (with a total value of £127,411,067) being re-classiﬁed as
defunct. That left 58 AiPs with a total value of £2,408,859,077.
10. The RPAs have also conducted a sample analysis of these projects where phasing information is
readily available. That analysis shows that:
— AiP projects coming forward for detailed submissions are now expected to have, on average, a 22%
price increase above the originally agreed budgets.
— About 14% of the total value of these capital projects have already come forward and have been
agreed in detail by the National Capital Committee.
— It is forecast that the future distribution of capital project values arising from AiPs will be:
Table 1
FORECAST ALIP TOTAL BUDGETS 2009–12
Year Ending
2009 2010 2011 2012
% of total 62.1% 17.5% 5.0% 1.4%
£m 1,496 421 121 33
30% slipped 1,047 608 267 104
!22% costs 1,227 742 327 126
The rising curve of College demand for Capital funds
11. From the record of the 2002–08 period, there is an obvious link between the total annual volume of
capital projects and the LSC contribution. So long as the average contribution level remained at between
28% and 35%, the annual demand for capital projects ranged around £500 million to £625 million. As the
aVordability systemwas ﬂexed in 2006–07 to an average rate of 41%, demand rose to £718million and when
the contribution rose to 59% in 2007–08, demand rose to £1.095 billion for the ﬁrst nine months of the year
and will reach over £1.15 billion in the full year of 2007–08.
12. One way of examining this issue is to plot the increase in the total budget value of all capital projects
Agreed in Detail (AiDs) along with the average LSC contribution through the 2002–03 to 2007–08 period.
The result is shown in Chart 1 below, where the left hand scale should be the average percentage of Council
contribution (£200 million on the left scale is 20% capital contribution on the right scale, £400 million on
the left scale is 40% capital contribution on the right scale, and so on). So long as the average contribution
level remained at between 28% and 35%, the annual demand for capital projects ranged around £500million
to £625 million. As the aVordability system was ﬂexed in 2006–07 to an average rate of 41%, demand rose
to £718 million and when the contribution rose to 59% in 2007–08, demand rose to £1.095 billion for the
ﬁrst ninemonths of the year andwill reach over £1.15 billion in the full year of 2007–08. It is clear that higher
Council contributions are associated with better aVordability of the capital programmes by colleges and
hence much higher total project budgets.
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13. This point can be made more clearly by graphing the average LSC contribution level against the total
value of capital project that year. The results are shown in Chart 2. An approximate line can be drawn
through these points, with the equation:
Total Annual Value of Capital Projects% (% CC -15) times 33.
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Chart 2 - Total Project Value vs LSC contribution
In other words, at a 60% capital contribution, the annual total of project funds agreed can be
calculated as:
%(60"15) times 33% 45 times 33%£1,485 million.
While at an LSC capital contribution of 30%, total projects agreed becomes:
% (30"15) times 33% 15 times 33% £495 million.
The implications of these observations are:
— Every 1% increase in capital grant may be associated with an increase in total capital project value
of £33 million and vice versa.
— The total level of capital demand can be controlled by increasing or reducing the Council
Contribution (for example, a Council contribution of 45% would produce a total annual capital
project value of about £1 billion per annum).
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— Because the level of capital project demand is linked to the percentage contribution, it is possible
further to calculate the approximate annual increase in Council commitments arising from capital
demand, as follows:
Council Contribution 30% 45% 60%
Total projects pa (£m) 500 1,000 1,500
Additional Council commitment (£m) 150 450 900
— Because of this linkage, Council commitments increase according to the formula:
(Contribution times (contribution -15) times 30)/100
or if contribution% c
Additional Council grant commitment in £m% (30*c(c-15))/100.
— The graph of that relationship is illustrated in Chart 3 below.
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Inputs to the LSC Capital Payments Simulation Model
14. Previously, the LSC has used a simulation model to forecast the total annual demand for capital
grants arising from previous capital commitments and the forecast new projects. This is not a simple
procedure because:
— For existing payments, slippage shifts the attempted payment of capital grants over three years
into a ﬁve-year pattern.
— For future payments,
— forecasts about projects always predict a rush of projects in the near future, and that rush has
never materialised in practice,
— slippage further discounts the future payments into a ﬁve year pattern.
The EVect of Slippage
15. The LSC planned payment schedule usually involves payments of 10% in year one with the rest
equally divided into the next two subsequent years. But projects are only agreed part way (on average half
way) through year one, and during a six month period, at best only about 5% of the grant can be claimed.
With 40% year one slippage, this reduces to 3.0% paid in year one, leaving (if the average grant is 60%) 57%
to be paid in equal amounts during years one and two, or 28.5% during each year. But if 30% slippage occurs,
then only 70% of 23.5% will be paid or about 20%. This leaves 37% for year three, but 30% slippage again
reduces that to 26%, leaving 11% for year four, which 30% slippage further reduces to about 7% in year four
and 4% in year ﬁve. Hence the attempted pattern of payment changes into actual payments as follows:
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Table 2
THE EFFECT OF SLIPPAGE ON CAPITAL PAYMENT SCHEDULES
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Attempted 10% 25% 25%
Observed 3% 20% 26% 7% 4%
Forecast of the LSC Year-end 2007–08
16. An estimates of the year-end expenditure and slippage factor for 2007–08 can be made as follows:
£m
Current expenditure on capital support grants for period 9 199
Forecast expenditure to year end (%199.43*12/9)! 65*.03 263
Forecast expenditure and commitments 483
Slippage to year end 45%
Budget 303
Possible FE underspend/acceleration required before year end 20
17. The capital grant commitment of the Council during 2007–08 is summarised at Table 3 below, which
shows the starting position of £701million commitment at the start of the year, reduced by in-year payments
of 303 million and increased by new commitments of £690 million (% 60% contribution towards of total
projects of £1.16 billion agreed in detail during FY 2007–08) to result in a predicted year end LSC grant
commitment of £1,088 million.
Table 3
TOTAL CAPITAL GRANTS DUE 2007–08
Year Start Paid oV New Year end
Commitments in-year commitments commitments
2007–08 701 303 690 1,088
18. At ﬁrst sight it looks as if the repayment rate is about 43% (% 303/701) but that calculation is too
high because:
— Capital payments at present are being paid oV wherever possible in two years rather than three.
— The £303 million includes accelerated payments of about £120 million, with net claims of £183
million.
— Taking account of these factors, the actual repayment rate of mature projects previously agreed
seems to be about 15% to 25% and that implies a four to ﬁve year payment period for the
average project.
Inputs and Outputs of the Simulation Model
Assumptions
19. From the above considerations, we can calculate the inputs to the simulation model and make
estimates of the adequacy of the LSC capital budget against the likely demand. If we assume that:
— The total budget of capital projects could rise, given the evidence, to be as shown in the
following table:
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
1,500 1,400 1,300 1,200 800 600 400
— The attempted payment proﬁle will remain as now (averaging 10%,25%,25%).
— Slippage is likely to average 30% and the eVect on Council grant payments is set out at table 2
above.
— Existing commitments will slip to a similar pattern.
We can then calculate the budget shortfall or underspend.
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Results—Provisional
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Commentary on Chart 4
20. A reasonable test of any forecasting model is whether it successfully predicts the recent past. At ﬁrst
sight the model fails because the predicted out turn for 2008 is £226 million. However the actual out turn
for 2007–08may be only about £183million and the only way that claims expenditure may reach about £300
million is because capital projects that are in build are being paid for over two years rather than three. This
has a knock-on eVect on the following year of 2008–09 and about £120 million of claims that would have
been in that year were paid the previous year. Claims during 2008–09 are likely to be within the available
FE capital funds because of that eVect.
21. From 2010 to 2013 however, if current policies did not change and the tempo of capital projects is
maintained, the demand for capital grant payments moves in 2010–11 up to £450 million above the funds
available for FE projects. This simply proves that the continuation of the current payment proﬁle of projects
is unaVordable to the Council.
22. It should be noted that demands for capital funds may not actually decline as illustrated in chart 4
because the demand for funds is only being modelled for the seven year period 2008 to 2014 and the
predictions beyond 2014 although they represent Council liabilities may well not reﬂect future Council
policies.
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
£ 
m
ill
io
n
2008    2009     2010    2011     2012    2013    2014     2015    2016     2017    2018
FE funds
Av incl 16-19
Demand
Chart 5 - Forecast Demand with 50% Council Contribution Over Five Years
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Commentary on Chart 5
23. Suppose that 2008 was not a freak high year for capital projects and that the level of detailed projects
agreed rises to and remains at £1,400 million a year. What policies could cope with that level of demand?
24. If capital grant Council contributions reduce to 50% and are paid equally over ﬁve years then the
pattern of claims payments are as shown in chart 5 above. If the policy of accelerated payments continues,
then it can be shown that the entire demand for capital grants can be coped with.
25. A reduction in Council contribution to 50%, however, would probably reduce any funding diYculty
to nil because the annual level of capital projects would fall to about £1 billion. That would be undesirable.
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Commentary on Chart 6
26. If we consider the level of contribution and the resulting level of demand from colleges
simultaneously, it seems probable that the levels of Council contribution that would meet the availability
of fundingwould be a contribution of 55% to 57%. If payments are equally spread over ﬁve years, that would
create the headroom tomeet all likely capital claimswhile increasing themanageability of the capital budget
system. Chart 6 shows the likely outcome of a 55% to 57% contribution—capital projects averaging £1,350
million a year and accelerated payments in the early years balancing out the funding gap in later years.
Possible policies
27. The following mix of capital project policies is recommended for consideration.
— The average level of Council contribution should be reduced from 60% to about 55% to 57% in
order to stabilise capital project demand at a high and sustainable level (of about £1,350 million).
— The Council should increase the manageability of the capital claims system by extending the
payment period for all new projects to a ﬁve year period.
— The Council should consider oVering a slightly increased grant in order to cover the increased
interest costs of college loans due to later Council payments.
— Capital projects should not require a College to contribute cash to a project that would reduce
College cash days below 50. Higher cash days should be kept in hand to enable higher levels of
interim borrowing.
— The Council should continue to reserve the right to payoV projects early if the capital funds
available to the LSC so permit.
— The Council should consider making aVordability more certain by relating the capital borrowing
to an appropriate range of years of college accounts but adjusting the college borrowing
percentages required to produce a broadly neutral eVect.
— TheCouncil should continue tomonitor the slippage level, the level of capital project grants agreed
and the eVects of these changes in order to feed back further changes into the system as required.
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Conclusions
28. The reduction in ﬂexibility of FE Capital budgets will mean, if about £100m of the FE budget is not
restored, that either the FE renewal programme must be slowed down or prioritising or rationing must be
introduced.
29. These recommended capital policy changes increase themanageability of the capital payments system
and if adopted will help to ensure that the Learning and Skills Council can continue to manage its capital
budget within the available funds despite the increasing volatility of capital claims from colleges.
February 2008
Memorandum 7
Letter from Graham Stringer MP, Member, Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee to the
Rt Hon John Denham MP, Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills
Following our exchange at the Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee on Wednesday, I
agreed that I would write to you with some examples of where I thought the demand led nature of both the
capital and revenue programmes at the Learning and Skills Council had led to relatively aZuent areas
receiving a disproportionate amount of funding when compared to deprived inner city areas such as
Manchester.
I gave the example of Bournemouth and Poole on £102 million, within Greater Manchester, Aquinas
College (a small selective Catholic college) has received £40 million and Stockport College has received £20
million with a further £52 million already allocated. This compares starkly with the money allocated for
Manchester College. Other obvious examples are East Surrey College on £55 million, Hasting College of
Arts and Technology £72 million, Herefordshire College of Technology £30 million, Hertford Regional
College £27 million, compared to a trivial £23–4 million for Bradford College. One could go on.
I also mentioned the funding methodology and Student Learner Number (SLN) applications. Our
Government’s objectives are to intervene and engage where there is disadvantage. Why then does the
Learning and Skills Council methodology not support this aim? Manchester College covering the areas of
highest deprivation within Greater Manchester has received a much lower ratio than many colleges in
GreaterManchester. TheManchester College SLN ratio is 1.32. Colleges coveringmuchmore aZuent areas
receive more funding via this formula: Stockport 1.68; Bury 1.48; Cheadle andMarple 1.65. Other inner city
colleges also have similarly lower SLN ratios ie Newcastle on 1.27 and SheYeld on 1.25.
On top of all this, if I use Manchester College as an example again, the Government wants it to increase
its learner numbers but its Additional Learning Support (ALS) as a proportion of overall funding has
decreased by 10%. This seems perverse when a recent inspection found its ALS to be outstanding.
I am copying this letter to Phil Willis and the Committee Clerk as part of the evidence to our inquiry and
I will do similarly to your reply, which I will look forward to.
May 2009
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